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ITS broad, winding river, crossed by a multitude of bridges; its surrounding hills, amongst which stands conspicuous the long line of the Hradcine, topped by a continuous stretch of stately buildings with the cathedral of St. Vitus towering above them; the wide expanse of its numerous streets, over which rise the spires of many churches, ancient towers, and the lofty walls of numerous municipal and university buildings; the long history to which its architecture bears everywhere striking witness and of which its inhabitants are justly proud, rendered the city of Prague a no less fitting background for the eighth philosophical Congress than that which Oxford provided four years ago for the seventh. Nor was the hospitality which Czechoslovakia offered to its members a whit less cordial or less generous than that of England. The delegates who gathered together from all parts of Europe, from America, China, and from Japan, were welcomed both by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Beneš, by the Minister of Public Instruction, Dr. Krčmář, by the Mayor of Prague; and, were it not for his unfortunate illness, would have been received by the President of the Republic himself. The Společenský club was placed at their disposal. They were entertained at the Foreign Office to tea, and at the palace of the President to supper by his daughter, Dr. Alice Masaryk. Their railway fares and even their tram fares were considerably reduced. On Thursday they were conveyed by motor-cars to Konopišté, a beautiful castle, soaring above pine forests and overlooking an extensive lake, formerly the residence of the Archduke Franz-Ferdinand, now taken

over by the State, but maintained exactly as it was when the unfortunate heir of the Emperor Franz-Joseph was living there. The arrangements for the Congress were excellent, thanks to its President, Dr. Rádl, and to an extremely efficient organizing committee which placed itself unreservedly and unremittingly at the disposal of the 350 active and 150 associated members who attended the various meetings.

The subjects to be discussed by the Congress were divided into eight groups: (A) Logic; (B) Norm and Reality and the Methods of Natural Science; (C) Religion and Philosophy; (D) the Crisis in Democracy; (E) the Mission of Philosophy; (F) Psychology, Pedagogy, Aesthetic and Language; (G) the Theory of Knowledge and of Values; (H) Organization. In the morning the Congress was addressed on one or other of these topics by two selected speakers, who spoke for an hour each, after which there was an open discussion in which each member participating—to the relief of the audience but to the discomfort of the more verbose—was restricted to a speech of five minutes. In the evenings the Congress broke up into groups which were addressed for a quarter of an hour each by a succession of five or six speakers, and a discussion either followed each speech or was withheld until all had spoken.

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Nominally, at least, the Congress had an aim—a practical aim. In inviting it to Prague, its organizers expressed the hope that its deliberations would have some practical issue, political, social, and moral, for the world at large. It is by philosophy, they urged, that the world should be directed, as Plato pointed out. On our arrival we were handed a bulky packet, containing over a hundred résumés of the papers which were shortly to be read, amongst them a "Philosophical Programme," drawn up by thirteen Czechoslovak philosophers. In it they set forth the principles which formed the basis of their own public activity, and of that of the distinguished philosopher-President of their nation, whose followers they claimed to be. Present-day philosophy, they alleged, suffers from excessive intellectualism and neglects the practical obligations of civilized life. It is descriptive, contemplative, analytical, abstract, theoretical, depersonalized, whereas it ought to "lead public life towards clear, theoretically elaborated, but also practical goals." As it is, philosophy exists for the philosopher's sake; it ought to exist in order to serve humanity and to be its guide alike in science, art, literature, politics, morals, and obedience to God.

It was on the same thesis that Czechoslovakia's distinguished Foreign Minister laid emphasis in his inaugural address. He hoped that the discussions in which so many eminent philosophers would

engage might throw some valuable light on the unprecedented confusion in which the world finds itself to-day, alike in the domains of thought, of morality, of economics, and of politics, and not least in the domain of international politics. For my own part, said Dr. Beneš, I have ever been opposed to experimentalism and opportunism, for I am convinced that all political action should be inspired by determinate philosophic and moral thought, applicable to all civilized political societies. It is only the cynic who would identify political action with the maintenance of power at whatever cost or with the acquisition of wealth at the expense of others, oblivious of the fact that social life comprises spiritual as well as material factors, and that the aim of political strife should not be the subordination of spirit to matter but its victory over matter. All regimes have advantages and inconveniences, but the real question is "whether or not we accept as the true basis of modern civilized societies the idea that one of the essential ends of human activity is progressive development towards individual liberty and towards the expansion and inviolability of human personality, with the necessary reserve relative to the rights of other individuals and of the community—in accordance with classical formulae and with all the logical conclusions drawn from them by the philosophy of the 18th and 19th centuries." The so-called crisis in democracy was not in Dr. Beneš' view so much a crisis of institutions as a crisis of men, of democrats themselves. It arose from the difficulty of finding leaders who were true democrats and of finding adequate means and methods whereby to safeguard in the highest degree human liberty and at the same time to reconcile it with the collectivist tendencies of modern societies and States.

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It was evident from the outset that the crisis in democracy was destined to be the main topic to which the Congress would devote its attention. It was to be expected, too, that in the daily discussions of this topic, to which the largest room in the Faculty of Arts was devoted, the representatives of that nation which inaugurated the era of democracy in Europe toward the close of the eighteenth century should play a prominent part. Almost half the papers dealing with democracy emanated from France; four from Paris, two from Lille, and one from Besançon. All were agreed that the chief aim of democracy is the safeguarding of human liberty; and Professor Basch of Paris was at pains to show that, though art, save in Greece, has in fact flourished ill under democratic regimes, it at any rate ought to flourish where liberty prevails, and may possibly, when every citizen has become truly free, really equal, and has also been

properly educated, be able to do so and even to evolve a new *art de la Cité.*

But what is democracy? And what is that liberty which it is the chief aim of democracy to preserve?

To define democracy as "that regime in which one attempts to make a people believe that it governs itself," is a jest that is not without profound wisdom, said Professor Barthélemy of Paris. He would himself define it, however, to be "the regime in which the greatest possible number of the members of a group participate in the most direct way possible in the administration of common interests." But the second part of his definition admittedly presents a difficulty. Direct decisions by a people on problems of public interest are impracticable. Semi-direct decisions, by means of a plebiscite or referendum, are cumbrous. Yet the alternative—representative government—is more remote than either from the logical ideal which the definition sets forth. Moreover, the astonishing impotence of parliamentarianism has led many to think that there is something wrong with the central machinery of democratic government. All that Dr. Barthélemy would insist upon, therefore, as essential to democracy is that hereditary rulers should be excluded, that the participation of the governed should be express, and that each individual shall participate in an equal way.

The other delegates from Paris were of much the same mind. Democracy and parliamentary rule are by no means synonymous, said Professor Guy-Grand. Democracy has to reconcile two ideas, those of liberty and of sovereignty, and there are two ways of doing this. If it be on the rights of the individual and the liberties of the citizen that emphasis is laid, the distinctive note of such a democracy will be *liberal.* But we may also conceive democracy as *massive,* and in that case concede rights only to the sovereignty of the people, realized in the nation, race, or proletariat, and handed over to some chief. In the one case we conceive democracy after the manner of Rousseau as a *popular absolutism*; in the other after the manner of Hobbes, as the absolutism of a *prince.*

Dr. Parodi agreed. "Dictatorship and democracy are not mutually exclusive," he said, "provided it is from the people itself that the dictatorial power emanates." A dictator or a party may realize what is to the general interest better than the citizens themselves, and they, realizing that he realizes it, may acclaim him as virtually their delegate. But, since it is essential to democracy not only that a nation should take itself for end and be the mistress of its own destiny, but that a national organism formed of citizens should participate in sovereignty, a dictatorship is justified only in time of crisis. In the long run a dictatorship will either return to democratic institutions, to freedom of inquiry and of criticism and to repre-

sentative government, or it will be false to the unanimity on which it is based, and will develop into a monarchy properly so-called.

For Professor L. Rougier of Besançon the two principles essential to democracy are those of (1) *popular sovereignty*—rulers must derive their power from popular delegation, and (2) *the control of governmental action by the governed*. This latter principle, in his opinion, the *Führer-princip* violates; for without freedom of the Press and freedom of association there can be no control of governmental action. The choice between a totalitarian and a democratic State is the choice between a *directed* public opinion and one that is allowed freely to form itself amongst the public at large. Both have advantages, but a directed public opinion becomes subservient, induces in the masses the mentality of the courtesan, and, in encouraging a nation to believe that a patrimony common to all peoples is peculiar to itself, destroys mutual understanding and endangers both civilization and peace.

Liberty implies freedom of association, freedom of the Press, and the right to criticize governmental action. It implies also, for Professor Barthélemy, that the law shall leave to the individual a domain in which he shall be free to act as he pleases. Law is essential if liberty is to be maintained. Hence, with Montesquieu, liberty may be defined to be "the right to do anything which the law permits." Liberty and law are thus reconciled nominally. But there must also be in a democracy, said Professor Guy-Grand, equilibrium between the rights of the individual and the rights of the society to which he belongs. It is just this, however, that it is so difficult to establish and maintain; and neither the account which Professor Henri Gouhier (Lille) gave of the ideas which underlay the French Revolution and of their subsequent development, nor yet Dr. Barthélemy's frank acknowledgment of the impotence of the parliamentary system was encouraging.

The tone of the papers read by representatives of Czechoslovakia sounded more hopeful, yet their enthusiasm for democracy as it is was not unqualified. Democracy, said Dr. J. B. Kosák of Prague, is "not to be confounded with its institutional and constitutional instruments," nor yet with political parties, of which many have allied themselves with a liberalistic capitalism from which in the name of democracy they must be severed. Similarly, Dr. Joseph Fisher, having assigned as the moral and philosophical basis of democracy the synthesis of universalism and individualism, admitted that in the social sphere and in the sphere of economics, this equilibrium is very far from having been established. If the *subject* of to-day is to become the *citizen* of to-morrow, economics must be controlled by society, which means Socialism, Dr. Fisher claimed.

Professor Glenn Morrow of Illinois, approached the question of

democracy from the standpoint of liberalism. Its heart was still sound. It still found in human personality the chief source of value, refused to worship the State, and resolutely treated it as but a powerful instrument in securing the fundamental conditions of social life. Classical liberalism, however, had erred in trusting too much to man's reasonableness, and in clinging too tenaciously to the practical inventions of its predecessors. Whether liberalism is necessarily committed to parliamentary systems may well be questioned. Freedom of speech is sacred to it, but it has no real stake in permitting the radio and the Press to fall into the hands of an interested group. An unprejudiced and flexible liberalism should also countenance a much larger measure of control over the economic processes than the older liberalism would welcome.

No one seemed to be entirely satisfied with democracy as it is, but there were only two practical suggestions as to how it should be modified in order to meet present-day needs, one emanating from America and the other from France. Both involved a dualism, though of a different kind, and both had affinities with Fascism.

Professor Montague of New York advocated as "an escape for democracy" the establishment of an *economic* dualism in the shape of fascistic communes in which the unemployed shall be free to enlist for a period of years, during which they will be subject to strict discipline and will be economically insulated from the rest of the community, except in so far as it must support them until they can support themselves—a project that to some critics suggested a revival of slavery.

Professor Lavergne of Lille proposed that "in order to put an end to the weakness of the democratic State," there should be a *second universal suffrage*. As human beings all men are equal and have equal political rights, but all men must also have recourse to the public services, in respect to which they may be either private consumers or professional producers. Moreover, the general interest is very different from the sum or mean of private interests, and where it is sacrificed to a coalition of individual interests, a community cannot prosper. In addition to its individualistic base the State requires a second support and base, the will and the competence of all the *élites* and of all bodies whose culture and disinterestedness renders them capable of discerning and of willing the general good. There should be, therefore, not only an *individual* suffrage, but also a *social* suffrage, which should take account of superior human values. In this second suffrage representatives should be chosen by organized bodies grouped under three heads, scientific, practical or economic, and social.

From the views expressed by those who professedly spoke on behalf of democracy we must now pass to those expressed by repre-

sentatives of totalitarian States. Signor Bodrero of Padua said that in his opinion the crisis in democracy was due to a wrong conception of democracy and to the fact that States which admitted universal suffrage were often governed by the wrong people. Democracy illustrated Graham's law: bad money tends to displace the good. The concept of the essential goodness of man, embodied in universal suffrage, makes the idea of the State immanent, not transcendent. It confuses what is good with what is actual, and pulverizes the State into disparate atoms. As Kant denied that there is knowledge of things-in-themselves, so there is no thing-in-itself recognized by the liberal democratic State, with the result that it has no principle that can save it in time of crisis.

Materialism also has invaded the activities of democratic States, which regard property, not as a religious fact, but as a material or economic fact, freed from any sort of moral or political obligations. The bourgeoisie, in granting universal suffrage, did so in order to save their own possessions. Yet no property is absolute if the holding of it be contrary to public interest. Social justice is of a higher order than private interests or private wealth, and of justice the State alone is arbiter. We want others to participate, concluded Signor Bodrero. We await the last word which shall relieve us from the bestiality of social life and shall restore to us the ideal of harmony, justice, and peace.

A revolution, said Signor Redano of Rome, is the coming of the people into their universality. This universality is the State or nation as expressive of the general will, the universal will of Hegel. This is not the will of a multiplicity of individuals, which, though it has force, also has weakness and is often the voice of the least competent. Will is not feeling. Nor from the clash of many wills and many interests is it possible to obtain that unity of will which is requisite for effective political action. In a well-conceived spiritual organism all think and feel, but only *one* wills, interpreting and directing all minor faculties with the maximum of respect for human liberty provided no harm is done to the State.

There was no paper dealing expressly with the democratic crisis from the German point of view. Dr. Feldkeller of Berlin, in a paper entitled *Geophilosophie und Historiurgie*, dealt with a much wider theme, the nature of true philosophy, which is, he said, the only means whereby men can be raised from materialism, superstition, and myth to genuine freedom of spirit. Such a philosophy is not that of Marx, but that of Plato, Buddha, and Hegel, whose philosophy is a living thing which appeals not to any particular race but to mankind as a whole. We are not at the end of a culture-period, as Spengler asserts, but at the beginning, as Keyserling claims, and the chief danger is that mere intellect may gain the victory over spirit.

The remaining paper, which was read under the head of the crisis in democracy, was by Professor Vuk-Pavlović of Zagreb. In it he contrasted *politics*, which seeks to preserve inequality, supposes dependence, strives to keep others down, and envisages only legality, with *education*, which seeks to bring about equality and independence, strives to raise others up, and is concerned not with legality but morality. The paper was a forceful plea for free as opposed to State education, but had little to do directly with the main topic.

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Another subject which aroused considerable interest was that of Religion and Philosophy. The two addresses which were given on Wednesday morning by Fr. Przywara,[1] S.J., of Munich and by Professor Brunschvicg of Paris, were reviewed at considerable length by the Prague papers on the following morning. Fr. Przywara distinguished three possible ways of conceiving philosophy, and over against each set a concept of religion which contrasted with it and yet was connected with it. Philosophy is concerned with the world itself, with its ultimate ground, with the "first and last" conceived as a necessity which holds for all actual orders. Religion is concerned with God Himself, with the reality of the world as ordered by God, with the "first" as Creator and the "Last" as Judge. Yet it is the actual that makes the necessary knowable; and the religious concept of God is the "pre-form" of the abstract philosophic absolute. Again, philosophy strives after an insight into ultimate necessity, whether conceived as categories or relations or unconditioned ground; whereas religion passes from belief to obedience, in complete surrender to the unseen coherence of the divine will; which is thus superimposed upon the philosophical idea of necessary connection. Thirdly, philosophy derives its questions from actual existence, it originates in man, whereas religion originates in free grace. Philosophy considers ever-creativeness in the creature, religion the ever-being-created through the agency of the creative God; and without this the creature would become but the ever-vanishing expression of a divine immanence.

Professor Brunschvicg began by distinguishing the idealist attitude towards religion from the positivist attitude. For the one, *religions* (plural) imply a knowledge of a transcendent reality which is bound up with a knowledge of transcendent truth. In the other, *religion* (singular) is discussed as a human function on the same basis as science or ethics, and is judged by the same norms; all dogmas must be demonstrated by reason—a view which inevitably leads to scepticism, for there are many dogmatisms, all of which move

[1] Pronounced something like *chivāra*.

in a closed circle of unproven hypotheses. If the cause of religion is not to be compromised, it must not be defended on the *terrain* of profane thought. It must construct itself from the outset on its own basis, without appeal to that worldly wisdom which St. Paul condemned. Nor can it ignore the existence of religions in the plural.

For religion there is no other basis but religion itself. Its content and its basis are identical. It is the *Word,* the interior Light which illumines all men and gives coherence to their thoughts. There is that within us which renders intelligence something quite other than a passive accumulation of images, and love something quite other than an instinctive up-gush. Philosophy can have no God save the Word, comprised in that immanence which assures its perfect spirituality. Hence it can have no relation to external forms which make it dependent on spatio-temporal conditions and which drag religious thought back into the lower regions of matter and life. To regard God as a transcendent and all-powerful Being, whose anger may be averted and His grace merited so that we may enjoy in a posthumous eternity a rest that is refused us here below, is to make puny man the principle centre of the Almighty's interest. To regard God as the cause of the world as we apprehend it in space and time is to convert an abstract and immanent principle into an absolute and transcendent being. The problem of religion cannot be solved either on a physical or a biological basis. We can solve it only if we triumph over nature, abdicate a naïvely egocentric vision, renounce our terrestrial privilege, and expect of God only the understanding of what is divine and full and pure. It is time that we forsook the zone of passions which exalt, but also excite and obscure and dismember, engendering in cults and churches unverifiable and reciprocal accusations. *Beliefs are diverse, but there is only one religion,* said Kant. If religion is to be wholly united, it must be wholly spiritual.

If from the paper of Professor Lossky (Prague), who stressed the symphony which religion gives to free agents, especially in the Orthodox Church, we pass to that of Dr. Verweyen (Bonn), who maintained that religion is not dependent upon science, but is self-sufficient and is concerned not with the part but with the whole; and so to the paper of Professor Werner (Geneva), who lamented the subjugation of religion to determinate forms and, having discarded attempts to prove the existence of God as one proves a theorem in geometry, would have us descend into the abyss of the soul that we may there discover the infinity which it encloses and the liberty which makes us children of God, we approach very near to the thesis of Professor Brunschwicg; and in the paper of the Berlin professor, Dr. S. Frank, approximate to it yet closer perhaps.

The spiritual position of the past to-day is crumbling, said Dr.

Frank. All that men thought true is becoming doubtful, and we come back to the phrase of Socrates: we know only that we know nothing. This confession of human ignorance means that men are now trying to look not at a system of concepts, but at reality itself, that they may the better understand their position in the world. They are discovering that they are members of a totality with a centre which is the basis of all being. This mystical knowledge is a negative theology—a *docta ignorantia,* the learned Professor called it, citing Nicholas of Cusa, but with the emphasis laid on the noun. It is the philosophy of plenitude and manysidedness, of stability in manifoldness; and in contrast with the "Either—Or" of the popular preacher, and with the philosophy of onesidedness and of fanaticism—the philosophy of "As this, so that," is a philosophy of tolerance, not in the sense of condoning error, but in the sense of recognizing the manysidedness of truth and of affirming the coincidence of opposites. Universal concepts and the greater darkness pave the way to disaster, said Goethe. An all-embracing, concrete, supra-conceptual experience and that modesty which springs from religious humility are the only way to salvation.

Miss Forbes Liddell of Tallahassee also said that in philosophy a place must be found for *der Geist der stets verneint,* the Spirit which ever answers in the negative; for philosophy questions all; and though many, perhaps the greatest among philosophers, have maintained that God *is,* materialists, sceptics, and atheists have honestly reached the opposite conclusion. Miss Forbes regards any man as religious who "takes himself seriously as the agent of reality. The importance of self in religious experience is none the less "derived from the essential connection with ultimate reality, God." Philosophy, because speculative, contains its own negation, but religion is essentially positive, for its truth is not discovered through speculation or demonstration; it is manifested and enjoyed.

In addition to Fr. Przywara's paper, there were two other papers by philosophers who, as Catholics, acknowledge a revelation which in dogma finds intelligible expression. Between their position and that of the papers which have been briefly summarized above, there were inevitably marked differences, yet also, it would seem, some common ground, especially in the case of Professor Chevalier of Grenoble. Though man was a *faber* before he became *sapiens,* said Professor Chevalier, it is a mistake to regard human concepts as the man-made measures of things. Arts, like customs and traditions, are, as the ancients used to phrase it, gifts of the gods to men, who, without them, would have been impotent. Man has invented neither fire, nor yet justice. Human laws do not constitute justice, justice implies an eternal law which, like virtue and power, comes from God. Man is not creative. It is a mistake to ascribe to man, with the

Kantian, a creative power, determinative and perfectly free, which enables him to treat the given as if it were the product of his own constructive thought. It would be more exact and more in conformity with experience to regard his "intuitive knowledge", with Descartes, as an "illumination of the spirit whereby he sees in the light of God the things which it pleases him to discover by the direct impress of the divine clarity on our understanding, which is not considered here as agent, but only as receiving *les rayons de la Divinité.*" To claim that man contains within himself the means of transcending himself and of fully realizing himself, is to run the risk of his falling back on himself, of his becoming fixed in a sterile immanence, in the vanishing deception of the moment—poor substitutes for the only immanence worth while, which is that of the transcendent in man.

Conceptual knowledge, which for Professor Brunschwicg is a closed circle of hypotheses, is by Professor Chevalier, as by Descartes and by Augustine, ascribed to the illuminative action of that purely spiritual being which religion postulates. It thus forms an integral part within the whole, but only to become once again divorced in the thesis of Monsignor Noël, the distinguished representative of the Louvain school of Neo-Thomism, founded by Cardinal Mercier. For Monsignor Noël, as for Professor Brunschwicg, philosophy comprises a closed chain of purely rational ideas, which, whatever be its history, is in nature independent of faith and distinct from theology. But to such ideas Monsignor Noël ascribes an objective validity which Professor Brunschwicg expressly denies, at any rate in regard to their applicability to a divine being. He does not, however, connect them with faith, nor admit with Monsieur Blondel, that there can be a *Christian* philosophy. Philosophy leaves the door open to faith, but in itself it is the work of pure reason.

In one respect all are agreed. There exists a purely spiritual being in regard to whom we should humbly confess our ignorance, but whereas for those who think with Professor Brunschwicg that our ignorance is mainly ignorance and but little *docta*, the other school claims with unanimity that our ignorance is *docta*, alike by faith and in philosophy. The divergence between Monsignor Noël and Professor Chevalier concerns only the way in which reason becomes *docta* in philosophy, and even there, as Monsignor Noël suggests, the difference may be largely one of words.

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The Mission of Philosophy was another topic to which considerable time was devoted. It was discussed at group meetings on Tuesday, Wednesday, and Friday; and on the morning of Friday Professor Utitz of Prague and Senator Orestano of Rome (who took

the place of Benedetto Croce) read papers on the same subject. The other topics which occupied the morning sessions (on Monday and Tuesday) were "The Frontiers of Natural Science," on which papers were read by Professor Bachelard of Dijon and Professor Driesch of Leipzig, and "Normative and Descriptive Standpoints in the Social Sciences," on which papers were read by Professor Hellpach of Heidelberg and Professor T. V. Smith of Chicago. No morning session was devoted to Logic, but with the philosophers this question took first place if we may judge by the number of papers, no less than twenty, which were read under the head of "The Importance of Logical Analysis for Knowledge."

The part played by England in the Congress was far from conspicuous. At the opening meeting the Congress was saluted by delegates from all parts of the world, but no one spoke on behalf of England; nor was there a paper read by an Englishman at any of the morning sessions. Of the three papers on Values one was by Professor J. Laird, but it was impossible to discuss it owing to the length of time that had already been devoted to Professor Hartmann's paper on the same subject. Dr. F. C. S. Schiller read a paper on "How is 'Exactness' possible?" Mr. G. E. Hemens and the author of this article read papers dealing with Philosophy and Natural Science. Miss Hilda Oakley contributed a paper on "Historical Necessity and Ethical Freedom"; and a paper on "Hegel's Logic and Modern Religion," written by the Rev. G. J. Shebbeare, was read by Mr. Muir of Merton. Six papers in all out of over a hundred, and there was a similar dearth of English authors in the Exhibition of modern works on Philosophy! A volume containing all the contributions, together with a summary of the discussions, is already in preparation and will be published in due course.

GREAT THINKERS

(III) ARISTOTLE

II

PROFESSOR J. A. SMITH

WHEN we from what may be called Aristotle's Cosmology (crowned as it is by the upper story of his Astronomy, which is a sort of "super-Physics") turn to his work traditionally called the *Metaphysics*, we are faced with something—an inquiry or doctrine—of a surprisingly different character. There what we find is the exposition of a sort or degree of knowledge superior to that of the Sciences. This is what we call his metaphysics, but he does not so name it; he names it Wisdom, or (in effect) Theoretical Wisdom. At times he calls it First (we should rather say Last) Philosophy, or, again, Theology (which means not knowledge of God or gods, but knowledge of what is divine). It is *par excellence* knowledge, the consummate achievement of theoretic or cognitive power. It is the supreme Science, *scientia scientiarum*. Of what is it knowledge? It is knowledge not about, but of, whatsoever is real, really real (and of that at its widest extent), and of its universal and necessary attributes. The latter are distinct from one another, and from that to which they indissolubly belong, and metaphysics apprehends all this in its distinctions and interconnections. Further, it is a knowledge of itself, a knowledge of knowledge, and so a *Wissenschaftslehre*, or "super-Logic." Finally, it is knowledge commensurate with the real Universe as a whole, so that nothing which is genuinely a part of that escapes its view.

Such knowledge is, according to Aristotle, no mere ideal desideratum: it is attainable and has in a measure been attained, even by (some) human beings at (some) times. Undoubtedly he claims for himself a share in it, and endeavours to impart it to others. His tone in the exposition of it is confident, didactic, dogmatic; he endeavours in it to proceed methodically, and to establish it by irrefragable reasoning—in a word, to give to it, as of right, the form of a system, set beyond the possibility of doubt.

These lofty claims may seem to us of a monstrous extravagance, or, to put our protest more temperately, quite uncritical, and made in ingenuous ignorance of the necessary limitations or the reach of Man's cognitive powers. By some they will be pronounced to have been finally put out of the court of Philosophy. But by Aristotle they

were made, and to make them thought by him to be for Philosophy inevitable. In the history of Philosophy down to our own time they have been again and again renewed. In Aristotle's time, save by extreme sceptics, they were not openly challenged, and as yet not in the name of Faith or Supernatural Revelation, or at least only in weak and negligible forms.

One result of the entertainment of this ideal is that in Aristotle two "metaphysics" appear almost as rival conceptions of it—the sort of "Super-Physics" which emerges at the end of his Physics, and this one which is expounded in his *Metaphysics*. Though he distinguishes them, he nevertheless identifies them. The latter tends as the superior to displace the former as the inferior. What in the former is confused and obscure becomes in the latter clear and distinct. Yet Aristotle does not hold that at any stage what we possess in the way of metaphysics is an absolutely clear, distinct, unclouded or unhindered vision of the absolutely real, what M. Bergson has called *la vision* (or *intuition*) *intégrale de l'absolu*. On the contrary, he dwells upon the thought that the organ at our command with which we strain to see (know) what in itself is most fitted to be seen (known) is but as the eyes of owls that see only in the twilight, and so we fail to see, or all but fail to see, the midday sun and what it most illumines. Nevertheless, purblind as at its best our seeing is, what is seen by it is really seen; it is no mis-seeing. The seen (or the scene) is dim, confused, obscure, but, as we gaze in its direction, it grows in clearness and distinctness. It is as if the sun were rising and spreading its light all over it, so that it ever more and more revealed itself as it is.

What, then, according to Aristotle has thus so far been revealed to us of the total kingdom or Universe of real being, and in particular what of the highest region or stratum in its structure? It is difficult to find fit (they cannot be adequate) words to express what has there disclosed itself to us—in the "divine" realm. It is a region occupied by a number of distinct Beings (= "substances") of the same general type, who together form a family or household. Among them (or, rather, above them) is One, who is the father of all, the lord and master of the whole household. The common type of which each is a singular or unique instance, Aristotle labours to bring before his and our understandings with increasing clearness and distinctness: in this endeavour he is driven to employ negations of, or contrasts with, what are to us more familiar types of Beings, or determinations of their relations to these (lower orders or grades of Beings, notably ourselves). They are, e.g. wholly immaterial: they have no "matter" in them, that is, no ingredient which is heterogeneous from others or another. To put this more positively, they are (in our language) purely *spiritual* Beings. But his most pregnant

designation of them is to call them "perfections" (*entelechiae*). They are in all ways and manners "perfect." Yet we must add that their being perfect is not the result of a process of perfecting. Theirs is not a perfected perfectness; it is an eternal perfectness, without beginning as without end. It is to be noted that unlike the "angels" of Christian theology, they are not created, but are essentially increate, eternal *à parte ante* as *à parte post*. Each is a perfect unity, perfectly unified and perfectly unique, a perfect individual.

If, for a time, we leave out of view the One (of which all that has been just said is eminently true), and we speak only of the others, of each of those it may be said that it has with each and every other a common nature or *whatness*, yet we must at once add that each possesses that common nature with a distinctive peculiarity or specialty, so that *its* nature is as unique as itself. Their common nature is, to use the words of a modern thinker, to be "a system harmonious and all-inclusive," and yet again the harmony and inclusion, the system, of each is diverse from that of any other and is genuinely unique. Further, each is in its own way and manner perfectly or indefectibly good; there is no defect in its ever-present perfectness; there is nothing which it has not got and does not possess and enjoy, nothing which it requires and has to acquire.

In contrast with the Supreme One, these divine Beings are finite or limited, and, therefore, what has been said of their mode of being is to be understood under that condition. It is of their essence to be limited. Two or three things are to be noted concerning them: (1) Their common nature is characterized by their self-subsistence or independence upon any thing other than themselves; (2) their being expands or runs out into a course of being or *existence* (one might almost say a "life" or "career"); (3) as they are powers, this expansion is into actions or exercises of power. Perhaps we may add that the actions which flow out from their nature do really flow *out*, and influence what is other than themselves, in which they call out responses. It is a bias of Aristotle's to view these Beings as primarily Intelligences, active or illuminative Intelligences. But, disconcertingly to us, he regards their ministry in the administration of the Universe as almost confined to the guidance in their courses of the principal celestial bodies ("the divine bodies") in the structure of the cosmical machine (or *mécanique céleste*). Later writers assigned to them in the divine administration other functions more appropriate to their nature as Intelligences, but of this there is in Aristotle no hint.

As in thought we, under Aristotle's guidance, descend to the lower stages of the hierarchy (what Mr. Mure calls the *Scala Universi*) of Beings which people the Universe, we encounter a rank or order of less perfect Beings. These are the Beings concealed behind the

show of the world of sense, and yet revealed by or through it. Of them what has been said of the divine Beings holds only upon further conditions and limitations, or, may be said, *diminutis diminuendis*. It is immensely difficult to keep hold of the clue to the understanding of their nature or natures which we have found by studying that of the divine Beings, and to make due application or adjustment to them of the lessons learned from that study. They too are self-subsistent perfections, but they are doubly imperfect perfections; they are not only finite or limited, they are also complex. They are essentially dual Beings, and have two natures coupled in one. Their *whatness* is a union of two somethings or other of very different characters and properties: it is a one compacted of two, which may fall apart and subsist in separation one from another. To these two "parts" in their compacted or "concrete" natures Aristotle gives the names of Form and Matter. Every sensible or physical Being (it seems henceforward more natural to say Substance) is, therefore, a formed matter or materiated form, and within its unity sometimes the form predominates, sometimes the matter. As we continue to descend the scale the form in the combination recedes before the matter while the matter dominates, and therewith the physical substance declines in rank or status. But neither ever reaches zero: the Substance, as long as it remains a Substance, is still dual. If the two were really to come apart, each would be, if a substance at all, an *incomplete* substance. Still, there is a difference between the two, and Aristotle frequently speaks of the Form of a concrete sensible Substance or itself a Substance.

Here I will ask the reader to imagine himself making a return journey from circumference to centre of the Aristotelian Universe, or its more or less sensible counterpart the Cosmos. In this descending journey the terminals are the outermost Heavens and the centre of the Earth. All the way he is passing through regions peopled by successively lower and lower, more and more imperfect, Substances. Let us suppose ourselves to have descended below the concave surface of the sphere of the Moon, into the sublunar region. Here begins what Aristotle in effect calls the "Mid-Air," and it stretches down to close upon the surface of the Earth. This region of Mid-Air is, according to Aristotle, what I may call the natural home of the simpler (but still complex) physical substances: there they subsist and exercise their proper actions upon one another. The simplest of all are the so-called four Elements, and the consequence of their actions upon one another is that there is a perpetual cyclical transmutation of each of the four into each other. But there is also a constant coming-to-be and passing-away of substances of a more complicated structure, especially at its lower levels. These are very like what we call 'organic substances' as we normally find them in

the bodies of living things (but it includes also "minerals"). In fact, this whole region of Mid-Air is a sort of vast Chemical Laboratory in which substances of various sorts are synthetically produced and analytically destroyed.

Just at (or near) the surface of the Earth this substance-generating (and destroying) activity reaches a further elaboration: out of organic substances it produces organisms (employing also portions of sub-organic substances). These complex and elaborate structures are living beings, plants and animals, and to them we are wont specially to apply the name of Substances, because they seem obviously each of them to subsist of itself and apart from others. Among them are ourselves, human beings, and we regard Men as standing highest in the animal or living world. We should therefore expect living men to exhibit or to possess the common character of physical substances with a special clearness and distinctness.

Having now brought the reader down to the surface of the Earth, the natural home of living beings, but especially of Man, I will take leave to pass over Aristotle's account of living beings in general (his biology), and concentrate attention upon the account of Man (as the highest or paragon of animals, and so of all living beings). Man—every man—is a substance, a natural or physical substance. As such he—his nature—is essentially dual, a combination in one of two natures (or incomplete substances), compacted of a Form and a Matter. So far he, as a physical substance, is in no way different from any other physical substance. Nor is it peculiar to him that his form is a special form, and his matter a special matter, that his form and his matter are specially suited one to another or are strictly correlative. Nor, again, is it peculiar to him that, if they have ever been apart, or have fallen apart, neither is in its separateness what it was in the combination. All that is true of any and every physical substance. Hence it follows that, if we force the contrast between his form and his matter, and endeavour to conceive either by itself, ignoring its relation to the other, we fail to conceive it properly and give to ourselves an "empty" account of it. We must never forget—Aristotle does not forget—that Man is a complex or dual being, a combination of two parts distinct and distinguishable one from another, however close be their correlation and combination.

It might look as if, in the exposition of what may be called his Anthropology or Human Psychology, Aristotle was unfaithful to this conception of the nature of Man. For there, accepting for the formal and the material components of that nature the current names of Soul and Body, he begins by speaking of the former by itself, as if it were, so taken, a complete substance (in the *De Anima*). In another series of works he similarly treats the Body by itself, and lastly he devotes a number of special treatises to those operations

of living things (or at least of animals) which involve interactions and co-operation between the one component and the other. In all these points there is nothing peculiar to human nature, and what he says is applicable *mutatis mutandis* to all living beings whatsoever, even to plants. The Greek word (*psyche*) which we translate "Soul" is used to name the formal component of all such beings: each one of them is an embodied soul or besouled body. Nevertheless, his chief interest is in the nature of human beings, that is, of ourselves. He does not really ever forget that by comparison with the divine Beings the undivine or sub-divine nature of Man is a union not quite perfect of two complementary but distinct and contrasting natures.

The Soul of Man, then, is a system of powers which is in his total nature united with those of a bodily organism, which is itself a system or apparatus of instruments suitable for use by his Soul. The system of soul-powers is a constitution with a definite arrangement and order of its constituent parts. They fall under two heads, (A) cognitive and (B) motive or executive powers. In the whole psychic constitution, and within each of these two sets, there is, besides arrangement and order, superordination and subordination: there are among the powers differences of level or rank. At the lowest level are powers which do their work blindly or in darkness: there are the powers we share with plants, such as those of nutrition, growth, and reproduction. Next above them are those we share with other animals ("the brutes"), such as (in the cognitive set) the powers of the senses or of Sense, through which we become acquainted with the qualities and changes of quality of the physical bodies which make up our environment (and also with their shapes and sizes, and the changes of these): in the higher animals the reach of these sense-powers extends to the past (the power of Memory) and even forward into the future, or again to the apprehension of the helpful or harmful qualities of surrounding bodies. As these sensory powers are found in our nature, they have an even greater elaboration and a further reach than they have in any sub-human animal. All this has its parallel or analogue in the set of the motive, or, as modern psychologists would say, "conative" powers. In this account of the constitution of the human Soul there are two principles governing Aristotle's mind which are apt to escape notice: (1) that these "powers" are what our ancestors called "passive powers," powers that do not put themselves into exercise, but require to be stimulated and guided *ab extra* from and by the environment; (2) though they are powers (or capacities) of the Soul, their exercise requires the constant co-operation along with it of the powers belonging to its Body. Hence (1) we cannot by the senses perceive what we please or when we please, and (2) what perceives—or what endeavours to

reach something absent—is not the Soul, it is the whole animate being or embodied soul. It is "we"—this or that man—who at this level cognize and "conate." Yet we must not say that even "we" perform the manifold and various cognitions and conations which fill our lives; "we" rather suffer or undergo them.

But that is so, only so far as we regard Man as the highest of animals, his nature as a very elaborate or developed animal nature, and his Soul in the same way. And that is not the whole story of any of them. For, whether we think of him as cognitive or as conative, we are forced to recognize in him (within his nature and his Soul) what there is not to be found in any other animal. There is in him something in virtue of which he thinks and knows or understands in a way impossible to the brutes. This ingredient in his nature is called by Aristotle his *Nous*—a word which we translate "Intellect." It is, he says, something "divine," a divine Being or Substance, and of it he repeats the language he had used in speaking of the divine Beings of the highest rank in the Universe. It is notoriously difficult to extract from the text of Aristotle his theory of this Being or Power, but it seems to me best to take him literally to mean what is involved in the pregnant designation of it as "divine." One of these implications is that it too is a self-subsistent or "independent" Substance in the manner in which the Beings styled "divine" are. Hence we shall have to say that it is ungenerable and indestructible, that is, is eternal, and that its simple essence freely and perpetually flows out into a course of actual existence; that, again, it is a perfecting perfection, and so on. No doubt, so to understand him, is to run ourselves, or follow him, into paradoxes, or as some might say into self-contradictions. If, we should like to ask Aristotle, if it is in itself a complete Substance, how can it be an ingredient or a whole together with another of a different rank? How can it be said (as he says) to come into that union "from outside"? How can a spiritual Being form one being together with a material and corporal being? He has foreseen, and indeed propounds, some of these questions, but he answers none of them. It might seem a little more justifiable for us to press for answers to another set of questions concerning the operations of this Power in our lives, and the traces of them there to be found which are evidences of its presence and work in us. Here he does (at least in respect of our cognitive experiences) do something to help us. The main significant fact in our cognitive life is that at times we come, as no animal can or does, to "understand," to apprehend what is finally and indubitably real, fitfully, vaguely, confusedly, and obscurely to partake in a knowing which is certain or most certain or absolutely certain. Such knowledge *exists*, and is perpetually imparted, communicated, transmitted from intellect to

intellect: it ceaselessly renews itself and leaves traces of itself on the historical record. We must, however, not attribute to Aristotle any doctrine that its perpetuity is a progress; so far as he says anything relevant to its character, he conceives it rather as a cyclical course of successive rises to a climax and declines from it, yet so that it never wholly vanishes from history. So at least he speaks of the course of human civilization, mainly viewing it as a course in knowledge. He says nothing of the same kind of the course of human conation or action, but probably he would have said much the same, and similarly of the outflow of Man's nature as a whole into actual existence or history.

In the facts which thus result and occupy the stage of Man's life —or at any rate those which fill the frame of the contemporary Hellenic world—Aristotle shows a wide interest, but his interest is not that of a mere observer or describer. He desires to see them in their arrangement and order, and in the end to understand and explain them to himself and others. In proceeding to do so, he once more distinguishes them into (A) the cognitive and (B) the conative, or, to use his own terms, the theoretical and the practical, fields. In his study of both these fields he endeavours to give to the fruits of his thinking the ordered (or methodical) and systematic form of a Science. It is because of his success in this design that he may justly be called the father of both Logic and Ethics.

His Logic—so to call his account of what has issued and continues to issue from the exercises of Man's distinctive powers of thinking—has won and held the admiration of philosophers ever since his time. I need only quote Kant's judgment upon it: "Logic, as we have it, is derived from Aristotle's, who correctly settled the extent of its subject-matter, and omitted no essential point: all that is left to his successors is to improve upon its doctrine in the ways of greater accuracy, definiteness, and distinctness." It would be quite impossible for me here to furnish a *précis* of Aristotle's logical doctrine; I mention but a few of the leading principles that govern his Logic.

(1) It has for its subject-matter, primarily and chiefly, the whole of the processes of human Thinking, or, more precisely, of that sort or degree of it in which we think something *about* something else, affirming or denying "predicates" about "subjects." It recognizes (but does not specially study) simpler mental processes by which we clear up products of such processes and apprehend them so as to name them correctly, and towards the other end of its domain there are products that fall almost beyond "thinking about," and are hardly expressible in the form of predications about subjects. Nevertheless, its proper field includes not only what are simply "thinkings-about" ("propositions" or "judgments"), but also the more elaborate products which he calls "syllogisms" and we "reason-

ings" or "inferences." Pushing his Logic ever further he extends it to take in still more powerful processes, the results of which are, though still formally "thinkings-about," more than "thinkings": they are knowings, knowledges, Sciences. All the same, they are continuous with "thinkings-about," and this may be expressed by saying that they are "knowledges-about," not "knowledges-of"; in them we know not what anything is, but only something about it, which is other than it. Even in the Sciences, where our knowing is most sure and certain, this is so: beyond such knowledge Science cannot go. If there be knowledge which is a knowing-of what in Science we know about, it falls beyond the domain of Logic. No "scientific" thinking can further or establish or "prove" it.

(2) All this "thinking-about" is the outcome of a power which is part of Man's nature. It is a distinctive or peculiar power of ours which is part of our natural endowment and which is absent from the nature of all animals lower than Man. But it is not what we have earlier called "Intellect," it is inferior and subordinate to that. It used to be called in English his Reason, because the most and best it can issue in is "reasonings." By contrast with it his Intellect used to be called his Understanding, but, most unfortunately for us, Coleridge reversed the uses, and so ruined *both* words for employment in the exposition of Aristotle's doctrine. Hence we can only say that, while the power ("Reason") of which Logic studies the working and results, thinks or knows *about* (thinks or knows something about something else), Intellect knows what is thought about without thinking about it. Hence the consideration of Intellect, and its activity (intellection or understanding) falls outside Logic, or occurs only in an appendix or epilogue to it.

(3) The Logic of Aristotle throughout considers the thinkings and the thoughts which it studies as expressed in speech, spoken or written. He never recognizes bare, naked, "pure" thinkings or thoughts: his Logic is not "pure Logic." That is implied in the calling of the science of them "Logic," for *logos* in Greek means simply "speech." Even when the thinking is as private as possible to the thinker, it is still embodied in inward speech (*la parole intérieur*). Doubtless that speech is not just the speech of ordinary intercourse, but it is not discontinuous with that: it is that stripped of its aesthetic, its action-directing, and its passion-exciting associations. Briefly, it is prosaic speech.

Hence—to repeat the last two points—the thinkings and thoughts which form the subject-matter of his Logic are (*a*) natural, and (*b*) concrete, thinkings and thoughts.

We must now turn to his account of the processes and results which are the outcome of Man's practical power or powers. That,

too, is (or these are) a part of his nature, his distinctive or peculiar natural endowment, a part also which is absent in the constitution of the infra-human animals. Upon that scene, less well lit than the province of Logic, he opens his eyes wide, observing and describing the phenomena it presents in his near neighbourhood, i.e. in the contemporary Hellenic world. Here, too, his aim is to reach as nearly scientific an account of it as is possible, but, according to him, such a scientific account is less possible than in the case of Logic. His account of it is given in two treatises (the *Ethics* and the *Politics*) or in two stages. Of the relation between the subject-matters of the two treatises little more can profitably be said than that they are in a sense one and the same, and that the second carries out doctrines implicit or latent in the first, making them explicit and patent. But in this explicitation Aristotle is in thought following the explicitation of the subject-matter itself, bringing and presenting to view a further and fuller outcome into existence of the initial powers of Man's nature—his practical powers.

The leading or governing conception throughout both treatises is that Man's practical powers are his (or their) nature directed toward a special something (Aristotle calls it a special "end" or "good"), which by nature he has not got and does not possess or enjoy. While and because it is absent, the lack of it disturbs and disquiets him, he longs for it and strives or strains towards it. There is begotten in him a vague or dim notion, confused and obscure, of what is thus absent, an anticipatory notion of it—or if "notion" is too bold a word, a presentiment or fore-imagination of it. To this special or human (practical) end or good we usually give the name of Happiness, but the Greek word which we translate Happiness by no means signifies as the English word does that it is a state of Feeling, still less that it is a passive state, or indeed that it is a *state* at all. On the contrary, it was for him relatively easy, without parting company with contemporary Greek usage, to suggest that Happiness is to be conceived as a continuing or enduring condition of immense activity or doing, in which our practical powers are at work on the largest scale and in the fullest exercise. It is in such a condition that our natural practical powers will achieve their natural end or good, that our longings will be stilled, our strivings cease or come to rest, and, in a word, our natural wishes be gratified or satisfied. He takes it for granted that our natural human wishes (our whole power of Wishing) are rightly directed to what is in them wished for, and exerts himself to define, to clarify and distinctify, what that is which by nature we do wish for. His definition of it is, briefly, that it is the fullest and freest outgoing into actual existence of our nature-given practical powers, unhindered by internal friction or external obstruction.

Success or failure in the attainment by a man of this end depends in part upon his good or evil fortune, but it also depends upon conditions within Man's power to determine. The most important of these may be called, as a whole, "Character" (*ēthos*). To be successful it is above all things necessary for a man to have become possessed of a good Character. This character Aristotle conceives as a group of distinct and describable excellences or "Virtues," or, rather, as a group of (practical) Virtues, consisting of two sub-groups, (A) the sub-group of Virtues of Character in a special sense (the peculiarly "Moral Virtues"), and (B) that of Virtues of a relatively more intelligent or thoughtful kind (the "Intellectual Virtues"). (A) are implanted in the lower and properly practical part of human nature, are seated and do their work there. He sets them before the reader in a sort of picture-gallery of types of man who possess them. Yet he regards these Virtues as, in spite of this separation, having a natural affinity, and so as fitted to form together a coherent and co-operating whole (a "Moral Character") under the headship of the supreme Moral Virtue of Justice. Each of them is formed and fixed by a process of Habituation or training, in which the individual has under direction learned to repeat actions of a certain kind with increasing regularity and ease or freedom from external pressure. In consequence he gradually comes to do similar actions of his own accord or "freely," to do them for their own sake or worth. But the individual is but part-cause of his Character, he is of it only a subordinate or secondary cause, rather a consenting than an originative party to its formation and fixation. As it exists in him, it is very largely the product of the action upon him of his external (social) environment.

His undergoing of the discipline which forms it in him is a sort of apprenticeship in the business or art of human living. The Moral Virtues he has acquired are not yet truly consolidated or able fully to accomplish their collaborative work, and that is so because they subsist and work in relative darkness or twilight. To make these really effective he must learn to use them not blindly or purblindly but with open eyes, and to do so he must acquire or develop the Virtues of the sub-group (B). The members of this sub-group Aristotle again presents to the reader as a sort of family culminating in and presided over by the supreme Virtue of "Prudence" (or Practical Wisdom). It must not be forgotten that these members (and the whole sub-group) are, though called in English "intellectual," still "practical." They are, therefore, to be distinguished from the group of the theoretical Virtues of the Intellect, some of which have the same names. This difference is marked by the fact that the supreme or "sovereign" members of the one and the other group have different names, *Phronesis* ("Prudence") and *Sophia*

(which we are obliged to translate Theoretical Wisdom). But the difference is still more patent in the types of men which are the concrete embodiments of each of these supreme Virtues, viz. the Statesman or "Politician," and the Philosopher or "Sage."

The former is the practical thinker *par excellence*, what he excels other men in is thinking practically. Because he thinks practically so supremely well, he is in practice the most originative and the most effectively constructive of all human agents. He is the architect or master-builder of Man's practical world; he makes the fullest and largest use of the practical powers of men; he does most to further the actualization by men of the practical end or good, Happiness.

What he has in this way done is studied in the *Politics*. The main result of his practical thinking (or his thoughtful practice) is the institution of what the Greeks called the *Polis* (the "City-State"), and what he continues to do is to preserve it and guide its life, the whole course of its activity. By doing this, by devoting his thinking powers to that service he does more than any other type of Man to further the coming into existence of human Happiness, and that on the largest scale. But here it may be well to remember that Aristotle himself was not a practical Statesman or Politician, was not even a citizen of any City-State in which his life was passed. At Athens he was never more than a denizen or resident alien. He was, therefore, an outsider in respect of the political life in his neighbourhood or environment, or in it but not of it. Whatever may have been the effect upon him of that situation, we have to recognize that he regarded the Happiness which he called Practical as a *second*-best Happiness. Before his mind, in contrast with it, there rose and stayed the ideal of a far higher Happiness, the Happiness of a life absorbed in the cultivation, promotion and extension of knowledge as a whole and for its own sake. This ideal he laboured throughout his life to make to himself and others clear and distinct, to commend it to those fitted to endeavour after it, to actualize it not in solitary contemplation but in the fellowship of a chosen *élite*.

It is as living, and successfully living, such a life that I have here tried to present him, rather than as the great man of science he also was or as the possessor of a glorified common sense which he was too. For over and above all he was a philosopher, and no one is a philosopher who does not strive to make the most of that which in him and in Man generally, dimly descrying its presence and feeling its sovereign power, we call the Intellect, and, to cover myself under the authority of one who knew him well, I recall that his master Plato called him "the Intellect" of his school.

(*Concluded*)

THE MEANING OF *ἀγαθόν* IN THE *ETHICS* OF ARISTOTLE

PROFESSOR H. A. PRICHARD

I HAVE for some time found it increasingly difficult to resist a conclusion so heretical that the mere acceptance of it may seem a proof of lunacy. Yet the failure of a recent attempt to resist it has led me to want to confess the heresy. And at any rate a statement of my reasons may provoke a refutation.

The heresy, in brief, is that Aristotle (in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, except in the two discussions of pleasure—where *ἀγαθόν* is opposed to *φαῦλον* and *μοχθηρόν*) really meant by *ἀγαθόν* conducive to our happiness, and maintained that when a man does an action deliberately, as distinct from impulsively, he does it simply in order to, i.e. from the desire to, become happy, this being so even when he does what is virtuous or speculates. Of this heresy a corollary is the view that Aristotle, being anxious to persuade men first and foremost to practise speculation and secondarily to do what is virtuous, conceived that, to succeed, what he had to prove was that this was the action necessary to make a man happy. This corollary, however, which may seem only a further heresy, I propose to ignore. The heresy, in my opinion, is equally attributable to Plato, and for much the same reasons. But for simplicity's sake I propose to confine consideration to Aristotle, with, however, the suggestion that the same argument can be applied to Plato.

In attributing this view to Aristotle I do not mean to imply that he does not repeatedly make statements inconsistent with it. Nor do I mean to imply that the question of the consistency of these statements with the view simply escapes him; it seems to me that it does not, but that owing to a mistake he thought they were consistent with it. Nor do I mean to imply that his acceptance of this view appears on the surface; but rather that it becomes evident once we lay bare certain misleading elements in his account of the motive of deliberate action.

The first two chapters of the *Ethics*, and especially its opening sentence, are undoubtedly puzzling. Aristotle begins by saying: *πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξίς τε καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ· διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο τἀγαθόν, οὗ πάντ' ἐφιέται.* "Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and purpose, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which

all things aim." Then after pointing out that certain aims or ends are subordinate to others, he contends that there must be one final end to which all others are subordinate, and that this will be τἀγαθόν, the good, and that, consequently, knowledge of this final end will have great influence on our lives, since if we have it, we shall have a definite mark or goal to aim at. And he goes on to say that, this being so, his object in the *Ethics* is to discover what this final end is.

Here, as the rest of the first book shows, Aristotle, in his first sentence, is not simply stating a common opinion, but stating it with approval and on the assumption that it is an opinion which his hearers will accept and so which can be used as a basis for his subsequent argument. And, so regarded, it is very sweeping.

Even if he had said that in every deliberate action we have an aim or are aiming at something, we should have regarded the statement, put forward as expressing a fact obvious to everyone, and so as needing neither elucidation nor discussion, as sufficiently sweeping. But what he does say is more sweeping. In effect, taking for granted that there is always something at which we are aiming, he commits himself to a general statement about its nature, stating that it is always ἀγαθόν τι, or, as we may transliterate the phrase, a good.

But besides being sweeping it is obscure. Even if Aristotle had said that in all action we are aiming at something, we should have felt that the statement needed elucidation. But saying as he does that we are aiming at something good, we have an additional puzzle. If, instead, he had said that we are always aiming at a pleasure, or at an honour, or at doing some good action, then we should have at least suspected he knew what he meant, whether or not we agreed. But the meaning of ἀγαθόν is not clear.

Consequently to discover his meaning we have to find out not only what he means when he speaks of us in a deliberate action as aiming at something (ἐφίεσθαι τί) or as having a τέλος or end, but also what he means by ἀγαθόν. And of these tasks, plainly the former has to be accomplished first.

The idea, which of course underlies the *Ethics*, that in all deliberate action we have an end or aim, is one the truth of which we are all likely to maintain when we first consider action, "action" being a term which, for shortness' sake, I propose to use for deliberate action. The idea goes back to Plato; and Mill expresses it when he says that all action is for the sake of an end. We take for granted that in doing some action there must be some desire leading or moving us to do the action, i.e. forming what we call our motive, since, as we should say, otherwise we should not be doing the action; or, for this is only to express the same idea in

other words, we take for granted that in doing the action we have a purpose, i.e. something the desire of which moves us to do the action. And, taking this for granted, we are apt to maintain that our purpose in doing the action always consists in something other than the action which we think the action likely to cause, directly or indirectly, such as an improvement in our health which we expect from taking a dose of medicine.

Further, taking this view of the motive of action, we are apt to express it metaphorically by saying that in any action we have an aim or that there is something at which we are aiming. For when we consider, e.g. taking a drug from the desire to become healthy, we are apt to think of the thing desired, viz. our health, as that by reference to which we have devised the action as what is likely to cause it, and so as similar to the target by reference to the position of which a shooter arranges his weapon before shooting. We are also apt to speak of our purpose metaphorically as our end, as being something which we think will come into existence at the end of the action. In either case, however, it is to be noticed that the terms "end" and "aim" are merely metaphorical expressions for our purpose, i.e. for that the desire of which is moving us to act. No doubt further consideration may afterwards lead us to abandon this view. For certain actions and notably acts of gratitude or revenge seem prompted by the desire to do the action we at least hope we are doing, such as the desire to inflict an injury to another equal to that to which he has done us. Yet we may not reflect sufficiently to notice this, or even if we do we may fail to notice that such actions require us to modify the view, or may even think, as Aristotle did, that the doctrine may be made to apply to them.

Plato, it may be noticed, expressly formulates this view in the *Gorgias*. In trying to show that orators and tyrants have the least power in States, he lays down generally[1] that a man in doing what he does wishes not for the action but for that for the sake of which he does it, this being implied to be some result of the action. And in support he urges that a man who takes a drug wishes not for taking the drug but for health, and that a man who takes a voyage wishes not for the sailing and incurring of dangers but for the wealth for the sake of which he takes the voyage. He is, however, here obviously going too far in asserting that the man does not want to do the action itself, for if the man did not want to do the action, he would not be doing it. What Plato should have said and what would express the view accurately is this: "A man undoubtedly wants to do what he does, and this desire is moving him. But the desire is always derivative or dependent. His having it depends on

[1] *Gorgias*, p. 467.

his having another desire, viz. the desire of something to which he thinks the action will lead, and that is why this latter desire should be represented as what is moving him, since it is in consequence of having this latter desire that he has the desire to do the action."

The view, therefore, implies the idea that the desire to do some action is always a dependent desire, depending on the desire of something to which we think the action will lead. But, as we soon notice, this latter desire must either be itself an independent desire, i.e. a desire which does not depend on any other, or else imply such a desire, since otherwise, as Aristotle put it, desire would be empty and vain. We are therefore led to draw a distinction between an independent desire and a desire depending on a desire of something which we think the thing desired will cause. Aristotle, of course, recognized and even emphasized the distinction, but unfortunately he formulated it with a certain inaccuracy. He implies that it should be expressed as that between *τὸ βούλεσθαί τι δι' αὐτό*, or *καθ' αὐτό*, and *τὸ βούλεσθαί τι δι' ἕτερον*. But the latter phrase must be short for *τὸ βούλεσθαί τι διὰ το βούλεσθαι ἕτερόν τι*, and, this being so, the former phrase must be short for *τὸ βούλεσθαί τι διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι αὐτό*, which, meaning wishing for something in consequence of wishing for itself, is not sense. The distinction should have been expressed as that between *το βούλεσθαί τι μὴ διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι ἕτερόν τι* and *τὸ βούλεσθαί τι διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι ἕτερὸν τι* or, to be more accurate, between desiring something not in consequence of desiring something else, and desiring something in consequence of desiring something else to which we think it will lead. And in this connexion it should be noticed that the English phrase for an independent desire, viz. the desire of something for its own sake, which is the equivalent of Aristotle's *βούλεσθαί τι δι' αὐτό*, has really only the negative meaning of the desire of something which is not dependent on any desire.

Further, having reached this distinction, we are soon led, as of course Aristotle was, to hold that in every action we must have some ultimate or final aim, consisting of the object of some independent desire, and to distinguish from this aims which we have but which are not ultimate.

Having drawn this distinction we do not ask: "Of what sort or sorts are our non-ultimate aims?" since obviously anything may be such an aim. But we do raise the question: "Of what sort or sorts is our ultimate aim in various actions?"

To this question Aristotle's answer is *ἀγαθόν τι*, since his opening statement covers ultimate as well as non-ultimate aims. And the most obvious way to ascertain what Aristotle considers our ultimate aim is, of course, simply to find out what he means by *ἀγαθόν*. But,

as should now be obvious, there is also another way. Like ourselves, he must really mean by our ultimate or final aim that the independent desire of which, or, as he would put it, that the desire of which καθ' αὑτό, is moving us to act. Consequently, if he says of certain things that we desire and pursue, i.e. aim at, them καθ' αὑτό, we are entitled to conclude that he considers that in certain instances they are our ultimate aim. Now in Chapter VI of Book I he maintains that there are certain kinds of things, viz. τιμή, φρόνησις, and ἡδονή which are διωκόμενα καὶ ἀγαπώμενα καθ' αὑτά; and to these he adds in Chapter VII, § 3, νοῦς and πᾶσα ἀρετή of which, together with τιμή and ἡδονή, he says that though we choose them for the sake of happiness, we also choose them δι' αὑτά, i.e. as being what they severally are, since we should choose them even if nothing resulted from them. And to say this is only to say in other words that in some instances our ultimate end is an honour, in others it is a pleasure, in others our being φρόνιμος, and so on. Consequently, if we hold him to this, the only possible conclusion for us to draw is that he considers (1) that in such cases our ultimate end is not ἀγαθόν τι, whatever he means by ἀγαθόν, and also (2) that our ultimate end is not always of the same sort, so that no single term could describe it. We thus reach the astonishing conclusion that Aristotle, in insisting as he does that we pursue these things for their own sake, is really ruling out the possibility of maintaining that our end is always ἀγαθόν τι, or indeed anything else, so that we are in a position to maintain that he has no right to assert that our ultimate end is always an ἀγαθόν, even before we have attempted to elucidate what he means by ἀγαθόν.

Further, if we next endeavour, as we obviously should, to do this, we get another surprise. Aristotle's nearest approach to an elucidation is to be found in Chapter VI, §§ 7–11, and Chapter VII, §§ 1–5. There he speaks of τὰ καθ' αὑτὰ διωκόμενα καὶ ἀγαπώμενα as called ἀγαθά in one sense, and gives as illustrations τιμή, φρόνησις, and ἡδονή; and he speaks of τὰ ποιητικὰ τούτων ἢ φυλακτικά πως as called ἀγαθά in another sense, and he implies that these latter are διωκτὰ καὶ αἱρετὰ δι' ἕτερον[1] and that πλοῦτος is an illustration.[2] Further, he appears to consider that the difference of meaning is elucidated by referring to the former as ἀγαθὰ καθ' αὑτά and to the latter as ἀγαθὰ διὰ ταῦτα, i.e. ἀγαθὰ διὰ ἀγαθὰ καθ' αὑτά. But this unfortunately is no elucidation, since to state a difference of reason for calling two things ἀγαθόν is not to state a difference of meaning of ἀγαθόν, and indeed is to imply that the meaning in both cases is the same. Nevertheless, these statements seem intended as an elucidation of the meaning of ἀγαθόν. And the cause for surprise lies in this, that if they are taken seriously as an elucidation, the con-

[1] *Ethics*, I, 7, 4. [2] *Ibid.*, I, 5, 8.

clusion can only be that *ἀγαθόν* includes being desired in its meaning, and indeed simply means *τέλος* or end. For if they are so understood, Aristotle must be intending to say (1) that when we say of something that it is *ἀγαθὸν καθ' αὑτά* what we *mean* is that it is *διωκόμενον καὶ ἀγαπώμενον καθ' αὑτό*, i.e. simply that it is an ultimate end, and (2) that when we say of something that it is *ἀγαθόν δι' ἕτερον*, what we mean is that it is *διωκόμενον καὶ ἀγαπώμενον δι' ἕτερον*, i.e. simply that it is a non-ultimate end. In other words, if here he is interpreted strictly, he is explaining that *ἀγαθόν* means *τέλος*, and by the distinction between an *ἀγαθὸν καθ' αὑτό* and an *ἀγαθὸν δι' ἕτερον* he means merely the distinction between an ultimate and a non-ultimate end. Yet if anything is certain, it is that when Aristotle says of something, e.g. *πλοῦτος*, that it is an *ἀγαθόν* he does not mean that it is a *τέλος*, i.e. that it is something at which someone is aiming, and that when he says of something, e.g. *τιμή* or *φρόνησις*, that it is an *ἀγαθόν καθ' αὑτό*, he does not mean that it is someone's ultimate end, i.e. what he speaks of in Book VI, 9, § 7 as *τὸ τέλος τὸ ἁπλῶς*. Apart from other considerations, if he did, then for him to say, as he in effect does, that we always aim at *ἀγαθόν τι* would be to say nothing, and for him to speak, as he does, of the object of *βούλησις* as *τἀγαθόν* would be absurd.

But this being so, what *does* Aristotle mean by *ἀγαθόν*? Here there is at least one statement which can be made with certainty. Aristotle unquestionably would have said that where we are pursuing something of a certain kind, say an honour, *καθ' αὑτό*, we are pursuing it *ὡς ἀγαθόν*, i.e. as a good. Otherwise there would not even have been verbal consistency between his statements, that we pursue, i.e. aim at, things of certain stated kinds, and that we always aim at *ἀγαθὸν τι*. Again, unless we allow that he would have said this, we cannot make head or tail either of his puzzling statement in Chapter II to the effect that since, as there must be, there is some end which we wish for for its own sake, this end must be *τἀγαθόν*, or, again, of its sequel in Chapter VII, where he proceeds to consider what that is to which the term *τἀγαθόν* is applicable by considering which of our various ends is a final end. For we are entitled to ask: "*Why* does Aristotle think that if we discover something to be desired and pursued for its own sake, we shall be entitled to say that it is *τἀγαθόν*?" and no answer is possible unless we allow that he thought that in desiring and pursuing something for its own sake we are desiring and pursuing it *ὡς ἀγαθόν*.

But Aristotle in saying, as he would have said, that in pursuing, e.g. an honour, we are pursuing it *ὡς ἀγαθόν* could only have meant that we are pursuing it in virtue of thinking that it would possess a certain character to which he refers by the term *ἀγαθόν*, so that

by ἀγαθόν he must mean to indicate some character which certain things would have. Further, this being so, in implying as he does that in pursuing things of certain different kinds καθ' αὑτά we are pursuing them ὡς ἀγαθά, he must be implying that these things of different kinds have, nevertheless, a common character, viz. that indicated by the term ἀγαθόν. It will, of course, be objected that he expressly denies that they have a common character. For he says: τιμῆς δὲ καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἡδονῆς ἕτεροι καὶ διαφέροντες οἱ λόγοι ταύτῃ ᾗ ἀγαθά.[1] But the answer is simple; viz. that this is merely an inconsistency into which he is driven by his inability to find in these things the common character which his theory requires him to find, and that if he is to succeed in maintaining that we pursue these things of various kinds ὡς ἀγαθά, he *has* to maintain that in spite of appearances to the contrary they have a common character.

Nevertheless, though we have to insist that Aristotle in fact holds that in pursuing any of these things καθ' αὐτό, i.e. as we should say, for its own sake, we are pursuing it ὡς ἀγαθόν, we cannot escape the admission that in doing so he is being inconsistent. For to maintain that in pursuing, e.g. an honour, we are pursuing it καθ' αὑτό, or, as we should say, for its own sake, is really to maintain that the desire of an honour moving us is an independent desire, i.e. a desire depending on no other. And, on the other hand, to maintain that in pursuing an honour, we are pursuing it ὡς ἀγαθόν, or as a good, is really to maintain that the desire of an honour moving us is a dependent desire, viz. a desire depending on the desire of something which will possess the character indicated by the word ἀγαθόν, we desiring an honour only in consequence of desiring something which will possess that character and thinking that an honour will possess it. It is in fact really to maintain that in pursuing an honour, our ultimate aim, i.e. that the independent desire of which is moving us, or what Aristotle would call that which we are pursuing καθ' αὑτό, is not an honour but a good, i.e. something having the character, whatever it may be, which is indicated by the word ἀγαθόν, we desiring an honour only in consequence of desiring a good. The principle involved will become clearer, if we take a different illustration. In Chapter VI Aristotle speaks of ὁρᾶν as one of the things which are pursued for their own sake; and if he had said that we pursue ὁρᾶν ὡς αἰσθάνεσθαι he would in consistency have had to maintain that what we are pursuing καθ' αὑτό is not ὁρᾶν but αἰσθάνεσθαι, and that the desire of ὁρᾶν moving us is only a dependent desire depending on our desiring something else which we think ὁρᾶν will be.

It will be objected that there is really no inconsistency, since

[1] *Ethics*, I, 6, 11.

Aristotle conceives the characteristic referred to by *ἀγαθόν* as a characteristic of an honour and of anything else which he would say we pursue *καθ' αὑτό*, and that to speak of us as desiring something in respect of some character which it would have is not to represent our desire of it as dependent. In illustration it may be urged that to speak of us as in desiring to do a courageous action desiring it as a worthy or virtuous action is not to represent our desire to do a courageous action as dependent. But the objection cannot be sustained. For if we desire to do a courageous action, as something which would be a virtuous action, i.e. really, as something which we think would be a virtuous action, although our desire does not depend on a desire of something which we think a courageous action would *cause*, it does depend on the desire of something which we think it would *be*. And as a proof of this dependence we can point to the fact that if while having this desire, we were to do a good action of another sort, e.g. a generous action, the desire would disappear.

What is in the end plain is that Aristotle cannot succeed in maintaining that our ultimate end is always *ἀγαθόν τι* without abandoning his view that we pursue such things as *τιμή* and *ἀρετή καθ' αὑτό*, or, as we should say, for their own sake, and maintaining instead that we pursue them as things which we think will have the character to which the term *ἀγαθόν* refers. Nevertheless, in spite of having to allow that we are thereby attributing inconsistency to Aristotle, we have to admit that he in fact holds that in desiring and pursuing certain things for their own sakes we are desiring and pursuing them in respect of their having a certain character, viz. whatever it be to which he refers by the term *ἀγαθόν*.

So far the only clue reached to the meaning of *ἀγαθόν* is the idea that Aristotle used it to refer to a certain character possessed by certain things, the thought of the possession of which arouses desire for them, and indeed is the only thing which arouses desire for anything, except where our desire depends on another desire.

We have now to try to get to closer quarters with the question of its meaning. The question is really: "What is the character which Aristotle considered we must think would be possessed by something if we are to desire it, independently of desiring something else to which we think it will lead, that character being what Aristotle used the word *ἀγαθόν* to refer to?"

Here it seems hardly necessary to point out that the answer cannot be "goodness." To rule out this answer, it is only necessary to point out two things. First, if Aristotle had meant by *ἀγαθόν* good, he would have had to represent us as desiring for its own sake any good activity, whether ours or another's, whereas he always implies that a good activity which we desire is an activity of our

own, and in addition he would have had to drop, as he never does, the idea of a connexion between a good activity and *our own* happiness. And second, Aristotle's term *ἀγαθόν* is always *ἀγαθὸν τινί*, as appears most obviously in the phrase *ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν* and in the statement in Book IX, 8, § 8–9, where he says that reason always chooses what is best for itself—*πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς αἱρεῖται τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτῷ*—and goes on to add that the man who gives wealth to a friend assigns the greater good, the having done what is noble (*τὸ κάλον*), to himself. Once, however, we regard this answer as having to be excluded once for all, there seems no alternative but to attribute to Aristotle a familiar turn of thought to which we are all very prone and which is exemplified in Mill and T. H. Green.

When we consider what we desire we soon come to the conclusion, as of course Aristotle did, that there are things of certain kinds which we desire, not in consequence of thinking that they will have an effect which we desire, but for themselves, such as seeing a beautiful landscape, being in a position of power, helping another, and doing a good action. We then are apt to ask, "What is the condition of our desiring such things?" and if we do, we are apt to answer—and the tendency is almost irresistible—"It is impossible for us to desire any such thing unless we think of it as something which we should like, since, if we do not think of it thus, we remain simply indifferent to its realization. Then, if asked what we mean by its being something we should like, we reply: "Something which would give us enjoyment, or, alternatively, gratification, or, to use a term which will cover either, pleasure." The tendency is one to which Mill gives expression when he says that desiring a thing and finding it pleasant are two parts of the same phenomenon; and Green exhibits it when he maintains, as in effect he does, that we can desire something only if we think of it as something which will give us satisfaction, i.e. gratification. In maintaining this, we are really maintaining that the thing which we at first thought we desired for its own sake, such as seeing a beautiful landscape, or doing a good action, is really only being desired for the sake of a feeling of enjoyment or gratification, or, to put it generally, pleasure, which we think it will cause in us. And correspondingly, where we think of the desire as moving us to act, we are really maintaining that what we at first thought is our ultimate end is really only our penultimate end or the proximate means, and that our ultimate end is really a pleasure which we think this will cause. We are, however, apt to think of a thing's giving us enjoyment, or alternatively, gratification, as if it were a quality of the thing just as we think of the loudness of a noise as a quality of the noise. And our tendency to do this is strengthened by the fact that the

ordinary way of stating the fact that something X excites a feeling of pleasure, or of gratification, is to say that X is pleasant or gratifying, a way of speaking which suggests that what is in fact a property possessed by X of causing a certain feeling is a quality of X. The tendency is mistaken, since as anyone must allow in the end, something's giving us enjoyment is *not* a quality of it, and when we say that something *is* pleasant, we are not attributing to it a certain quality but stating that it has a certain effect. Nevertheless, the tendency exists. And when it is operative in us, we state our original contention by saying that in desiring to see a beautiful landscape for its own sake, we desire it as something which will be pleasant, and that when we are acting on the desire, our ultimate end is the seeing a beautiful landscape as something which will be pleasant, thereby representing what on our view is really the proximate means to our end as our end.

This being the line of thought to which I referred, it remains for me to try to show that it was taken by Aristotle. Before we consider details, we can find two general considerations which are in favour of thinking that he took it. In the first place, if we assume it to be indisputable that he thought that there are things of a certain sort which we desire for their own sake, but that in desiring them we desire them in respect of having a certain character to which he refers by the term *ἀγαθόν*, and then ask "What can be the character of which he is thinking?" the only possible answer seems to be: "that of exciting either enjoyment or gratification." And in particular two things are in favour of this answer. First it is easy, from lack of consideration, to think of existing pleasure, as a quality of the thing desired—as indeed Aristotle appears to do when he speaks of virtuous actions (*αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις*) as *φύσει ἡδεὰ* and as *ἡδεῖαι καθ' αὑτάς*,[1] i.e. as pleasant in virtue of their own nature; and second, the perplexity in which he finds himself in Chapter VI when trying to elucidate the meaning of *ἀγαθόν* would be accounted for if what he was referring to was something which is not in fact a character common to the various things said to be *ἀγαθά*, although he tended to think of it as if it was. In the second place he applies the term *ἀγαθόν* not only to the things which we desire for themselves, but also to the things which produce or preserve them, and it is difficult to see how he can apply the term to the latter unless *ἀγαθόν* means productive of pleasure, whether directly or not. In fact, only given this meaning is it possible to understand how Aristotle can speak not merely of *τιμή* but also of *πλοῦτος* as an *ἀγαθόν*.

To pass, however, to special considerations, we seem to find evidence, and decisive evidence, in a quarter in which we at first

[1] *Ethics*, I, 8, 11.

should least expect it. At the beginning of Chapter IV he directs his hearers' attention to the question: τί ἐστι τὸ πάντων ἀκροτάτον τῶν πρακτῶν ἀγαθῶν, i.e. "What is it that is the greatest of all achievable goods?" and he proceeds to say that while there is general agreement about the name for it, since both the many and the educated say that it is happiness, yet they differ about what happiness is, the many considering it something the nature of which is clear and obvious, such as pleasure, wealth, or honour, whereas, he implies, the educated consider it something else of which the nature is not obvious. Then in the next chapter he proceeds to state what, to judge from the three most prominent types of life, that of enjoyment, the political life, and that of contemplation, various men consider that the good or happiness is, viz. enjoyment, honour, and contemplation. And later he gives his own view, contending with the help of an argument based on the idea that man has a function, that happiness is ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν.[1]

Here it has to be admitted that Aristotle is expressing himself in a misleading way. His question, "What is the greatest of goods?" can be treated as if it had been the question "What is a man's ultimate end?" i.e. τὸ τέλος τὸ ἁπλῶς, cf. Book VI, 12, 7. For as Book I, Chapter II, § 1 and Book I, Chapter VII show, he considers that to find what is the greatest good, or the good, we must find a man's final end, i.e. that which he desires and aims at for its own sake, and in Book I, Chapter V he judges what men consider the good from what their lives show to be their ultimate aim. And his answer to this question, if taken as it stands, is undeniably absurd. For, so understood, it is to the effect that, though all men, when asked "What is the ultimate end?" answer by using the same word, viz. εὐδαιμονία, yet, as they differ about what εὐδαιμονία is, i.e. really, about the thing for which they are using the word εὐδαιμονία to stand, some using it to designate pleasure, others wealth, and so on, they are in substance giving different answers, some meaning by the word εὐδαιμονία pleasure, others wealth, and so on. But of course this is not what Aristotle meant. He certainly did not think that anyone ever meant by εὐδαιμονία either τιμή or πλοῦτος; and he certainly did not himself mean by it ψυχῆς ἐνεργειά τις κατ' ἀρέτην τελείαν. What he undoubtedly meant and thought others meant by the word εὐδαιμονία is happiness. Plainly, too, what he thought men differed about was not the nature of happiness but the conditions of its realization, and when he says that εὐδαιμονία is ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις κατ' ἀρετὴν τέλείαν, what he really means is that the latter is what is required for the realization of happiness. Consideration of the *Ethics* by itself should be enough to convince

[1] *Ethics* I, 13, § 1.

us of this, but if it is not, we need only take into account his elucidation of the meaning of the question "*τὶ ἐστιν*": to be sure that when he asks "*τί ἐστι ἡ εὐδαιμονία*": his meaning is similar to that of the man who, when he asks "What is colour?" or "What is sound," really means "What are the conditions necessary for its realization?" We must therefore understand Aristotle in Chapter IV to be in effect contending that while it is universally admitted that our ultimate aim is happiness, there is great divergence of view about the conditions, or, more precisely, the proximate conditions, of its realization.

But, this conclusion reached, we can plainly take one step further and conclude that Aristotle himself is in agreement with the view that our ultimate end is happiness, and that, taking its truth for granted, his *Ethics* is concerned first to prove that it is by virtuous action that it will be realized, and then to work out in detail the character of virtuous action, so that we shall be better able to obtain our aim. In other words, we can conclude that his real answer to the question, "What is *τὸ τέλος τὸ ἁπλῶς*, i.e. our ultimate aim?" is not, as we may at first think, *ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν* but *εὐδαιμονία*, i.e. happiness. Putting this otherwise, we can say that the accurate statement of his own view is to be found in I, Chapter 12, where he gives as a reason why *εὐδαιμονία* is *τίμιον*, whereas *ἀρετή* is merely *ἐπαινετόν*, that it is for the sake of *εὐδαιμονία* that we all do everything else.[1]

Now, if by thus going behind Aristotle's terminology we are driven to conclude that Aristotle really considered our ultimate end to be always our happiness, or alternatively some particular state of happiness on our part—for sometimes he seems to imply the one view and sometimes the other—we are also driven to conclude that, though he at times makes statements to the contrary, he also holds that where we are said to have as our ultimate end *τιμή* or *ἐνέργειά τις κατ' ἀρετήν* or anything else of a kind which we consider a condition of happiness, the thing in question is really according to him only our penultimate end, and the desire of it is only a derivative desire depending on our desire of happiness. And then it becomes obvious that when he implies, as he always does, that in desiring one of these things we desire it as an *ἀγαθόν*, what he means by *ἀγαθόν* is productive of a state, or rather a feeling, of happiness, i.e. as I think we may say in this context, a feeling of pleasure. Further, this being so, we have to allow that he fundamentally misrepresents his own problem. Assuming that we all always have either a single ultimate aim, or at least, alternatively, an aim of one sort, what he ostensibly maintains is that we are

[1] [*ταύτης* (i.e. *εὐδαιμονίας*) *γὰρ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα πάντες πράττομεν*, *Ethics*, I, 12, 7.]

uncertain about its nature, and that therefore he has to discover its nature in order to help us to achieve it. But, as we must now conclude, what he is really maintaining is that though the nature of our ultimate aim, happiness, is known to us, for we all know the nature of that for which the word "happiness" stands, we are doubtful about the proximate means to it, and that consequently he has to discover the proximate means. In other words, in maintaining *ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν* to be our ultimate end of the nature of which we are uncertain, he is putting what on his view is really the proximate means to our end in the place of what on his view is really our end. And if we ask "How can he have come to misrepresent his own view so fundamentally?" then, if contentions already advanced are true, we have at hand a satisfactory answer. We can reply that the misrepresentation is due to his making two mistakes to which we are all prone; first, that of thinking of the property of causing happiness as a quality of what causes it, and secondly, that of thinking that where we are aiming at something of a certain kind for its own sake, and so having it as our ultimate end, we are nevertheless aiming at it in respect of its having a certain character.

By way of conclusion it may be well to refer to an objection which will inevitably be raised, viz. that I have been, in effect, representing Aristotle as a psychological hedonist, and that to do this is absurd. I admit the charge, but do not consider the representation absurd. It seems not only possible, but common to hold that there are a number of things other than pleasure which we desire for their own sake, and then when the question is raised, "How is it that we desire these things?" to reply: "only because we think they will give us pleasure." In my opinion, the reply is mistaken, and is made only because we are apt to think of the gratification necessarily consequent on the thought that something which we have desired is realized as that the thought of which excites the desire. But the mistake is a very insidious one, as, if I am right, is shown by the fact that Green, in spite of all the trouble he takes to point out that Mill falls into it, falls into it himself.

ON VALUE

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No one who is interested in the problem of value and attempts to read through the literature on the subject can fail to be struck by the extraordinary diversity of opinion. Some of this difference of view is traceable to ambiguities in language; there are various terms employed, each of which, of course, may or may not express any valid idea—terms like value, values, kinds of value, sorts of things that have value, value-objects, things that have value. The terms value and values are subject to and lead to much confusion, even on the part of those who are aware of the existence of such a danger. Much of the difference may probably be due to two other important factors: first, the education and training in earlier years whereby emotional reactions to words instead of intelligent understanding of their meaning and validity are induced, and, second, the continual reliance upon moral experience, which reliance may seem to be necessary, but which may be invalidated by the consideration, generally overlooked and unappraised, that moral, like social, experience might not be what it is if certain views were not entertained and did not prevail. The latter possibility would put moral and social studies on a plane quite different from that of physical investigations, for the moral and social inquirer would always have to bear in mind that the facts with which he is confronted, and to which he seeks to appeal, may exist to confront him and his fellowmen only in the sense that they arise from the acceptance and effectuation of a belief or theory, and would not be but for the effectuation of the belief or theory. The other factor, that of the influence of education and training upon emotional reactions, is also important in relation to a study of value, for it is necessary to be on guard against confusing reactions to *words* and reactions to objects, things, or situations.

The question with which contemporary philosophy is mainly concerned is one regarding the nature of value. Other questions may also be discussed, such as the incidence of value; but the latter question is somewhat involved, and may be resolved into at least two; namely, what has value and where is that which has value to be located? The distinction between these two questions may seem overdrawn, but its significance may be brought out by noting that a person is said to be just, that what is valuable is justice, that therefore value attaches to justice, and justice is located in persons.

In general, it would seem that value attaches to some quality—courage, honesty, justice, beauty, and so on—of some person, or object, or organization, such as a social system (which may be just or otherwise). It may be that some of these things may be also a value or have value, for instance, persons; or it may be that they are a value only because they possess some quality which is a value; but this is a point highly disputed and disputable. Many philosophers seem to be of opinion that the question as to what is the nature of value requires to be answered before an answer is obtainable to the question, what is it that is valuable or what are the values? Such an opinion is again disputable, for some theories of the nature of value are such as to give no guidance in the matter.

These preliminary remarks have been made in order to show that the problem of value is complicated, intricate, and full of difficulty and obscurity, and that a short article must very definitely be limited in its scope. Consequently the present effort is to be directed to a consideration of the objectivity of value, and, even then, only to a consideration of some points in connection with that topic, arising mainly, though not wholly, from a special type of theory originally formulated by, and associated with the name of, Professor G. E. Moore.

It is necessary to be clear about the nature of the distinction between subjective and objective when used in reference to the nature of value, for it is possible that some of the disputation that has taken place concerning *value* has been futile because of different meanings being attached to these terms. There are two other terms, also ambiguous, with which the terms subjective and objective may be, and indeed probably are, confused: these are the terms personal and impersonal. The latter distinction has arisen particularly in connection with the question as to where value is to be located, and the difficulty involved in it is no doubt in large measure due to a confusion between value and values. There are at least some values that are personal in that they are states, conditions, qualities, or activities of persons; and possibly, according to some opinions, persons themselves are values and, in fact, the only values. Now, if it could be maintained that all values were personal, there might be a *prima facie* case for holding that value was personal. But there would still be a question as to what this meant and as to whether it was justified.

One obvious meaning is that if there were no persons, that is no values, persons being assumed to be the only values, there could be no value, in the same way that there could be no yellowness if there were no yellow things. In this sense, value would be dependent on the existence of things that can and do have value. This view, however, is not obviously true; and it might be, and is, denied by some

theories; for there is an obscurity in the word *exist*; and what is at issue is the relation of value to existence and the ontological status of value. It might be true that if there were no values or no valuable things in existence, human beings could not and would not know value; but there still might be a metaphysical sense of *to be*, according to which value could be said *to be* even though no instances of it, that is no valuable things, existed. This, of course, is the contention of realism. If this were granted, then the fact that values are personal could not without further examination of the matter be taken as sufficient evidence for the view that *value* is personal. It is therefore possible that value is non-personal and objective in this sense, and that yet values are personal. If, however, the proposition, which has been initially accepted, that all values are personal is rejected on the ground that some values are impersonal—for instance, a beautiful sunset or landscape, these involving no reference to persons at all—then the argument for the view that value is non-personal and objective is considerably strengthened. It could not be said that value is either personal or natural; and the conclusion would be that in some sense it is non-natural without being personal, and if personal implies being mental, then without being mental. Hence the terms subjective and objective do not coincide with the terms personal and impersonal or natural.

There is a second possible meaning of the view that value is personal. It is that which is bound up with the idea of *being relative to*. This idea of relativity has a wider aspect than that which is to be considered here, for it may be held that value is relative to circumstances, or to the situations in which it is found. What is being considered here is the idea of the relativity of value to persons. Value is sometimes said to be relative to the individual, or sometimes to persons in general. Though the first meaning of the personal nature of value which has been discussed in the preceding section may seem indistinguishable from this view, yet the relativity in question is not that of the existence of a quality being dependent upon the existence of what has that quality. To say that something is relative to an individual is sometimes thought to signify that the something in question is subjective; and the latter term is supposed to mean (to omit the now generally recognized absurdity of interpreting it as implying a mental state of the individual) *existing only for the individual*. What requires to be emphasized is that *being relative to* does not necessarily signify *depending for its existence upon*. There is no need here to examine and refute any possible account (if any is ever forthcoming) of how the roundness of a square tower is dependent for its existence upon an individual who is viewing the tower from a distance. There is no more *subjectivity* involved when the individual sees the tower as round than when he sees it at close

quarters as square. If the roundness is to be called relative to the individual, it is relative to his seeing the tower under certain conditions which are non-individual, objective, and certainly non-mental; but it is none the less objective, even though it is not what is called a quality of the real tower. The conclusion to be drawn is that to say value is relative to the individual is not necessarily to assert that value is dependent for its existence upon the individual. The idea of the relativity of value to the individual and the idea of the objectivity of value are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Relativity need signify nothing more than a matter of emphasis and selection in regard to what is objective; but emphasis and selection do not turn what is emphasized and selected into something subjective. Toil may induce a man to concentrate his attention upon rest and to be more appreciative of it; war, danger, and disorder may lead men's or some men's minds towards, and make them more appreciative of, peace, security, and order; and hence, unless value is being identified with the *sense* of value or an attitude towards things, varying views of what is valuable, which are well known to exist, do not point to the subjectivity of value. They may point only to the presence of factors which affect the apprehension of what is objective, which may even conduce to a failure to apprehend at all. Two or more people may differ as to the colour of an object; but such difference is not evidence that the object has not a specific colour or that the colour exists only for the individual. If, however, this relativity does exist, a special problem, it is true, arises; for just as in the case of things and their qualities it gives rise to the question, what is the real nature of the thing, so in connection with value the relativity has to be discounted in order to decide, if it can be decided, what the value of anything that is declared to be valuable or otherwise actually is.

The term *being relative to* may be and has been given another interpretation; value is something not merely existing for the individual or for persons, but it is something that is made or created by the individual in virtue of the fact that he adopts some attitude towards things or situations. This is the view against which Professor G. E. Moore directed his vigorous onslaught. The best-known form of the theory is that which maintains that things are valuable because persons desire them or have some emotion or feeling towards them. It is quite clear that on such a view if there were no persons or creatures having desires or emotions there would be no such characteristic as value; it is not quite correct even to make the latter statement because there is no such distinctive quality to be called value; there is only the characteristic of being desired or *having an emotion towards*. This means that *value* is reducible to terms of something else—in this case to a subjective process or attitude or state;

and in this sense value is declared to be subjective. This view of value differs from the first meaning of the proposition that value is personal, discussed above, in that according to the latter value is recognized as something characteristic of personal states or activities or even of persons, while the latter does not hold that value is such a characteristic, but that it is nothing different from such a state, activity, or attitude. Against such a view it is held that value is not so reducible, that it is a unique characteristic of things—possibly of a great number of things different in many respects from each other, difficult to classify, and alike only in respect of being valuable or having the characteristic *value*. Value is a unique determination of objects; it is something that is judged or valued, not something that comes to be when judging or valuing occurs, nor when a thing is desired, for it is the value of the thing which is the ground of the obligation to desire it.

This is the objective view of value maintained by realists. The objectivity of value has been defended by other theories of a different philosophical type; wherein they differ fundamentally from realism is that they hold that there is a connection between value and mind, while realism denies this supposed connection. As for certain obvious reasons this connection cannot be between value and the finite mind, recourse is had to the idea of a divine mind in the case of a theistically inclined theory such as that of Professor Sorley, or in the case of idealism to an absolute system interpreted in terms of mind. For these theories objectivity means independence of finite minds; with this realism agrees, but it goes further in maintaining that value is not dependent on mind at all, that it is, as it were, a character real in its own right, and that, like any other predicate, it subsists independently of the subject that judges, values, desires, or experiences. This objectivity, stressed by realism, is yet held to be quite consistent with the fact that many, if not even most, instances of value, complex in nature, have among their constituents feelings or consciousness in some other form; for realism in making this admission is not admitting that the presence of feeling or consciousness in such instances is what makes the value of, or gives value to, them. In more technical philosophical terminology realism holds, first, that there is no analytical connection between value and desire nor, more generally, between value and mind; second, that the connection between value on the one hand and desire, or more generally mind, on the other, is synthetic, but that this connection is not necessary; third, according to some realists at least, that the connection between value and obligation is both synthetic and necessary.

The object of this paper is now to consider some points arising out of the idea of the objectivity of value in general, but in particular

out of the realist theory. Value becomes a rather remote and tenuous quality; and, even on the admission of some of the adherents of realism, very little of consequence seems to be inferrible from its view of value. Most people are concerned about values or about what things are valuable; and the realistic idea of value—the idea of value being the basic idea or at least one of the basic ideas, for realism seems to require two—provides no clue in this matter, everything depending upon the apprehension of or insight into value. The term insight, which is frequently used, is apt to carry with it the notion of peculiar difficulty in apprehending value and the need of special power and training. Value, apparently, is very shy and elusive. Realism, of course, cannot and does not assert that every claim to an apprehension of value is sound, for error seems possible here just as in other matters; experience bears witness to the diversity of opinion regarding what is valuable; and even among realists themselves there is considerable diversity of opinion, while the values which they do accept or declare to be truly values are one or more of those accepted for ages by mankind. In the case of varying opinion there is, unfortunately, no very clear and precise test to be applied to reach a decision as to who is right. When one man declares an object to be red or cold and another man disagrees, means have been found for explaining the difference between them; but it seems that no such means, at any rate of an indubitable nature, have been found for a decision in a conflict of opinion about value; and all that remains is a somewhat blind submission, so far as many are concerned, to the views of one or other conflicting expert or authority. From the point of view of practice the result is not so very different from the theory that value *is* satisfaction of a hormic tendency; in the latter case a person may be mistaken as to the nature (in a purely natural sense) of that in which he will find satisfaction; in the former case he may be mistaken as to the value of the object; in either case he will be striving after what he believes to be good, even though it will not really be so, and he will be doing what to some people he ought not to be doing. The view[1] that value is apprehended through judgment does not help in the difficulty, and is in itself somewhat misleading. It does not help, because judgment is not infallible or inevitably correct; and what at most is true is that value, in so far as it is apprehended at all, must be apprehended by way of judgment. But even this much does not appear to be quite true on analogy with other matters. What is judged is that something (X) has value, just as it is judged that grass is green. Value as an ultimate quality is not what is judged, any more than the quality *green* is judged or apprehended by a judgment. The apprehension of the quality is one thing; its attribution in the form of a

[1] Clarke: *The Logic of Value*, p. 255.

judgment to something (X) is another thing. Error may occur both in regard to the apprehension and the attribution.

A consideration of the realist view of the relation of emotion or subjective attitude to value raises an issue which is extremely intricate and difficult, for questions of psychology are involved, and they might easily lead to a long digression, which must be resisted, concerning the conditioning of emotion and the significance of such conditioning for the problem of value. Against the view which would reduce value to a subjective state or process—satisfaction, pleasure, or desire—the realist maintains that what must be considered is the *appropriateness* of the response and that this appropriateness is dependent upon the value of the object or situation. The response or attitude is justifiable only when it is appropriate. This is another form of the argument that a thing is not good because it is desired, but it ought to be desired if and because it is good. Enjoyment of a landscape, a natural scene, art, or music is valuable and justifiable only if the natural scene is beautiful and the art or music is good. In fact, to enjoy what is really ugly or bad is doubly bad. Professor Laird[1] states this position to the effect that "it is necessary to maintain that the rightness of emotion is subordinate to insight and that the relevant insight must be insight into values." There occurs here that use of the word *values* which is fairly frequent on the part of philosophers, and it is not certain whether the plural of value is meant or whether the meaning is objects that have value. The issue is a little uncertain in consequence; but it is assumed here that the question raised is whether the appropriateness of the response is dependent solely upon the value of the object or upon the mere natural character of the object. A naturalistic theory, such as the desire-theory of value, would probably, with certain qualifications arising out of the conditions under which the satisfaction of desires is achievable, maintain that the important factor is the real, but natural, character of the object, and that the justifiability of desire is dependent solely upon this, the appropriateness or inappropriateness of desire being decided by reference to it, and the badness of desire being due to a mistaken apprehension of it. There is a sense, of course, in which the response may be said to be always appropriate: in normally developed adults the response is conditioned by what the person takes the nature of the object to be; but he may be mistaken; and the idea of appropriateness involves a reference to what the nature of the thing really is. What the realist is asserting is that to have rightness of emotion there must be correct apprehension of the object or situation; and it must be admitted as true that rightness of emotion is subordinate to insight, for the simple reason that *rightness* is being defined by reference to insight or knowledge. On

[1] Laird: *The Idea of Value*, p. 246, Sect. 11. Cf. p. 238, Sect. 7.

the realist view the nature of the object, insight into which is necessary, presumably includes its natural character as well as its value or non-natural character, but special emphasis is put on the latter. Now, it may be difficult to decide definitely, but at least a doubt may be expressed as to whether there are convincing reasons for believing that the required insight is insight into value rather than merely into the natural character of the object. Instruction and correction, designed to secure the appropriate emotional response or, in view of the absence of any guarantee that value is correctly apprehended and hence of any test as to what is the appropriate response, what is believed to be the appropriate response, are directed to bringing to notice natural qualities, and, it may be, structural properties of an object or situation. Specific individuals may have an inability in apprehending such qualities or properties, and such an inability is not different in nature from that found often in regard to other matters such as mathematics or even physics; consequently, appropriateness of response is in their case difficult to secure, and even if manifested may be only a matter of imitation or of *pose*. Specific individuals may also suffer from abnormalities which render appropriateness of response difficult or impossible. But underlying the instruction and correction there is the assumption that certain qualities call forth a certain emotional response, that is, that there are some such primary correlations empirically verifiable, and that, allowance being made for conditioning or maladjustment, what is necessary to secure the appropriate response is to get the individual to grasp the quality or property. As any object which in the realist sense is held to have value has probably one or more such natural properties, the correlation between the property and emotion may very easily be supposed to be a connection between value and emotion. The naturalistic theory might thus claim that it could give an explanation of appropriateness of emotion without resort to the idea of a unique quality *value* and that the latter was superfluous; that an emotion is appropriate because it is a response to the apprehended natural quality x and not to the apprehended *value* of x; that the connection is between the quality and the emotion and not between *value* and the emotion; and that the connection is synthetic and necessary in the sense of being empirically verifiable in the majority of cases and the exceptions being capable of explanation. At any rate, the naturalistic case seems just as strong so far as evidence goes as the realist case; and the dispute seems to become merely a matter of dogmatic assertion on both sides. The realist admits that what is appropriate is not analytically contained in the realist idea of value and that the connection between value and emotional response is synthetic; and the point of contention is whether the emotional response is conditioned by the apprehension of the non-natural

quality *value* or by the apprehension of the natural quality or qualities of the object.

This controversy about the appropriateness of response is connected with a more general topic which raises one of two other points requiring to be discussed. The one point is the relation between value and obligation. The notion of appropriateness of emotion, of course, is one concerning what *ought to be* the emotion. Professor Laird[1] asserts that "there is a necessary and intrinsic connection between value and obligation," to which the qualification is added: "in every instance in which the thought of value may be a guide to action." This means that the idea of obligation is not obtainable by analysis of the idea of value, nor is it deducible from it; and consequently the idea of obligation is a basic idea like that of value. As value is said by some realists to be "that which ought to be," it is not clear whether all realists hold that value and obligation are both equally fundamental. There is a difference here which is important. According to the one view, to apprehend value is to apprehend obligatoriness, the latter being apparently regarded as a characteristic of value, and as objective therefore as value; according to the other view, obligation is a matter of attitude or response and hence subjective. It is questionable whether some realists are sufficiently careful in making their position clear, for they write as if they understood obligation to be a response—intrinsically appropriate—to value. In addition to the question whether realism intends to assert that the apprehension of value is the apprehension of obligatoriness, there seems to be obscurity or confusion regarding the nature of obligation; there is the question whether the apprehension of value gives rise to a sense or awareness of obligation, and there is the question whether the apprehension *ought* to give rise to such a sense or awareness. These two questions may suggest over-refined complication; but the point at issue is whether the *appropriate* response to value is the psychological sense of obligation itself or some other *emotion* which *ought* to occur.

An important issue requiring consideration is whether the realist theory of value fits in with or throws light upon the nature of obligation. As value is often declared to be "that which ought to be," and as this phrase seems to be full of difficulties, it is expedient that a beginning should be made with an examination of it. Now, it is not at all obvious that the apprehension of value reveals to us that it is what ought to be, and the statement probably involves a confusion between value and values, or things that have value. What is probably meant, and what would be generally admitted to be true, is that valuable things ought to exist. Secondly, the assertion that value is what ought to be is not based on the apprehension of value,

[1] *A Study in Moral Theory*, Ch. ii, p. 25.

but probably on the experience of obligation, and on an analysis of it in the first instance, the theory of value being built up to conform to what the analysis of obligation seems to require. Thirdly, there is a wide gulf between value as that which ought to be, and the nature of obligation; and a doubt must be expressed whether the realist view bridges this gulf. The idea of obligation implies that value not merely ought to be but ought to be *through human agency*; and even then what so ought to be are valuable things. Value may be realized without human agency; beauty, for instance, is realized in nature quite independently of human effort. It even seems that there is no necessity to admit that to realize beauty by way of art is an obligation; it does not seem to be an obligation to realize beauty for the sake of beauty; in fact, this has often been admitted; what has been maintained, though hesitatingly, in recent times to be an obligation is the promotion of beauty so that people may *enjoy* beautiful things; and the realization of beauty by way of art is obligatory in reference to such an objective, with an implication of a certain level of *personal being* thereby attained. Fourthly, there is considerable ambiguity in the meaning of the phrase *to be*. In a very important metaphysical sense value *is*. Some realists[1] declare that value is not an existent which comes into being with temporal existents or ceases to be when they cease to be. The sense, therefore, in which value *is* must be a sense different from that in which value comes to be through human agency. The latter sense is that value ought to be realized in the form of a valuable temporal existent; but to be realized is not the sense in which value *is*.

The difficulty here seems to be a real and an important one. The theory that value is objective and independent of individuals renders unmeaning the idea of an obligation to pursue value, in so far as obligation is taken to mean the pursuit or attainment of value. This is a difficulty which attaches to any theory, such as that of Professor Sorley,[2] which argues for the objectivity of value. The great idealists from Plato onwards, says Professor Sorley, have always recognized the values of goodness, truth, and beauty, which have been regarded as the true realities, and as such persisting eternally; the eternal validity of these may have nothing to do with their realization in consciousness; and they have a validity which is independent of their inadequate realization in the world or recognition by its inhabitants. The realist declares that the exemplification of value in temporal instances is not to be confused with the *being* of value, that what is worthy to be is worthy in exactly the same sense before any particular instance of it exists as it is after it exists, and that existence is not a necessary presupposition of value, for it may undoubtedly

[1] Clarke: *The Logic of Value*, p. 156.
[2] *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, p. 484.

attach to the potential or subsistent.[1] This view follows that of Professor G. E. Moore, in his *Principia Ethica*, where the distinction between the real and existent is vigorously emphasized. It follows from such views of value that value is not affected by man's pursuit or non-pursuit of it; its fate is independent of anything which human beings may or can do; they cannot create it nor can they destroy it. Wherein, then, lies the obligation to pursue and attain value?

Plato, it will be remembered, maintained in the *Republic* that the type of State-organization outlined by him was none-the-less desirable or valuable, even though conditions made its realization impossible. But if the value is there irrespective of its actualization in a temporal existent, what does it matter whether it is actualized or not? The only answer seems to be that in some respect its actualization itself is of value; and that it is because of this value attaching to realization that obligation comes to have meaning. In order to understand obligation it is necessary to interpret what *ought to be* as what *ought to be realized*, that is, in temporal form and through human agency. If this is so, the realist view of value requires to be at least modified in some way; for otherwise no connection, synthetically necessary or otherwise, is discoverable between value and obligation. The difficulty just stated is almost one of inner contradiction in the theory; for according to it value is a purely objective quality independent of any attitude of individuals and independent of realization, while yet, in order to interpret obligation, this objective value must be supplemented by a value which belongs to the realization of the former by human beings.

There remains for consideration the second of the two points previously referred to, one of which was the idea of obligation. This second point is one concerning the idea of greater and less value, and its possible meaning on the realist view of value. Professor G. E. Moore, in his *Principia Ethica*, maintains that good (or value) is an ultimate, simple, unanalysable predicate; and in expounding his notion of organic unities declares that the value of a whole need not coincide with the sum of the values of the parts or constituents, but may be greater or less than that sum. Other realist writers have followed him in this, and speak of greater and less value. The question that arises is whether it is possible to use such an idea at all so far as the realist theory is concerned. That in practice such a principle of more and less value is used must be admitted. It may even be necessary for the interpretation of human experience as well as for making decisions concerning conduct. That, however, is another matter. What is relevant here is that no idea or prevalent mode of speech should be adopted uncritically by a theory but that its adoption should be shown to be consistent with and intelligible in terms

[1] See Clarke: *The Logic of Value*, pp. 154–155, 156, 245.

of its basic conceptions. Realism may be capable of providing a justification of the idea of greater value or of *being more valuable*; but it is necessary to point out that there is a difficulty, and one that requires to be met. It is true that, to use an analogy, one yellow may be said to be more yellow than another yellow; it is also true that one cold may be said to be more cold or greater than another cold. Whether such analogies are helpful it is difficult to say, for they might be taken to signify that value is a rather complicated affair. The analogy of yellow suggests a *standard* yellow with which other yellows are compared; but one yellow plus another yellow do not yield a quality yellow which is more or less yellow than either or both of these. The analogy of cold suggests physical units of heat which are measurable, and which provide an intelligible basis for speaking of greater and less cold. Either analogy may suggest the fusion of two or more *things* either yellow or cold in such a way that a definite yellow or a definite temperature results. Does realism imply that anything analogous to these possibilities is applicable in the case of its conception of value? Does it hold that the *value* of one thing may fuse with the value of another thing, and that there is a single resultant value in a manner analogous to the fusion of two bodies whereby their respective temperatures become adjusted and give rise to a resultant temperature which is that of the mixture? Does it believe that the value of one thing can be added to the value of another thing? Does it on the analogy of a standard yellow believe that there is a standard value? Professor Laird[1] discusses standards of value, but throughout he seems to be concerned with the fact that people, including philosophers themselves, do weigh the value of one thing against the value of another, and do judge one thing to be more valuable or less valuable than another; and his special problem is to show how this is done. What is at issue, of course, is not this but the question whether all this is consonant with a realist view of value as a simple, ultimate, unanalysable quality, and whether on such a view the notion of a standard of value is permissible. Resort to intuition does not help, because there remains a question as to what is intuited, as to what is meant by more and less value. In actual judgments about the value of things it is probable that there is much confusion between the terms value and values; even the latter term has two meanings—first, things that have value; second, the plural of value, which is a very questionable one. It is probable, too, that, since it is values, that is things having value, that are of interest, and as values have other properties than that of being valuable, these other properties affect one's estimation of their value and lead to varying estimates by different people. Probably also in many cases what is really meant by *greater value* is a greater number of *instances*

[1] *The Idea of Value*, Ch. x.

of value or even a deepened sense of value. Because of such confusions it may be thought that to speak of greater or less value is quite clear and intelligible and justifiable. These considerations, however, remain irrelevant to the question whether *value*, as understood by realism, can be regarded as having degrees.

FROM DISENCHANTMENT TO CONSTRUCTION

MICHAEL KAYE, M.A., PH.D.

NOTWITHSTANDING persecution, the Jews have clung staunchly to God. But so have others. And is there any man's life which is free from the persecution of Death, which is not finally futility? "Surely every man walketh in a vain show"; "his days are as a shadow that passeth away."

Not that life and the world merit condemnation simply for the reason that "there is no new thing under the sun." With perfection all around, novelty might possess no charm. If vanity and repetition exist together, it is precisely because there is repetition of the vain. Thus to-day there is vigorous effort at social betterment; but similar efforts have been in the past—similar toil, similar failure, and similar martyrdom; yet permanent achievement is still for the future. "That which is crooked cannot be made straight: and that which is wanting cannot be numbered." If, then, without pessimism one may prophesy future earthquakes, why should one be thought fainthearted if, in a spirit of scientific detachment, one predicts a continuity of social upheaval and destruction? But suppose we imagine a universal peace established and even prolonged: shall we be wise to consider it deep-rooted? We have to remember the powerful men who have rejected such a Peace as not merely a dream, but a sickly dream. Doubtless the thought of Perpetual Peace is a fascination to the sensuous, the studious, the compassionate, and the timorous; but virility seems to find it suffocating. Thus in the world of men it is not simply that there has been no consolidation of persistent progress towards a goal universally accepted; more disturbing is that as yet there is no such goal which has won universal acceptance. Peace or War, Partnership or Paternalism, Organization and Security or Freedom and Uncertainty, Sufficiency and Equality or Wealth and Poverty, Material Power or Spiritual Power—the disjunctions here are many and urgent, and there is still no discovered way to their final resolution. Even, then, as we dismiss as mere romanticism the idea of a Golden Age in the past, from which all subsequent history has been as degeneration, we have still to protest that such an age is not either our troubled and dangerous present, or the future so far as it lends itself at all to discernment. Nor does the dawn of social perfection appear more near or certain than that complete extinction of life on earth which is foretold by modern astronomy.

Of course, it is easy to rhetorize that even for man—or at any rate for the more fortunate of his kind—the world is not bad without qualification. Regrettably its goods are frail and fleeting, yet still they are actual and multifarious, and in divers degrees rapturous for the moment that they last. Progress may be an illusion, and man's finitude certain; yet knowledge, beauty, friendship, adventure, vigour—these things remain for his delectation. Though the end must be tragic, the passage may be spirited. Amid a mass of frustration there may be snatches of joy. Let us, then, live while we can; let us not surrender before we must.

But a consideration more objective, and perhaps more important, is that even though the world be unacceptable to man, its goodness may yet be absolute—for God. The world is not of our own making, nor primarily for our own judgment. It is not our responsibility, nor with any completeness can we grasp it or relish it. Even if it be allowed as incontestable that from his own standpoint it would have been best for man that he should never have been born at all, yet still this does not mean that his origin and perpetuation are accidental and lamentable from the standpoint of the world. It is grossly untrue that man is the measure of all things. Man is a part of the world, and not the world a part of him. In so far as by his will man alters the world, it is because it is integral to the world that so he should do. Otherwise it ignores his will, as in every case it eludes his span. Man is an element of the world, and the world is not his, but God's. Should, then, man condemn the world, this can hardly be of metaphysical importance. It is God's will that matters originally and finally. We have been placed in the world not for our own delight, but for His. We may revile the inhumanity of God's cruelty, yet what we intend to be rebellion God finds inevitable obedience. "Therefore I hated life; because the work that is wrought under the sun is grievous unto me." "When I applied mine heart to know wisdom, then I beheld that a man cannot find out the work that is done under the sun." Nevertheless, this is "the conclusion of the whole matter: Fear God, and keep His commandments; for this is the whole duty of man."

But is such divine existence credible; and, if it is, how may it help us?

The credibility, it may be said with Professor Kemp Smith,[1] cannot be guaranteed by argument: its basis is intuition. We feel inexpugnably that Reality is Mind and its objective product. But once the truth of this intuition is respected—and it is not irrational to respect it if, as indeed is the case, we cannot disprove it—we can understand how the permanence of reality as an object of experience is assured, notwithstanding our own ephemerality; we can under-

[1] *Is Divine Existence Credible?*

stand how reality is comprehensible, because comprehended, notwithstanding our failure to grasp it ourselves, and that for our science the rationality of the world is not more than a pragmatic postulate; we can understand how reality is unified[1]—because it is the articulation of unity—notwithstanding that from electrons to elements, from matter to life, from life to mind, and from temporal particulars to eternal universals, there are jumps which our thought finds it difficult to bridge; we can understand how in the reality where there is succession as a fact, there is the repetition which renders comprehension more easy; we can understand how there is in reality a pervasive adoration—the whole world sings that it is all very good—notwithstanding the distresses and the tears of men. Thus our concept of universal deity seems to reinforce the fundamental presuppositions of scientific method, and to indicate how it is that the disinterested contemplation of ordered fact should appear so supremely worth while. But for this reason it becomes all the more important that we should avoid confusion as to the direction which this concept may give—or may fail to give—to our human morality.

Above all, we have to recognize that from the excellence of the world for God it is not a necessary inference that the world is intended for the good of man. We must face the challenge in the opening picture of Bertrand Russell's *A Free Man's Worship*. We must notice that precisely this is the difficulty of Theism, that, our earthly life being as it is, faith in God's love of men can be maintained only by faith in personal immortality, while yet ultimately the latter faith must be allowed to be dependent on the former. But there is no such circle in our view of the world as essentially God's expression and vision. For now it becomes simply unwarrantable dogmatism to hold that God's good is the irrefutable assurance of man's good. The world that is God's image and thought is the world in its absolute totality, the world in its diversity and prodigality. Therefore its Author appears as a mathematician, certainly, but not less conspicuously as the creator of stupendous drama, in which, though we may imagine that the whole is beauty, there is, besides comedy and idyll, abundant tragedy at once of the trivial and of the great. What David Hume[2] and J. S. Mill[3] adduce as to human failure and human suffering need not disconcert our concept of Pantheism. The Author of Nature *is* the same as the Author of the Sermon on the Mount; and Nature, for all its amenability to the vision of beauty, *is* in large measure destructive of what men would cherish. Dr. Inge has said: "Whereas in the Being there are no negative signs, in values,

[1] Cf. B. M. Laing: "The Conception of Reality as a Whole," in *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, January 1931; and C. D. Broad: *The Mind and Its Place in Nature*, pp. 17–38.

[2] *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.* [3] *Nature.*

and most distinctly in moral values, evil is no mere defect of being, but, to our minds at least, positive disvalue. This does make the identification of existence and value difficult."[1] I would say that it makes it impossible, and this for the reason that here the measure of value is appreciation by man. But there is no difficulty in the identification of value and existence if we regard as value what is appreciated by God. But in this case we have to reiterate that value for God may definitely involve the absence of value for man. This was perceived by St. Paul. The Potter has power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour. Yet our metaphysical picture is in large agreement with Dr. Inge's: "I mean by reality a kingdom of absolute or intrinsic values."[2] "The doctrine of values implies a super-individual subject, for whom the values are actual."[3] But these values which are actual for God do not seem to be essentially and primarily such as are esteemed by men. Rather I would urge with the Absolutists that it is not merely to misinterpret, but to impoverish, reality, to regard humanity as either the centre of its actuality or the goal of its nisus. Of course, reality for God includes humanity, but also it includes much else. No doubt, also, as experiencers, men appear not merely as God's objects, but seem akin to Him as subject. Into a certain selection of the multitudinous characters of His spontaneous creation, God seems to delight in a vivid self-projection. Yet it may still be a feature of the universal drama that those characters which are like to God most should be destined for the greatest fall. "The religious man," writes Dr. Jacks, "so far as I understand him, is endowed with a keen and persistent sense of the difference between good and evil."[4] Rather I would agree with F. H. Bradley, that what men call good and evil, the religious man is sensitive are alike contributory to the perfection of Reality as the vision of Absolute Mind. Though an important truth from our own standpoint, it is not evidently so from the standpoint of the divine, that "We ourselves are the most interesting products of the universe we are trying to understand."[5] It seems a religious conviction that God is actual, and His experience blessed, even though men be as the leaves of the forest. "Of old hast thou laid the foundations of the earth: and the heavens are the work of thy hands. They shall perish, but thou shalt endure." "The Lord gave, and the Lord hath taken away; blessed be the name of the Lord."

If, then, God's support of men against 'Nature' is doubtful, it is likewise not evident that among men He favours the righteous against the wicked. The righteous may make a kind of Pascal wager as to

[1] In *Philosophy*, April 1934, p. 155. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 151.
[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 155. [4] In *Science and Religion* (1931), p. 169.
[5] Dr. L. P. Jacks, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

God's promise of beatitude to His disciples, and they may believe that, despite appearance, His word will be surely accomplished—if not here, then in the hereafter. "Many are the afflictions of the righteous, but the Lord delivereth him out of them all." There is the difficulty, however, that the righteous are not easily recognized. For it is not merely that God sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust; even more challenging is the prosperity of the wicked and the tribulation of the righteous; wherefore men's judgments concerning God's wishes might seem to be in need of revision. Moreover, those documents, individuals, and groups that purport to testify as to God's declarations are so many and frequently contradictory, that it becomes wellnigh impossible, from any impartial standpoint, to decide for the supreme authority of any; not such divine revelations can help us, for example, to discover for a certainty whether God is rather for exclusiveness and war than for universality and peace, or for the latter rather than for the former; nor is it here a comforting reflection that those against whom their opponents would have invoked the divine wrath as against diabolical oppressors, have yet so often, with sincerity and fervour, thought their cause divinely sacred. Finally, that their righteousness or obedience to God might be absolute, the righteous should not complain, but should persist in their acquiescence, even though God inflicts on them evil, and this after having promised them good; they must willingly accept from God everything whatsoever, not least deceit and suffering and death in return for their excellent obedience; they cannot, therefore, with any logical justification, expect as certain a divine reward; nor can they be sure that the punished are the rebellious, or that the rewarded are the obedient. In no way, therefore, does God seem clearly to indicate those who are more obedient to Him than others. This does not indeed mean that in a struggle, so long as the struggle is actually proceeding, it is logically absurd that each side should believe that it is itself the divinely favoured; for to each side, of course, the belief may be valuable pragmatically, and it can be pragmatically disproved only by final defeat. It does mean, however, that ultimately we are invited to acknowledge that the vanquished, no less than the victors, the wicked as well as the righteous, the apparently rebellious equally with the apparently obedient, are expressive of God's nature and involved in His blessedness.

Admittedly, then, Pantheism does not seem to clarify our morality; but at the same time it need not obscure it; it allows our morality to shine by the light which is its own. For the excellence of the world for God by no means makes it man's definite duty to respect it as good for himself. Rather it might seem conformable with the divine perfection that man should revile reality as, on the balance,

hurtful, wasteful, tyrannical, and odious. In God's reality there are included the selfish, the grasping, and the cruel; there are included not less those who are ardent for service and reform. As we consider both the gospel of Nietzsche and the gospel of Jesus, it does not appear that, from the divine standpoint, either has precedence, or either is superfluous. Even, therefore, should the altruistic conclude that their purpose is finite, destined to frustration and final failure, they may still believe that their moral allegiance, against impossible odds, is itself divinely ordained. Not, of course, that this should reconcile them to the divine universe as it appears to men; they must still protest that, from the human standpoint, the universe seems exuberantly evil; to the universe which is itself the source of their impulse to transform it, they need not feel that they are at all obliged to render an unconditional obeisance. But from their recollection of the excellence of the world for God, it is open to them to extract this measure of consolation at least, namely, the perception that their moral heroism is not merely not metaphysically absurd, but is even metaphysically necessary. Thus Pantheism, while ineffective for the dissuasion of the selfish and the brutal, is also not contemptuous of the benevolent. It is not conspicuously adapted to inspire morality originally and positively; but it need not paralyse, or even depress, that moral enthusiasm which is already actual. What reveals value in facts universally should not evoke disparagement of the fact of moral seriousness. If anything, it might be thought an important item of the divine perfection that men should play their moral drama as though the part in its essence were the principle of the whole.

Moreover, even though impotent to generate moral effort, Pantheism may yet nourish it by providing it with a definite goal. If men would achieve for their fellows whatsoever is good, then it tells them that the highest good is the vision as enjoyed by God. It is precisely this vision, then, that it becomes the task of men as moral to endeavour to actualize in men universally. It is for altruistic education to arouse in each pupil at once a longing for this vision for himself, and a passion for its attainment by all others. Yet this also must be noticed by Pantheism: that such an education may find itself resisted. There may be an obstinate rejection not merely of its moral solicitation, but even of its selfish prescription; not a few men seem as though divinely ordained not merely to deride the good of others, but to misinterpret their own. As for the men who do indeed aspire to the divine vision for themselves, while yet indifferent to its enjoyment by their fellows, these also do not find achievement easy in the face of temptation, incapacity, and hostility. Yet by no means are the most successful in divine self-culture those who would mightily fulfil morality. Thus "The beatific vision can be seen by

few and described by none. Nevertheless, it is a fact. As Whitehead says, 'The fact of religious vision is our one ground for optimism.' "[1] But I think that the human, as distinct from the divine, possession of beatific vision is better described as an aspiration than as a fact. It is not even obvious that the distribution of infinite experience to finite experiencers, of an infinite object to finite subjects, is at all what the divine reality allows. In this reality morality emerges and discovers a goal; but it is a presumptuous conclusion that the goal will be reached or that the effort will persist.

So our main reflection is this. Granted the perfection of infinite vision to God, it does not follow that the divine perfection must be beneficent to man also, while yet the infinite vision is only God's, and not man's own. But it is for man to aspire to make it his own; and, as a moral man, he should struggle for its achievement by men universally. Yet as a suffering man he should not be expected to thank God; but he will be wise to meditate, to the degree that reality permits him, on his essential identity with God. Therefore, also, he should not wish to petition God, though he may find it cleansing and invigorating to allow a figurative expression to his hopes; of course, his supplication of God may be divinely determined, but it is not with any clearness the necessary or the unfailing condition of his good. In his moments of joy it is fitting that man should adore God, but he should see to it that his adoration is spontaneous, and not the gross coin of the petition which is sycophantic. Best, however, is it with man when his adoration of God is as God's self-adoration, when it is as something inevitably pervasive of divine communion. Even so, however, it seems to be man's part that, while he remains human and finite, he should recollect, even at the very moment when he imagines that he has glimpsed the universal light, his obstreperous obligations to the cave. Not for man, then, seems divinely intended that comprehensive concentration which is God's; for though God may relish human sufferings as essential to the perfection of the whole, it likewise appears involved in this perfection that certain men should have the character of altruism, should be stung to fury by the sufferings of their fellows. Such is the universal drama and the divine blessedness.

[1] W. R. Inge, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

AN APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

Professor JARED S. MOORE

The first important question which confronts the teacher of an introductory course in philosophy is likely to be the question as to how he may best *approach* the subject of what philosophy is, how to approach it in such a way as to pique the curiosity and excite the interest of the student from the beginning. After considering this question many times, it has recently occurred to the present writer that it might be helpful to make this approach by way of a parable, an allegorical account of what seem to be the three basic human desires—the desire to live, the desire to enjoy life, and the desire to understand life. He accordingly offers this suggestion for whatever it may be worth, and presents the following little tale as at least one possible working-out of that suggestion.

Once there were three brothers whose names were John, Jean, and Jolyon. As they approached manhood it became necessary for them to set forth upon the search for a livelihood, but before they did so they decided to meet together one day and reveal to one another their ambitions and hopes for the future. On this occasion some such conversation as the following ensued.

The eldest brother, John, was a burly fellow, with no nonsense about him. "The world is a hard place," he said, "at least, that is what everyone tells us, and from what I have been able to make out it must be so. After all, the one thing needful in life is TO LIVE, and I propose to satisfy that requirement, come what may. I shall go into some business, start at the bottom, and work my way up to the top. When I get there, then I may have time to look about me and see what pleasures the world may have to offer; but until then, I shall not allow myself to be swerved from my course by any allurements of the senses or any thoughts except those which are necessary to guide me in the attainment of my end." Now it must be admitted that John was a man of determination, and being a man of determination he went ahead and got what he was looking for; but he missed many things by the way, and when he attained his goal he was far from satisfied, and instead of finding happiness as he had hoped to do, he lived, I am afraid, a rather fretful old age, bored with himself, at odds with the world, and a dreadful nuisance to his friends.

Jean, the second brother, was of more sensitive mould. He listened

rather contemptuously to what John was saying, and could hardly contain himself until his turn came to speak. "In what way," he then asked, "is the life you are talking about any better than that of a goat or an earthworm, or even of a weed or a microbe? Of course, one must live—that goes without saying; but what is the sense of just living, like any other creature? As for me, I intend not only to live, but TO ENJOY LIFE *while* I live; and not to wait for happiness to come after the struggle for life is over; for if I do, I may never find it." And who will say that Jean was not right in so censuring his brother's narrow outlook? He was of a happy disposition anyway, and though he was never so successful financially as John was, he was certainly a far pleasanter companion; and when he came to die, he had many to mourn him and to rejoice that they had known him.

The youngest brother, Jolyon, listened in thoughtful and dignified silence to all that his elders said, and when they were through he continued in silence for some little time, until his brothers showed signs of considerable impatience. "Out with it," said John, "what are *you* going to do with *your* life?" And Jean showed by his looks if not by words that he, too, was eager to know what the youngster of the family was thinking. At last he broke his silence. "There are so many things I want to *know*," were his first words. "I want to know what life *is*, what *I* am and why I am here. I want to know whether there is any meaning or purpose in life, whether there is a God, and what kind of a Being He is. I even wonder if it is possible to know *anything really*, and whether perhaps life itself may not be but a long dream, and the whole world but an image in a dream. And so, you see, neither of you seems to me quite to hit the point that most interests me. I don't for a moment deny that one must *live*, nor do I deny that life without happiness is a pretty empty thing; but *merely* to live and to enjoy it seems to me rather futile after all. If John, with his sole interest in living, is hardly better than a weed or an earthworm, are not you, Jean, hardly better than an earthworm yourself? Does not the earthworm, too, in its simple way, want to *enjoy* life as well as to live it? But we are not weeds or earthworms, goats, or even anthropoids: we are *men*, with capacities of thought and understanding which no other creature possesses. No, I would not be satisfied merely to live and enjoy life: what I want to do above all is TO UNDERSTAND LIFE. I may never understand it very well, but I do at least want to understand it as far as I am capable of understanding it."

The brothers were rather overawed by Jolyon's lengthy harangue, but they were used to his peculiarities—he always had been a dreamer, utterly unpractical, but a lovable boy for all that. So they set this down as just another of his queer notions, and brought

their little discussion to an end in perfect harmony. And as time went on, each of the brothers attained after a fashion the goal he had envisaged for himself on that memorable occasion in his youth: John became a great merchant, with a seat on the Exchange; Jean, who was not a mere sensualist or voluptuary in his desire for happiness, developed into an artist of no mean talents; but Jolyon, who had begun life as a philosopher, remained a philosopher until the end of his days, getting as much happiness out of his thoughts as Jean did out of his art, and far more than John did out of his merchandise.

Our little parable represents fairly well, I think, the place of philosophy among the various human interests. Man seems to be controlled on the whole by three basic desires—(1) the desire to *live*; (2) the desire to *enjoy* life; and (3) the desire to *understand* life. The first of these he shares with all other living organisms, plants as well as animals; the second he shares with all other conscious beings; but the third belongs to man alone, and marks him off from all other created things. Though the desire to live is without question the most "vital," as we say, of all of them, nevertheless man is never contented merely to live, and if his life is to be complete, some measure of enjoyment and of understanding is also necessary.

Out of these desires, furthermore, have arisen certain organized interests or institutions. (1) Out of the desire to *live* have sprung what we know as the Useful Arts—hunting, agriculture, manufacturing, business, medicine, and the like—to enable us to become properly adjusted to our material environment, and to satisfy our own inner material needs; codes of Morals to guide our conduct in our relations with our fellow-men; and Religion to bring us into vital personal relations with God. (2) Out of the desire to *enjoy* life have arisen various forms of Play (games, sports, etc.), and above all the Fine Arts—painting, sculpture, architecture, dancing, poetry, music, and the like. And (3) out of the desire to *understand* life have originated the Pure Sciences and Philosophy. In each of these, again, man has set up certain ideals, or goals at which to aim in the various activities: (1) the Useful and the Good as goals of living, at the various levels distinguished above, with God as the Highest Good of man the ideal of the religious life; (2) Pleasure and the Beautiful as goals of enjoyment, also at different levels; and (3) Truth as the goal of science and philosophy.

Philosophy and what is called "pure" (as opposed to "applied") science, then, have for their sole task the attempt to understand —that is, to satisfy intellectual curiosity regarding—human nature, the universe in which man lives, and the living relation that subsists between them. As Aristotle said many centuries ago, a philosopher is just a man who seeks for knowledge—and knowledge for its own

sake, quite apart from any practical advantages, any aid in the business of more successful living, that may result from such a search. This view of the function of philosophy has prevailed throughout the ages since the time that Aristotle first set it forth; but it should be noted that soon after Aristotle's death a quite different view appeared among his immediate successors, the Stoics and the Epicureans, who regarded philosophy merely as a means to human happiness, and so (as they taught) to human welfare. This latter, more "practical," view of the place of philosophy in the world has had many advocates from that time to this[1]; so that in many persons' minds a philosopher is one who *lives* wisely, or who bears misfortune calmly, or who cares little for the ordinary pleasures of life. Accordingly, if one who claims to be a philosopher is discovered doing a foolish thing, or bemoaning an unhappy incident in his life, or indulging in the delights of a good dinner or an exciting detective story, he is thought of as in some way belying his profession by his conduct. But most professional philosophers would consider this an entirely erroneous view, sadly confusing the desire to understand life with the desire to live (or to enjoy life, in the case of the gourmet or the novel-reader). On the whole, as has been said, it is the Aristotelian view rather than the Baconian which has prevailed among those who call themselves philosophers, and it is that view alone which we shall herein support.

This interest in knowing for the sake of knowing is, as our friend Jolyon has already instructed us, one important characteristic which distinguishes man from the brutes. Animals use the knowledge which experience brings them solely as a guide to behaviour; man does this, too, but he also *reflects* upon his experience, treats knowledge as an end in itself as well as a means towards more successful behaviour—and in so doing, man is said to "philosophize." Without philosophy, therefore, said Bishop Berkeley, man is hardly more than a "thriving earthworm," not a man in any distinctive sense. As a matter of fact, every human being who has ever even asked questions about himself or the world in which he lives is an incipient philosopher: all of us have asked some of those questions, for example, which Jolyon propounded on the occasion of the meeting of the three brothers, and which made us say that he "*began* life as a philosopher." All that the *study* of philosophy can do is to develop our rather crude ideas through *disciplined* thinking—thinking under the guidance of others who have thought over these great problems before us. As William James once said, "Metaphysics [philosophy] means only an unusually obstinate attempt to think clearly and consistently."[2]

[1] Notably, in modern times, Francis Bacon; and among contemporaries Professor John Dewey. It may be called the Baconian view.

[2] *Psychology, Briefer Course* (1892), p. 461.

And F. H. Bradley, though speaking rather slightingly of philosophy as made up of bad reasons for what we already believe on instinct, nevertheless added that the tendency to search for reasons for our beliefs is itself an instinct—i.e. a natural impulse of man.

We are now ready, perhaps—at least, more ready than we were at the beginning—to formulate a definition of philosophy. This is by no means an easy task, and many attempts with quite diverse results have been made to accomplish it, but we shall now proceed in all modesty to offer our own suggestions in the matter.

A Definition of Philosophy

Let us first state our definition, and then consider it in detail: *Philosophy is a rational inquiry into the meaning of experience.* The import of this statement will become clearer as we analyse it, explaining its various terms more or less in the reverse order to that in which they occur in the definition.

First, then, philosophy is concerned with "*the meaning of experience.*" The word "experience," one of the most common words in the philosopher's vocabulary, must here be understood in the broadest possible sense as a general term for "any event or series of events in the life of a person."[1] In our ordinary usage we are inclined to restrict the word to some *striking* or *unusual* event—we speak of having had a "wonderful" or a "strange" experience, but would hardly think of applying the term to such a commonplace "event" as feeling a book in one's hands or seeing a man walk by the window; and yet for the philosopher these latter are just as truly instances of experience as the former. In a sense it is correct to say that all our knowledge of the world and of ourselves comes to us through experience, and it is the function of philosophy to *interpret* this experience, to discover its "meaning."

We used to hear it claimed by some that philosophy, unlike science and ordinary life, makes no assumptions. Few would have the hardihood to defend that claim to-day, but it is at least true to say that philosophy endeavours to make as *few* assumptions as possible. *Three* assumptions, indeed, are involved in our definition as we have considered it so far, and without these assumptions there could be no philosophy. These assumptions are: first, that the world, experience, *has* a meaning. If Macbeth was right in his cry of despair—"Life's but . . . a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing";[2] if the common saying, "Life is just one thing after another," is *all* that can be said about life; then, indeed, there ceases to be any place in the world for the philosopher. And yet in

[1] Merrington, *The Problem of Personality* (1916), p. 158.
[2] *Macbeth*, Act V, Scene 5.

one way it is true that even to say that life has no meaning is to philosophize—the meaning of experience is nothing at all; but such a position, though it is in a sense a philosophical one, certainly renders any *further* philosophy impossible—we are stopped in our philosophical investigations at the very outset. Unless we assume, then, that experience has a meaning, there can be no philosophy in any valuable use of that term.

The second assumption whose acknowledgment is essential for the very existence of philosophy, is that we can *know* at least *something* of the meaning of things, that human reason is not utterly unreliable in its endeavour to interpret experience. This claim on behalf of the human intellect is surely a modest one: we must admit that human reason *is* unreliable, else there would be no such thing as error; and perhaps we cannot expect to know very much about the meaning of life—certainly not as much as we should like to know; but if we could know *nothing* about it, if our reasoning powers were *utterly* unreliable, there could be no philosophy. True, just as there are some pessimists who deny that life has any meaning, so there are some philosophers—"sceptics," we call them—who deny that we can ever have any true knowledge of things; but this latter position is usually held as the result of quite a long process of argument, so it is really a *philosophical* position after all.

Finally, the third necessary assumption of philosophy is that it is *worth while* to attempt to discover the meaning of experience. For many years the present writer had presented to his students the first and second of these assumptions as necessary to the existence of philosophy, but the third had not occurred to him. Then, listening to the Presidential Address of Professor W. E. Hocking before the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1927, he was interested to hear the speaker declare that every philosopher makes *three* assumptions; and this interest grew even sharper when he found that Professor Hocking's first two assumptions were exactly the same as he himself had already ventured to suggest to his students! He waited eagerly for the third assumption, which followed immediately in the speaker's preliminary enumeration—"that it is worth while to" know the meaning of things, "and ought to be attempted."[1] And now the present writer gladly adds this third assumption to his own list; for surely, even if experience *has* a meaning, and even if we *can* know something of that meaning, yet if it is not worth while knowing what that meaning is, no one is going to take the trouble to philosophize.

We come now to the elucidation of another section of our definition. Philosophy, we say, is an "*inquiry* into the meaning of experience."

[1] This address of Professor Hocking's may be read in *The Philosophical Review* for 1928. Vol. XXXVII, pp. 133–155.

By using this word we are enforcing the truth that philosophy is largely a matter of asking questions, and does not pretend to give final answers to all questions. We can know *something*, we said, of the meaning of life; but we do not pretend to know *more* than "something." Many persons seem to think that if they once go into the subject of philosophy they may expect to find there an answer to every question that can enter into the mind of man; but if they approach the study of philosophy in that spirit, they are doomed to an early and sudden disillusionment. *Some* persons, I am afraid, do not even learn this lesson, and *act* at least as if they had discovered the final truth of things when they have read one book on this fascinating study, or taken one introductory course in it; though I can hardly think that those persons can really feel this way in the bottoms of their hearts. But often the asking of a new question is as important a step in the progress of philosophy as the attempt to answer an old one.

The inquiring nature of philosophy is well indicated by the etymology of the term. Two Greek words combine to constitute it: *φιλέω*, I love; and *σοφία*, wisdom. A philosopher, in other words, is literally and truly, not one who professes to be a "wise man" or "sage," but merely a "*lover of wisdom.*" There is no arrogance, then, in the profession of philosophy: if a "philosopher" meant a "wise man," few would dare to claim the title; but no one can be accused of arrogance who merely asserts himself to be a "lover of wisdom."

That mysterious but highly influential character of the ancient world, Pythagoras (sixth century B.C.), is usually thought to have been the first person to call himself a philosopher. About a century later a group of teachers arose in Athens who were known as "Sophists"—that is, men of wisdom. Their great contemporary, Socrates, was often regarded as one of their number, but sternly repudiated the charge of pretending to be wise in the Sophists' sense of that term, saying that the highest wisdom for man consists in the knowledge of how ignorant he is, and that God alone can be called *truly* wise.

Philosophy, then, as Professor E. S. Brightman has said,[1] is not so much a "body of conclusions about experience" as "a spirit or method of approaching experience" and asking it questions. Or to return to the ancient Greeks, both Plato and Aristotle have told us that philosophy begins in *wonder*[2]—wonder about nature, about man, human destiny, and the meaning of life. And the true philosopher never ceases to wonder until at last he ceases to live.

Finally, to return for the last time to our original definition, philosophy is "a *rational* inquiry into the meaning of experience."

[1] *An Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 7.

[2] Plato: *Thaeatetus*, p. 155 D; Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, p. 982 b. 12.

That is to say, it is an application of reason, rather than imagination, to experience; a *reflective* consideration of the meaning of things. In this, the philosopher is distinguished, for example, from the poet, who attains his conclusions through an emotional and imaginative response to experience, rather than through reasoning and argument. In fact, before there were any philosophers properly so-called in ancient Greece, there were the great poets of the ninth, eighth, and seventh centuries—Homer, Hesiod, and many others of lesser rank—who presented in an imaginative way many ideas which later philosophers developed in their own more argumentative fashion; and even the earliest philosophers themselves presented their arguments and conclusions in metrical form. Later, however, the two ways of dealing with experience became more and more distinct, though occasionally we find individuals who were able to combine the two types of approach—as, for example, Plato himself, and, later, Lucretius.

Philosophy, therefore, to vary somewhat the wording of our original definition, is *an attempt, through reasoning, to understand the nature of the universe and the place of man therein.*

The Value of Philosophy

But why should we study philosophy at all? Why take the trouble to inquire rationally into the nature of the universe and human life? Is our third assumption, which Professor Hocking told us about, true—viz. that it is worth while to try, so far as we can, to understand the meaning of things? In what way is it worth while?

From what has been said already it must be clear that the *primary* value of philosophy is not a practical but an *intellectual* one, its prime purpose not the guidance of conduct but the understanding of things in general—knowledge for its own sake. But what is to hinder our subject from *also* having, in some sense at least, a *practical* value? In stating that its primary interest is an intellectual one, are we not too sharply separating philosophy from ordinary life? Can theory and conduct be thus cut apart from each other, or is it not rather true that one's conduct is in large degree the *expression* of one's philosophy? Certainly these questions are well founded. It is absolutely true, and an important truth, that in ordinary life theory and practice are interdependent—our conduct is determined by our ideas, and ideas are in a very real sense instruments of conduct. And if this is true in ordinary life, there is no reason why it should not be true in philosophy. Let us consider, then, the question of the relation between philosophy and practical life.[1]

[1] This subject is excellently treated by C. E. M. Joad in an article in *The Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 1928, Vol. III, pp. 349–356.

Now the answer to this question depends largely upon what we mean by the word "practical." It is a notoriously ambiguous term, and most persons who utter it so glibly and frequently, as many do, have never stopped to consider what they mean by it. It is a popular word, and sounds well, so they use it freely! In one sense of the term —the narrow, *utilitarian* sense, as we may call it—philosophy is certainly *not* a practical study, and has, indeed, no practical value whatsoever. As has often been remarked, "philosophy bakes no bread": that is to say, it does not increase our *efficiency* in the specific activities of life, does not help us to secure wealth, success, or physical comfort. To secure these "useful" ends is the function of the useful arts and the applied sciences. Those who, like Francis Bacon and Professor Dewey, regard philosophy as having human welfare as its primary and sole end, are confusing, it would seem to those of us who disagree with their point of view, philosophy with what we now call applied social science. In the proper significance of the word, then, philosophy, like pure mathematics, is of absolutely no "*use*" in the world! And yet that statement is by no means intended to deny that there is a very real sense in which philosophy does have a "practical value," and we must now try to see what that meaning of the expression is.

It is in a much *wider* significance of the word than the foregoing that we can say that philosophy does have a practical value—namely, in broadening our knowledge of things, in increasing our appreciation of the wonders of the universe, and so in inspiring our daily life. Its practical value, we may say, is an *inspirational*, not a utilitarian, value. It promotes those virtues which we call "catholicity" and "tolerance"[1]—an interest in a diversity of things, and a willingness to consider a diversity of points of view with respect and sympathy—destroying their opposites, narrow-mindedness and bigotry. It will not make us better cooks or lawyers, or more successful in business, but it *should* make us better men and women. There was *some* truth after all, then, in the view of the ancient Stoics and Epicureans that the study of philosophy should promote human welfare and human happiness; where they were wrong was in thinking of that as the primary purpose of philosophy, whereas it is properly only a natural consequence of that study.

In its broadening effect upon the human mind, philosophy is not unlike astronomy, the most inspiring in many ways of all the special sciences. Other sciences also have a notable broadening influence and inspirational value—history, archaeology, geology, for example; but none carries the human imagination into such wide reaches that everything else seems trivial as does astronomy. Outside the field of

[1] See Gamertsfelder and Evans, *Fundamentals of Philosophy* (1930), pp. 62–64.

the sciences, literature, music, and the other fine arts also have much of this inspiring effect; and, above all, religion has the inspiration of life as almost (if not absolutely) its primary aim. It is with something like this in mind that the founders of the great fraternity of scholars, the Society of the Phi Beta Kappa, took for their motto the expression whose initials in the Greek constitute their title—*Φιλοσοφία Βίου Κυβερνήτης*, "Philosophy the guide of life."

Every enthusiastic student, whatever his field of special interest, is tempted to think of his own subject as the most important of all subjects. Like the pseudo-patriot who says, "My country, right or wrong, first, last, and all the time"; this is carrying things too far; but there is no harm—nay, rather, much good—in thinking of one's own subject as the most fascinating one in the world *for him*, and in saying why he thinks so. Perhaps, then, one such enthusiastic student may be permitted to say why philosophy is to him the most fascinating of all subjects, and perhaps his enthusiasm may in some degree infect one or two at least of his readers.

For the present writer, then, *the surpassing interest of philosophy* is to be found in three directions—(1) in the loftiness of its theme; (2) in the breadth of its scope; and (3) in the depth of its foundations.

The loftiness of its theme. The late eighteenth-century romantic philosopher whose pen name was Novalis, once said, in defence of philosophy against the criticism that it "bakes no bread": True, philosophy can bake no bread, but it "can give us God, freedom, and immortality." Now one may very seriously question whether in any sense it is strictly true that philosophy can "give" us God, freedom, and immortality; but it is certainly true that these and other lofty conceptions of the human mind[1] have been the constant concern of the greatest philosophers. All the sublime questions of religion are also subjects of philosophical consideration—Does God exist? If so, what or who is God? Does He care for us? Can we know Him as we can know a human being? Is He worthy of our love? Are we capable of choosing freely between right and wrong, or are we "fated" to act the way we do? Is this earthly life all, or does the real personality live on for ever after the death of the body? These are philosophical as well as religious questions, and the very asking of them ennobles the asker.

The breadth of its scope. Philosophers do not restrict themselves, however, to such exalted topics as these. Their field covers not only the problems of religion, but also those of all the sciences. In fact, there is probably not one subject of possible human interest which has not at least *some* philosophical significance. Go into any large

[1] To call these "conceptions of the human mind" does not, of course, imply that they are *only* human conceptions; any more than to speak of "man's conception of the universe" implies the non-existence of the external world!

university or public library, and examine in the catalogue the titles beginning "The Philosophy of——," and you will be surprised at their number and diversity. No wonder we take pride in the "broadening" influence of our subject!

The depth of its foundations. To many this is the most alluring characteristic of philosophy. It probes to the very bottom of all its problems, and is concerned with what we call the "fundamental" issues of life and the "ultimate" nature of things—that is, the issues which lie at the very foundations of life, and the nature of things in the last possible analysis. "No wonder," we might say again, philosophers cannot hope ever to *answer* all the questions they ask, for however far they may go toward answering them, they can never reach the "bottom"; but they continue to *ask* them, nevertheless, and to get an enormous amount of pleasure out of their attempts to find at least *some* kind of an answer! In any important scientific investigation, the inquirer is pretty sure at some time to come to a point where *as* a scientist he ceases to be interested—"that is a philosophical question," he says, and turns his attention elsewhere. But that is the very point at which the philosopher *begins* to be interested, and his interest never ceases merely because he has reached some boundary beyond which he has no right or desire to pass.

It is in the nobility, catholicity, and profundity of his subject, then, that the philosopher makes his boast, and dares to defend his right to exist even in such a utilitarian and hedonistic age as the present, when the desires to live and to enjoy life seem far more weighty influences on the conduct of mankind than perhaps at any previous time.

QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE: HOW AND WHY

J. E. TURNER, M.A., PH.D.

NOT in the lay mind only, but also to a wide extent throughout the realm of Science itself, there exists the belief that no matter how thoroughly research is pursued, it can never yield anything more than descriptions of whatever it may be concerned with. Undeniably, such descriptions are becoming so complicated in detail, and at the same moment so far-ranging in their applications, that they inevitably assume the aspect of more or less final explanations; and previous investigators often regarded them as being actually explanatory, finding indeed in this supposed result one of the most powerful impulses to carry their inquiries to their utmost limit. This however, it is frequently contended, is at best a short-sighted error and at worst a misleading superstition; the truth, no matter how unwelcome it may seem, being that explanation is unattainable because it is a wholly non-scientific category and ideal. If then we wish to discover any sufficient reason, any ultimate ground, any final solution, we must turn from Science to Philosophy; and even so, many sceptics do not hesitate to add, we are foredoomed to disappointment.

Nor can we halt here. For to the further question, What then is it that Science describes? varying answers are given. These descriptions, it is sometimes said, can be of nothing more than phenomena or events, processes or transformations, world lines or co-ordinate systems. It should not escape our notice, however, that in marked contrast with nineteenth-century Science, very little is now regarded as being epiphenomenal; even "mind is not to be explained away as a mere epiphenomenon";[1] and the philosophic significance of this radical change in viewpoint can hardly be ignored by even the most positivist investigators; for if they insist on our keeping to "facts," this itself is a "fact" of cardinal import. But quite apart from this, such questions as, What is being continuously transformed? What do phenomena themselves involve or imply? are banished to that Limbo of meaninglessness which so many still regard as Philosophy's own peculiar sphere.

Similarly, again, with regard to the descriptive conclusions, taken as such. It is often urged that however extensive, intricate, and self-coherent these may become, they always remain the constructions of man's own intellect, and in that sense are either artificial or sub-

[1] Huxley, *Essays of a Biologist*, p. 71.

jective, if not both at once. Further, they are incessantly open to modifications sometimes so thoroughgoing that they launch a series of Copernican revolutions at the devoted heads of the reflective lay public; nor can the most secluded philosopher always escape their swift and turbid backwash. Subjectivism and artificiality, this contention adds, are intensified by the ineradicably symbolic character of all scientific expressions and formulae without exception. Rooted in sense-experience and reared in abstraction, these must remain eternally divorced from what their symbols ultimately represent or refer to. They symbolize either the unknown or the unknowable, the Kantian noumenon or "the Dawn of Nothing"; so that, venturing to alter slightly a stanza of *Omar*, we must say that

> Science is not glad or sorry, as I deem.
> Labouring it dreams, and labours in the dream,
> Till, when the spool is finished, lo! I see
> The web, reeled off, curls and goes out like steam.

If, then, nothing more than this can ever be attained, scientific positivism seems suspiciously akin to philosophic pessimism. On the other hand, it is surely undeniable that when we consider these recurring modifications of scientific descriptions taken in their entirety, a few profoundly significant tendencies reveal themselves. The most obvious of these is a steady increase in Comprehensiveness which presents two aspects; for it affects in the first place the subject-matter of the descriptions themselves, and secondly the range of their applicability to Nature, to human experience, or to the Universe; and this is true however symbolic we may take the descriptions to be. Inseparable from Comprehensiveness, again, is the ever more intricate and more coherent interrelation between descriptive schemata which incorporates them within a unified corpus or Whole, incessantly growing in its definiteness in spite of its inexhaustibility. In other terms, the descriptions lose their original haphazardness and contingency in such a way that each in turn illuminates and interprets its associates, or becomes subsumed with these in some yet more generalized description.

Even more important than all this, however, is the uninterrupted trend from Probability to Certainty; and once any degree of Certainty has been obtained, onward to still more firmly based and more extensive certainties. "We see science," as Jeans expresses this vital principle, "moving towards a hypothesis which will cover all known facts with complete accuracy—if, indeed, it has not already attained such a goal. As our knowledge increases, the probability gradually changes into a certainty"; and thus the scientist unweariedly pursues, and occasionally captures, the "ideal of the theoretical physicist, highest purity, clarity, and certainty," as

Einstein has recently depicted this.[1] The advance is gradual, continuous, and successful; and even if we believe that such Certainty can never be other than abstract, or if we rigidly restrict it to pure theory, so as to exclude the concrete, the practical, and the empirical, still the tendency is always operative and—to repeat—of the highest significance.

But there are excellent grounds for regarding the current emphasis on abstractness and theoretical purity, equally in their relation to Certainty and their opposition to concreteness, as a seriously misleading exaggeration. For another most prominent feature of Science is the gradually changing status of Experiment in its connection with Theory. It goes without saying that the false *a priorism* of previous centuries, which despised experiments as superfluous, has been abandoned. Nevertheless pure theory is rapidly acquiring a most remarkable dominance over wide fields of research, which manifests itself in several ways. To begin with, few modern experiments are simple; they are, on the contrary, extraordinarily intricate and delicate, and this largely because they are suggested and controlled by that vast and coherent corpus of theoretical certainties to which I have just referred. But these highly abstract conclusions may do far more than merely suggest new experiments; in many cases they positively *dictate* which must be attempted and which excluded, while at the same time they often predict the results with striking precision. To express this remarkable and typically modern state of affairs in terms of the history of Science, it implies that while early and primitive theories arose from experiments, the subsequent advance consists to a great extent in the uninterrupted inversion of this connection, so that, ultimately, increasingly elaborate experiments are dictated by increasingly abstract theory; while the more precise predictions are plainly the inevitable outcome of profounder certainties. I do not, of course, suggest that these conditions are universal, or ever will be universal; but they imply that only at the far outposts of research, and not at G.H.Q., can trial and error, hit or miss methods, be tolerated any longer.

Detailed instances of this scientific transformation would demand far too much space. It must suffice to indicate the many recent applications of mathematics not merely to physics and geology, astronomy and inorganic chemistry, but also, though admittedly not to the same degree nor with the same success, to biochemistry, biology, and psychology, to eugenics and genetics, even to economics and its allied political theory. In short, pure mathematics is progressively and irresistibly invading and dominating the territories of its sister sciences; this remains true even if, like other successful

[1] *The New Background of Science*, pp. 55, 224. Whyte, *Critique of Physics*, p. 175. Cf. also Freud, *The Future of an Illusion*, pp. 96, 97.

dictatorships, it is threatened with megalomania. However we may choose to interpret this, it shows quite unmistakably that abstract and concrete, pure theory and empiricism, *a priori* and *a posteriori*, are much more closely connected than their current opposition implies.

We must now consider the bearing of these conclusions on the descriptive and quantitative aspects of Science. Obviously, description answers the question How? which can never be asked too often nor dealt with too successfully. Similarly, quantitative expressions reveal How much? with the utmost precision. Yet the ultimate results of this procedure are far too frequently radically misunderstood. Undeniably, it yields a literally infinite series of revelations of How and How much. Nevertheless the really essential feature of the situation is that these never remain a mere series and nothing more. On the contrary they become more intimately correlated and more reciprocally interpretative, they gain alike in comprehensiveness, coherence, and certainty, in such a way that once again we envisage, in the end, that inclusive corpus which constitutes the ultimate aim of research and the highest ideal of knowledge; granted that these remain ever unattainable, still they are being asymptotically realized. And this implies that the answers to How? steadily assume a new form and character so that they finally yield the reply to Why? In other terms, scientific *explanation* gradually "emerges" from scientific *description*; there is a continuous change in the intellectual viewpoint which is never merely accidental but is literally inescapable. As Whitehead has well expressed this principle, "there is a motive of unrest which urges scientists beyond satisfaction with description, even the general description. It is the desire to obtain the explanatory description which may justify the speculative extension of Laws."[1] This contention is abundantly exemplified by Jeans' treatment of his data in *The New Background of Science*. "This is necessary," he observes, "to explain why a mass of gas gives a spectrum of sharp lines. . . . This explains why photons always travel with the speed of light. . . . The new quantum theory goes far beyond the explanation of the hydrogen spectrum . . . it explains a great number of phenomena which had previously defied explanation." Not even mathematics can be excluded, since "twentieth-century science, projecting the ideas of pure mathematics on to nature, finds that they fit as perfectly and as uniquely as Cinderella's slipper fitted her foot"[2]—an excellent illustration of the very essence of explanation as distinguished from description.

These references to mathematics necessitate the brief discussion of another inadequate view of Science, namely, that it is pre-

[1] *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 164. [2] Pp. 190, 209, 55, 296; cf. p. 298.

dominantly quantitative and only exceptionally qualitative, so that "scientific investigation ignores practically all those aspects of experience which cannot be weighed or measured. Judgments that are qualitative and incapable of justification by quantitative arguments have little place in scientific schemes."[1] But this is by no means the case, even in mathematics itself, no matter how prominent its quantitative aspects must always be. These are, however, not the essential features; on the contrary, the real essence of all mathematics consists (first) in order or system, and (secondly) in absolute precision; and although the latter ideal is most adequately attained in quantitative expressions, still these are never more than instrumental and subordinate. As Cassirer has maintained, mathematics is "not the general science of magnitude but of form, not the science of quantity but of quality."[2] This is most readily perceived in geometry, because the differences between square and triangle, circle and parabola, point, plane, and volume, are plainly qualitative, not, of course, merely as regards textbook figures which are nothing more than convenient symbols of the actual entities, but rather as subsisting between their distinctive properties. Thus "geometry can be developed without any reference to measurement. It is only in some special branches of mathematics that notions of quantity and number are dominant themes."[3] It may even be argued, I believe, that the differences between numbers themselves are also to an important degree qualitative; certainly the contrasts between ultimate units are such—between length and mass, motion and acceleration—so that "physical science recognizes qualitative differences,"[4] and "in metrical geometry there (are) quantities, such as a unit of space length, which could not be deduced from anything simpler, all the rest of geometrical structure being cases of order and arrangement."[5] If then pure mathematics "recognizes qualitative differences," still more must all concrete sciences do so; and it is surely obvious that chemistry and biology, geology and psychology, would be fatally handicapped if they were restricted, as the writers just cited contend, mainly to "quantitative arguments" alone. This radically mistaken view is one of the unfortunate results of the current dictatorship of mathematical physics which has induced so many thinkers to oversimplify phenomena by reducing them to

[1] Barnes, *Scientific Theory and Religion*, p. 600. Eddington has emphasized this standpoint in *The Nature of the Physical World*. Similarly, "science deals with the calculable, measurable element in reality in abstraction from other elements." Matthews, *Dogma in History and Thought*, p. 21.

[2] *Substance and Function*, p. 92.

[3] Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas*, pp. 176, 197.

[4] Whitehead, *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 41, p. 140.

[5] Costello, *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXV, p. 439.

pure metrics. Quantitative precision, in brief, is indispensable and invaluable but never paramount; while from the philosophical standpoint it reveals the absolute precision of world structure; "the radius of the first hydrogen orbit, about a two-hundred-millionth of a centimetre, has a better claim than any other to be the ultimate footrule of the world."[1]

Of course, the descriptive Hows never disappear unless they prove to be inaccurate; apart from this they must always be appealed to. Still further, their transformation into Why is invariably gradual and continuous, even on those rare occasions when the Why comes in a lightning flash of inspiration. Actually, it always "emerges," although the result is often a sudden and startling crystallization; and the final synthesis unifies, without obliterating, both concrete and abstract, empirical and pure, *a posteriori* and *a priori*; these must always be contra-distinguished, but never separated.

Nor, finally, is the How a strictly scientific answer while the Why is strictly philosophic; any such view simply introduces afresh the false dichotomy which destroys continuity and "emergence." The matter, once again, is essentially one of degree, and at no stage is it permissible to sever the philosophical viewpoint from the scientific. For although one's individual temperament usually determines which of these standpoints is adopted, still temperament is far too narrow and rigid; and the racial intellect ultimately ignores all such purely personal idiosyncracies as it incessantly strives to attain that "inclusive corpus," the highest ideal of knowledge, already mentioned. Its constituent factors must be regarded in two distinct, but inseparable, ways; in the first place as interrelated to each other, so that we then obtain the linear and incomplete series with which Science is mainly concerned; secondly, as related to, and as finding their relevant place within, the whole corpus at any given time—the characteristic method of Philosophy; while as the corpus gains in its entirety it is inevitable that scientific theories and philosophic systems should become radically recast.

Now each of these two attitudes yields its own intellectual satisfaction. Nevertheless the racial consciousness, and often the individual consciousness likewise, can find *complete* satisfaction only by adopting the philosophic standpoint—that is, by grasping and envisaging the corpus in its diversified unity. For this is the ultimate goal attainable by intellect; beyond this it can never advance, except by expanding still farther the wholeness of the corpus itself. Thus to contemplate the entire corpus is to comprehend Why; to widen and deepen it is to substitute a higher, in the sense of more valid and more logical, Why for its predecessors; a Why which incorporates and remains continuous with a multitude of Hows. This conclusion

[1] Darwin, *New Conceptions of Matter*, p. 119.

suggests two reflections, the one linked with ancient, the other with modern, speculation. For an Aristotelian God might comprehend the perfect Why; while the racial Unconscious, in its unceasing search for such a Why, may rightly be described as philosophic.

But this ideal Whole of knowledge, which though transcendent is being asymptotically attained, reveals, or expresses, or even symbolizes, the constitution or structure of Reality. In other terms, the real Whole is "structural" just as—to select a simple and at the same time a static example—the multiplication table is ordered throughout; a much more adequate parallel, however, is found in the dynamic, but again "structural," personality of a Lincoln or Napoleon; for although this undeniably transcends any exhaustive description and prediction, nonetheless its characteristic reactions are discernible by both the historian and the intimate friend. Quite similarly in principle, though on a far vaster and more intricate scale, man's expanding grasp of the corpus of knowledge is inseparable from a deepening insight into the dynamic, but nevertheless ordered, structure of Reality which must, from its very nature, be ultimate and final so far as it extends at any given moment; and in this contemplation the human spirit attains, to some degree, the Why for which it is ever searching.

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE

To the bulk of the British reading public 'contemporary French philosophy' would seem to be interchangeable with 'the works of M. Bergson.' And it can scarcely be otherwise when, as an erudite correspondent of *Le Temps* relates, Paris now prints in a week one million books—as many as were printed annually in the reign of the Roi Soleil. For the proportion of these devoted to philosophy is not small. One voracious reader and professor of philosophy in Switzerland, Monsieur J. BENRUBI, has withstood for thirty years the annual avalanche of philosophical books, read steadily on, abstracted and collated his gleanings. In him we have a most competent guide. Familiar with every rivulet and path, and with the historic formation of the country, he now reveals to us the whole panorama. His encyclopaedic enterprise,[1] treating some hundred and sixty authors, is neither a chronicle nor a classification, except in a secondary way. It aims principally at tracing cross-currents in recent philosophies so as to discover their internal connexions, and thence in what direction present French thought is heading. M. Benrubi's scrupulousness in seeing nobody is left out tends perhaps to overcrowding, and his emphasis on that which coheres may somewhat overshadow that which divides. And it may be inevitable, too, with a field of figures so vast, that the accounts of some should be insufficiently detailed. But the total effect is substantial, and his volumes are invaluable to whomever would appreciate whence and whither French thought is proceeding. There are three threads to guide us through the labyrinth. The distinct though still interacting tendencies are described as 'empirical and scientific positivism,' 'epistemological and critical idealism,' and 'metaphysical and spiritual positivism.' Each rests on certain characteristics manifested with varying explicitness in the thought of its many representatives. I indicate summarily and quite inadequately some points of M. Benrubi's conclusions. The first current (whose higher reaches pass by Comte, Condillac, Hume, Locke, and Bacon) is marked by its violent and negative attitude towards metaphysics ("as though born of a desire to exterminate the adversary"), by its denial of ultimate natures and final causes, its search for relationships, avoidance of hypotheses, rejection of philosophy as an autonomous science, uncritical acceptance of sense-data as ultimate, employment of comparative and wholly inductive methods, faith in universal determinism and satisfaction with mechanistic explanations. The second current (issuing from Kant and Renouvier and bifurcating into 'criticism of the sciences' and 'critical rationalism') exposes the shortcomings of positivism and its unjustified assumptions, attacks its determinism and its 'reductive' method, denies the unconditional value of scientific results, develops a constructive epistemology, stresses the creative rôle of mind in the construction of science, and conceives the main task of philosophy—an autonomous science—to be the progressive rationalization of Nature. The third movement issues largely from the work of the Bergsonians and their adversaries. Neglecting nuances, it is charac-

[1] J. BENRUBI: *Les Sources et les Courants de la Philosophie contemporaine en France.* Ouvrage couronné par l'Académie des sciences morales et politiques. 1933. 2 vols. Pp. 1058. 100 fr. Paris: Alcan.

terized by a common acceptance of mind as the substance of reality and of personal consciousness as the point of departure, the strict inseparability of metaphysics and psychology, a reintroduction of finality in explaining the inferior by the superior, the defence of freedom and of an intimate connexion between philosophy and religion.

Two posthumously published articles by EMILE MEYERSON[1] and three volumes by Professor G. BACHELARD[2] of the University of Dijon are prominent among recent contributions to the epistemology of the sciences. M. Bachelard's last book, *Les Intuitions atomistiques*, might perhaps have been as appropriately entitled 'Les Illusions atomistiques,' though this would be to read into his work an irony he does not seem to intend, for it professes to be no more than an 'essai de classification.' No single definition, he points out, can both cover all and do justice to each of the very diverse types of atomistic assumption which science and philosophy have used in the speculative reconstruction of Nature. He therefore singles out the main conceptions of the atom in ancient and modern times, elucidates their presuppositions, and shows how the attempt to avoid the difficulties of one or another originates its successor. So far as analysis of natural phenomena tends to become thorough, it resolves into a search for the atom as its ultimate term. But atomism is to be justified only in and by the synthesis, and it is at precisely this point that arises the dilemma which M. Brunschvicg indicated, and of which we have instances enough throughout M. Bachelard's book. Either the atom is "too rich" in connotation, and the question of composition has consequently no sense; or the atom is "too poor," and the composition is consequently incomprehensible or incredible. Or, conversely stated, if all the essential characters of the composition itself are transferred to the definition of its ultimate constituents, then there is no genuine composition and "the explanation" is purely verbal. Yet, since every composition depends on *some* sort of environing field (for even the most elementary compounds—juxtapositions, mixtures—are at least partly determined by the properties of space, or of some other 'field' or 'medium'), atoms are not self-sufficient, and their relations to the external field assigned constitute a sort of 'reality of the second order' whose properties have, soon or late, to be introduced to supplement the original, inadequate connotation. And this radical form of deficiency shows up in more definitely scientific contexts. The analysis which purports to fix the character of the atom, and the synthesis which purports to recompose the sensible phenomenon, remain, in the end, unconnected. Failing to 'join up' with each other, they fail to corroborate or verify one another. These points are first of all illustrated by a full consideration of the views of Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius. From their naïve realism, a variety of doctrines develop, falling within two extremes, according to the number of characters attributed to the atom, viz. (*a*) a form "vraiment prodigue," assigning all the phenomenon's properties, and (*b*) "the most restricted form conceivable," fixing on some one property as essential. Between the extremes, in order of increasing complexity, lie the very many forms of atomism which successive attempts to solve the problem of composition have engendered. Modern forms, seeking to liberate us from these primitive views, quit the position of naïf realism, and M. Bachelard devotes the second part

[1] 'La Notion de l'Identique,' pp. 1–18 of *Recherches Philosophiques III, 1933–1934* (Paris: Boivin. 75 fr.) and 'De l'Analyse des produits de la pensée,' *Revue Philosophique*, September–October 1934.

[2] G. BACHELARD: *La Valeur inductive de la Relativité*. 1929. Pp. 254. Paris: Vrin. 12 fr. *Le Pluralisme cohérent de la Chimie moderne*. 1932. Pp. 237. Paris: Vrin. 25 fr. *Les Intuitions atomistiques*. Bibliothèque de la Revue *des Cours et Conférences*. 1933. Pp. 162. Paris: Boivin. 15 fr.

of his book to surveying more recent and less simple-minded attempts. Scientific (as distinct from philosophical) atomism claimed, "under cover of positivist precautions," to reduce physics to a systematic phenomenalism experimentally verifiable. But the instability of this intermediate position, now falling back towards naïf realism, now leaning on a predominantly rationalistic organization of experience, called for its rejection. The whole investigation reopened with Hannequin. The realistic position abandoned, a solution was attempted along Kantian lines, viz. from the hypothesis that physical atomism is imposed on science not by Nature but by the method of physics itself in particular, and by the conditions of cognition in general. The last stage of the examination brings us to the atomism of contemporary science: "il faudrait y voir une tâche de catharsis"! In the last metamorphosis ("axiomatic atomism") the atom postulated is "intimement opaque," only its function can become transparent. The purpose of its definition is to enable us to understand the theory and the facts, not to describe the atom itself. Atomism has thus become the name of a *technique* "with its own instruments, methods, and experimentation." Its postulates are required to be treated as neither true nor false (surely, therefore, unsuitably called 'axiomatic') but as being "merely the basis of a construction." It is this construction alone that may claim to be true, though its purpose is less to express the reality known and more to effect a co-ordination of the conceptions by which "we think reality," and in particular, to enable us to conceive a technique suitable for making further discoveries. Theories have now to be estimated by their efficacy. M. Bachelard says much that is suggestive to the reader interested in the formal character and limitations of attainments in natural science.

Two recent works on child psychology,[1] by Professor M. Foucault of Montpellier and Professor J. Piaget of Geneva, are important contributions to their branch. M. Foucault shows sufficiently that the potentialities of the Binet-Simon method are far from being exhausted. It was admittedly only a first step. It has already been corrected and supplemented by psychologists of two continents, and now Professor Foucault proposes three further revisions. The method should be (i) made applicable to subjects over the age of ten (to apprentices, secondary pupils, "and even university students"); (ii) so adjusted as to measure mental aptitude as well as mental age. And (iii) the very broad conception of intelligence on which the method was originally based must be rendered more precise. It is the first two of these projects that determined the course of M. Foucault's researches at Montpellier during the last ten years, and his experiments and results are here fully reported and discussed. He considers the Binet-Simon method approximately adequate for subjects under the age of ten, but doubts whether Simon and the bulk of American psychologists are right in supposing intellectual development to cease at so early an age as ten or twelve. The doubt led him to devise two series of tests, one for children between ten and twelve years, the other for older subjects. The character of these tests and the technique of their application are fully explained, and 'a table of normal values' is constructed from the results of their application. Before calculating these values, however, M. Foucault deals in a non-theoretical way with two important "questions préjudicielles," viz. whether intelligence develops at the same rate and attains the same maximum indifferently to the sex of the subjects; and how far the subjects' development

[1] M. Foucault: *La Mesure de l'Intelligence chez les Ecoliers*. 1933. Pp. 135. Paris: Delagrave. 15 fr. J. Piaget: *Le Jugement moral chez l'Enfant*. Avec le concours de sept collaborateurs. 1932. Pp. 473. Paris: Alcan. 60 fr.

is affected by the economic positions of their families. M. Foucault is not a psychologist who 'measures' without concern for what it is he is measuring. As a contribution to positive science, his research is 'conservative' in the best sense of the word. The analyses are carried out with extreme thoroughness, and the ease and lucidity of his writing shows how a somewhat special subject can be treated exactly without the use of the vague pseudo-technicalities of many modern writers. And the reader will be grateful to his author for explaining so clearly and amply each application of a mathematical formula he is about to make before he makes it.

It is not with measuring child intelligence, but with differentiating the approximately constant stages traversed in its development and accounting for the successive transitions, that Professor Piaget is concerned. Consequently his method differs from that of M. Foucault, and proceeds by free conversation rather than by questionnaires and tasks antecedently determined. And the material to be investigated is not the moral sentiments or the moral conduct of children, but their moral judgments. How does the child represent to itself 'a rule,' and how does he put it into practice? These are the most general questions M. Piaget raises, and he begins by analysing such 'representations' and 'puttings into practice' in the situations in which they develop most freely, viz. in child play. Four stages of development are discernible in the results reported: (i) where the response is a purely motor and individual one; (ii) where it is egocentric and imitative only (each is 'out for himself'); (iii) a stage of nascent co-operation motived by concern for mutual control; (iv) one in which the dominant interest is in the rule itself ('recherche de la règle pour la règle'), hence, codification of rules. M. Piaget's account of the differentiation of (iii) from (ii) is important. When the child sees that 'to win' involves observance of rules common to itself and its partners, and when its pleasure in play has become socialized and is no longer egocentric or centred in its motor responses, it has entered on the third stage. The development marked by this transition is analogous to its advance from finding pleasure in "monologues collectifs" (in which the child talks only for its own pleasure, the presence of others serving simply as an 'incitement') to finding pleasure in social conversation. Rules are now "authentic norms" ("fabrications of reciprocity and co-operation") and are regarded as carrying their own authority and justification. From responses to 'rules of the game,' the author passes to responses more specifically moral, to which adult constraint attaches. His examination of children's attitudes towards 'objective responsibility' focuses directly on the judgments they pass upon instances of culpable clumsiness, theft, and in particular lying; their replies furnishing indirect evidence on how they conceive one and another particular kind of duty. Moral judgment is found to pass through the same general stages as judgment of other kinds; its normal development being towards a level at which a need of sanction is no longer felt, and not (as M. Fauconnet holds) towards one in which an enfeeblement of a primitive sense of responsibility is evident. M. Piaget determines further his main conclusions by confronting them with the theories of Bovet, Durkheim, and Baldwin. This extraordinarily interesting book justifies the attention of a wider public than one of professional psychologists.

The Parisian who would pursue university studies through later life enjoys an advantage not provided for the Londonian so minded, and not equally sought by him. Professors of the Sorbonne and the Collège de France deliver courses of advanced public lectures which continue throughout the whole academic year. The current list announces the following in philosophy and psychology: Professor E. Le Roy, 'The New Mechanics and the Theory of

Knowledge'; Professor E. Gilson, 'The Social Ideal in the Middle Ages' and 'The Metaphysics of Duns Scotus'; Professor A. Rey, 'The History of Hellenic Science and its relations to Philosophy'; Professor M. Brunschvicg, 'The Problems of the Nineteenth Century'; Professor A. Lalande, 'Le Raisonnement'; Professor E. Bréhier, 'The Conception of Creation in the Philosophical Doctrines of the Seventeenth Century'; Professor J. Laporte, 'The Religious Thought of Pascal'; Dr. C. Lalo, 'Art and Action'; Professor Fauconnet, 'Problems in Sociology'; Professor M. Mauss, 'Sin and Expiation in Inferior Societies'; Professor G. Dumas, 'Pathological Psychology'; Dr. H. Wallon, 'Problems of Pedology and Pedagogy.'

S. V. KEELING.

PHILOSOPHY IN GERMANY

IN his introduction to the logic of morals[1] KARL MENGER (Vienna) maintains that only two kinds of ethical inquiry are fruitful—the psychology or biology of morals and the logic of morals. The first of these is an empirical science which discovers what value judgments have actually been made and correlates them with various other factors. In this way it provides material for the logic of morals, which neither discovers empirical facts nor analyses them, but simply points out logical relations. In this book Menger discusses the nature of ethical judgments and carries out some investigations of the logical type.

In discussing ethical judgments Menger is careful to avoid making any himself. This does not mean that he avoids giving examples, but that he himself neither accepts nor rejects any of them. None the less, in discussing the matter at all he is really admitting a third type of ethical inquiry. He calls this epistemological, and remarks that ethical questions only require a few simple epistemological statements.

There are, he points out, two indubitable facts: first, that every sane man classifies many types of behaviour into good, bad, and indifferent; and secondly, that while there is considerable agreement between the classifications of different men, there is also considerable disagreement. When we turn from these facts to ethical systems, we find a great deal of discussion about ideals. We find the questions, "What is good?" and "What is right?" and that the answers consist in some general principle such as "It is right to obey any law which you can will to be a universal law"; "It is right to do what leads to the well-being of the State," and so on. But these general principles are sterile, and do not enable us to deduce specific rules of conduct. We first accept a number of specific rules which for the most part have no logical relation to one another, and then we use the general principle to describe them. But in using this principle we are simply providing a complicated synonym for "good" or "right." Thus the best way of drawing up a moral system is to collect a great number of specific rules. And it is mistaken to think that in drawing up such a system we are *discovering* what is good or bad. We are simply stating what we want. Thus there is a certain analogy —but one must not press it too far—between ethics and geometry. In both we get a number of different systems, and provided that each system is self-consistent it is not the case that one is false and another true.

After this discussion of ethical judgments, Menger starts on his logical

[1] *Moral, Wille und Weltgestaltung. Grundlegung zur Logik der Sitten.* Julius Springer. Wien. 1934. Pp. 143.

investigations, of which I can only give a very rough account. It is clear that the value of such investigations must depend on extreme accuracy and detailed statement. Roughly speaking, they are concerned with classifications on the basis of different hypotheses, and my main aim in the following is to indicate some of the hypotheses and some of the principles of classification.

Menger first describes the formation of classes where inclusion in a class is determined by attitude—acceptance, rejection, or indifference—to an ethical rule (norm). An ethical system made up of two rules involves nine classes (some of which may be empty), the general principle being that a system which contains n rules involves 3^n classes. After discussing these classes, he gives examples of a certain duality. Consider a class of men M and a class of norms N such that each member of M either accepts, rejects, or is indifferent to each member of N. We can classify the rules of N through their relation to any one member of M, and we can classify the men of M in relation to any given rule of N. We can say any two men are in agreement when they agree in their attitude to every rule of N, and we can say any two rules are coupled when every member of M has the same attitude to the one as to the other. After further consideration of this duality, Menger discusses a new classification. Consider a class of men M and a class N of all the rules which prescribe for a given situation, e.g. how to behave on Sunday morning. Suppose every member of M divides N into two sub-classes, the rules which he accepts and the rules which he rejects. Suppose also that the former class can contain "disjunctive norms," e.g. that a member of M accepts rule 1 or rule 2 and rejects all the rest. This provides a basis for the division of M into sub-classes which is discussed in great detail.

In his next investigation Menger begins with the fact that a man may accept a rule for himself without wanting other men to accept it. Suppose, for example, we call a man "polite" if he observes certain forms of behaviour, "impolite" if he does not observe them, "sensitive" if he is only willing to associate with polite people, and "insensitive" if he is willing to associate with both polite and impolite people. We then get four groups: (*a*) men who are polite and sensitive; (*b*) men who are polite and insensitive; (*c*) men who are impolite and sensitive; (*d*) men who are impolite and insensitive. Menger points out with whom any member of each group is willing to associate, and then, since actual association is dependent on *mutual* willingness, with whom he can in fact associate. Thus, for example, any member of the group (*d*) is prepared to associate with any member of all the other groups, but in fact can only associate with every member of (*b*) and every other member of (*d*). What groups can we form, Menger asks, such that no group contains any member with whom any other member will not associate? We can form the following: a group containing every member of (*a*), a group containing every member of (*d*), and a number of groups each containing one member of (*c*). And then we can distribute the members of (*b*) among these groups in any way we like. It is clear, he points out, that if a group such as (*c*) is very large, many of its members must either abandon their attitude or live in isolation.

Menger concludes with a practical suggestion. At present the only way of imposing a law on any group of citizens is to impose it on all. It might be possible, he suggests, to form sub-groups of citizens united by desire for the same rules, and restrict legislation enforcing these rules to members of the sub-group. This scheme, he believes, would have many advantages, and is not so impracticable as might be thought.

The Law of Contradiction,[1] by EBERHARD CONZE, is a study in dialectical

[1] *Der Satz vom Widerspruch.* 1932.

materialism. In the first two chapters Conze claims to give the traditional views of this law and indicate their presuppositions, while in the third chapter he discusses the conditions of its validity. He starts by giving five different ways of formulating it, and these include what he calls the psychological version, namely, that we cannot at the same time think of contradictory judgments as true. But it soon becomes evident that in Conze's view the law applies as much to decisions as to thoughts, and most of the first chapter is concerned with the circumstances in which a person would neither think contradictory thoughts nor make contradictory decisions. At the end of the chapter Conze links up the five different formulations of the law, and in Chapter II discusses its relation to the law of identity.

In Chapter III Conze comes to the question of its validity, and first dismisses the theories which base this on *a priori* grounds. He then discusses nominalistic inductive theories, which he states to be *bourgeois* in origin and outlook. He claims to show that a *bourgeoisie* and capitalistic tendencies existed even in the fourteenth century, that the prominent nominalists took part in the political activities of this *bourgeoisie*, and that nominalist theories express its outlook (ideology). Loss of touch with concrete reality is one of the main features of this outlook. And every ruling class exhibits this defect, because touch with reality depends on work, that is, on the production of changes in the material world.

Nominalism leads to pragmatism, which has the merit of recognizing that thought and truth are dependent on practice, but shows its cloven hoof (it is a *bourgeois* theory) by failing to specify the kind of practice on which truth depends. Pragmatism leads to Marxism, which supplies the required specification. Truth depends on work, i.e. a social activity, which produces material changes that outlast itself. Other kinds of practice only lead to illusions—for example, the illusions of capitalists and "theoretical men." It is only work, and not mere practice, which guarantees the law of contradiction—and guarantees it in the sense that no effective work is possible unless contradiction is avoided.

Conze then discusses the dependence of thought on practice in greater detail. Thought is a form of adaptation to environment, a reaction to external stimuli which is not complete unless it produces external changes. Incomplete reactions do indeed occur, but are products of disease—substitutes for the practical activity which the "theoretical man" desires but cannot achieve. The "theoretical man" is the least likely person to discover truth, for thought is only true when it leads to the conquest of material conditions.

I would like in conclusion to draw attention to the forthcoming publication of two volumes on contemporary British philosophy[1] by Rudolf Metz. The author is very anxious that an intimate connection between German and British philosophy should be established, and points out that a fruitful connection depends on mutual understanding. His exposition ranges from the middle of the nineteenth century to the present day, but is mainly concerned with recent movements. The table of contents indicates an extremely comprehensive treatment, and it seems likely that the book will justify the publisher's claim of being the most comprehensive work on the subject.

[1] *Philosophische Strömungen der Gegenwart in Grossbritannien.* Felix Meiner. Leipzig. Pp. 850. RM.30. After publication RM.40.

Helen Knight.

NEW BOOKS

Modern Tendencies in Philosophy. (Aristotelian Society. Supplementary Volume XIII.) (London: Harrison & Sons, Ltd. 1934. Pp. 236. Price 15s. net.)

This volume containing the President's Address and the Symposia read at the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association at Cardiff in July last year is of particular interest as a weather signal of the direction in which the philosophical wind is blowing—all the more so perhaps as the International Congress of Philosophy that was held at Prague in September was absorbing the attention of some of the senior members of both societies and the papers were mainly given by younger men. But it is also one that is particularly difficult to review owing to the wealth of matter contributed by different hands which it contains, and I have had to ask the Editor of PHILOSOPHY for special indulgence if I am to make it more than a bare record of "transactions." Even so, it can't be very much more.

In his Presidential Address under the title "Humanity and History," Professor J. W. Scott propounds the question "What was Idealism? What did it try to say and do?" He answers: Idealism arises when the mind, confronted with the representation of reality as a turmoil of material atoms, protests that value too is real. It goes on to corroboration when it shows reality to involve a system of categories both of actuality and value which can only be supplied by a Subject. It means in fact that we see what we are in what we know, and accordingly that knowledge consists in "letting ourselves down into what we report." But this definition raises the further question what Subject or self do we mean, and what is the object into which it thus inserts itself? Taking the world of men for illustration, the writer answers that the self is the moral self, the self of ideals and purposes, and the object is the process of events. History is thus definable as the mixing of moral purpose with events. But unfortunately the moral purpose so seldom succeeds in establishing itself that history turns out in the end to be mainly a record of "that which might have been and nearly was." In other words, Idealism points to possibilities rather than actualities, and "Plato's defence stands—that the ideal is none the worse for never having been realized, so long as you can prescribe a small change which would realize it."

In the emphasis that is laid on self-activity, creation, and freedom there is much in the address that is true and vital. But in the idea of history as the pursuit of an ever-elusive perfectibility there is a note that reminds us of the neo-idealism of Gentile and his disciples rather than of the robuster doctrine which has been mainly influential in this country, and according to which philosophy is the attempt to see the ideal, not as something floating ineffectually above the world of the actual and powerless to be born, but as what is most real and decisively operative in it. I can hardly think that Professor Scott means to renounce the hard won gains of the latter doctrine, yet his address left me wondering.

The five symposia that follow fall into two groups according as they deal with subjects of more general interest or with others of a more technical kind, relating to the theory of knowledge. Neglecting to some extent the

order in the book, and taking the former group first, that which deals with "Liberty and the Modern State" will probably attract most attention in the readers of PHILOSOPHY. Mr. C. E. M. Joad here leads off with an attractive paper which might be called Mill's essay "On Liberty" up to date. From what he finds an embarrassing wealth of arguments for liberty of thought and action he selects three: its necessity as the condition of all advance in the mind of the race; the absolute value which attaches to truth; and the contribution it makes to other values that enter into the constitution of human personality. But he admits that there must be limits to individual liberty, and, finding himself faced with the same difficulty which Mill felt in laying down the principle of State action, proceeds, like Herbert Spencer, by way of evacuating government of positive ends and confining its function to that of securing a "minimum background of ordered security" and "a minimum standard of behaviour" in the relation of the citizens with one another. Extremes meet, and Mr. John Strachey, starting from the opposite pole in the name of Karl Marx, carries this evacuating process a step further by treating State control as a product of class conflict and bound in the end altogether to disappear in the classless society which is the aim of Communism. His defence of the suppression of freedom in the intermediate stage is probably the best that can be offered for it, namely, that the amount of suppression needed by proletarian rule is incomparably less than that necessary in the case of a ruling capitalist class, and that, such as it is, there is a discernible limit of time to the necessity of maintaining it. Those who doubt the validity of these promises are asked not to "wait and see," but to "go and see"—presumably to Russia. Professor Field modestly resists the temptation to attempt a reconciliation of these "mighty opposites," and after a defence of British Idealism as we have it, e.g. in Green, against Mr. Joad's imputation of supporting an immoral theory of the State as the source of all rights, brings the discussion down from these theoretic heights by warning us against the mistake of treating the question of liberty as entirely a matter of State interference (all co-operative activity involves the subordination of the individual to corporate ends), and by calling attention to the psychological effect of suppression on the mind not less of suppressor than suppressed. His paper is a valuable reminder of the extraordinary complexity of the problem and of the necessity of keeping clearly in view the fact that the aim of all statesmanship worthy of the name is that of increasing the opportunity of self-development *on the whole*.

In the second symposium in this group on "Artistic Form and the Unconscious" the *pièce de résistance* is the opening paper by Mr. J. M. Thorburn, in which through a series of sympathetic references to Goethe's reflections on the subject he leads up to the contrast between visual art, appealing to the spatial or static, and auditory, resting on the temporal and changing—the one courting sensible clarity, the other imaginative illusion; the one more intellectual, the other more emotional; the one appealing more to the conscious, the other to the unconscious. The chief illustration is found in the contrast between painting and music, but the distinction also applies to poetry, e.g. between the dramatic as in Shakespeare and the lyric as in Goethe. A dualism of this kind, even in the relative sense claimed for it, lends itself to criticism, and Mr. Hannay has little difficulty in showing that visual art is as ancient and as deeply welded to archetypal emotion as auditory. Mr. Thorburn had illustrated his thesis by referring in somewhat ecstatic terms of praise to Ernest John's psychoanalytic treatment of Hamlet as a victim of the Oedipus complex. To this Mr. Hannay acutely replies that the analysis in question rests on a confusion between Hamlet as an

historic character (who may or may not have suffered from an incestuous obsession) and Hamlet as conceived by Shakespeare, who shows no trace of it. Mr. P. Leon with his usual freshness and energy pushes home the former of these criticisms by pointing out that the distinction, on which so much stress had been laid between visual and auditory art, is a psychological one and has no real bearing on aesthetics. What is relevant to aesthetics is the manner and the degree in which the difference between them is transcended. Similarly with reference to the second of Mr. Hannay's criticisms, selecting three out of the twenty meanings of the "unconscious" which the psychoanalysts have confused (the primary creative element in mind, the passive and retentive element, and the region of complexes), he insists that only the first of these is of any real significance for aesthetics.

Coming to the larger and more technical group, the discussion of the claim of the new science of "philosophical analysis" under the title "Is Analysis a useful Method in Philosophy?" occupies a far larger space than any of the others in the book, indicative perhaps of the interest it is at present attracting among experts. Mr. Max Black, in the character of an anxious inquirer who is willing to give the method every chance, offers an ingenious account of what in a simplified world might be expected of it. Even so, he is visited with a sense of what he calls its "sins of omission," and ends, as I understand him, with what is practically a doubt as to whether the degree of abstraction which is necessary in order that it may do its perfect work is not fatal to its utility in concrete circumstances. Mr. J. T. Wisdom follows with what believers and sceptics alike will agree is a masterpiece of exposition of the scope and method of the science. It is all the more to be regretted that the limits of this review forbid a detailed report, and compel me to confine myself to the barest statement of the features in it that are attacked by the third symposiast. As contrasted with the other kinds of analysis, e.g. "scientific" which proceeds by definition of terms and "logical" which is concerned with the analysis of inference, "philosophical" analysis aims at the more explicit apprehension of the structure of facts, as expressed in words or sentences, by translating them into the elements or more ultimate facts concealed beneath them. Thus when you hear of a nation you get nearer the ultimate fact by translating it into terms of individuals with such and such common features; when you hear of individuals by translating them into terms of sense-data and mental states. Similarly when you have a universal of the form $2 + 2 = 4$ you get nearer the "fact" indicated by translating it into the concrete "two S's are P and two other S's are P, etc." To doubts such as Mr. Black had suggested as to the utility of the method, Mr. Wilson contents himself by replying that to those who have followed his account of it "it will be clear that it is an old and useful method in a certain kind of philosophy." Accepting this statement, Mr. Maurice Cornforth, in what some will find the most interesting paper in the book, goes on, from a Marxian point of view, to arraign the whole "kind of philosophy," in which a place for analysis is claimed, as not only in itself useless for any real advance in knowledge, but as a poisonous outgrowth of the bourgeois civilization —equally with religion devised to "extenuate and justify class oppression." Against the idea of a world which, according to the analyst, "must divide into a kind of mosaic of atomic facts," Mr. Cornforth puts forward that of "a world of continual becoming"; and against the idea of levels of primariness of propositions, obtained by formal analysis, the different levels of knowledge that the advance of material science is continually revealing.

While rejecting the proposal to merge philosophy in physical science, whether on Marxian or any other principles, many readers will share with

Mr. Cornforth the suspicion of the methods of the "atomic logic" favoured by the analysts. In order to be complete, an analysis of any kind must take account of all that is contained in the *analysandum*; but what are we to say of one which (to take Mr. Wisdom's own example) analyses the whole which we call a nation into a mere aggregate of the individuals who compose it, and an individual into an aggregate of sense data and mental states to the exclusion of the unity of consciousness that holds them together and makes them *his* mental states? Like Mr. Black I am a sympathetic inquirer on the whole subject; but a voice keeps whispering in my ear that until the method is purified, I will not say of its realism (this is the attractive feature of it) but of its nominalism,[1] it must remain a comparatively barren one.

Meantime, the kind of difficulty it raises is illustrated in the remaining two discussions. In that on "Communication and Verification" Professor Susan Stebbing is not slow to see the danger that any form of analytic philosophy resting on sense data and mental states runs of falling into a pure subjectivism, and after a series of acute criticisms of other logicians ends by falling back on the common-sense solution that we can communicate with one another because we have experiences "of the same sort" as others have, leaving as Professor Heath later points out the idea of "common sense" for a future application of "our analytic labours." Professor L. T. Russell follows Miss Stebbing with a particularly lucid and likewise critical paper. He refuses to be trapped in the abstraction of a direct exclusively individual experience, and takes his stand on the concrete fact of society as a group of individuals already in communication with one another by means of verifiable *reports*. This again is common sense, but, as he is well aware, requires further positive development in a freer atmosphere, and we can only regret that he has not found time to go on to give it. Even Professor Heath seems to suffer from the prevailing atmosphere and only finds courage at the end of his all too short paper (and that in a note) to whisper the idea of language as the creation of "objective spirit" as possibly supplying the missing clue.

In the last symposium, on "The Element of Immediacy in Knowledge," Professor Aaron, perhaps too hastily, takes the question raised by the title to be, not that of the nature of what is "given" to mind at its lowest, but that of the existence of an element of immediacy in knowledge "with mind at the height of its cognitive activity." Finding, however, that this interpretation seems to evaporate the question (nothing to him seeming more obvious than that the answer must be in the affirmative, and that knowing when used in a precise and strict sense means direct knowing), he is fain to try to give point to his contention by attributing to idealists the sin of denying any such element of immediacy and identifying knowledge with discursive thought. Professor C. A. Campbell in the concluding paper has little difficulty in showing how wide of the mark any such interpretation of idealist doctrine is. For the rest he has some penetrating things to say of Professor Aaron's treatment of the famous $7 + 5 = 12$ as an example of unmediated intuition. But again, as with the writers in the previous symposium, modesty or perhaps time triumphs, and we are left without the constructive development of the subject which no one is better fitted to give than the writer of this paper.

Attempting to summarize and taking the papers in the volume as a whole,

[1] The characteristic feature of which is what Whitehead calls "the itch," which is "the disease" of philosophy "to express itself in the form of 'some S is P' or 'all S is P.' "

they seem to me full of vitality, of sound scholarship enlightened by acute criticism, and of a spirit of open-mindedness which is more than mere tolerance of differences and which augurs well for the future of philosophy in this country. If I have complained of a certain timidity on the part of some of the younger men in showing colours that are suggestive of views which for the moment are out of the limelight, it is only to remind them in terms of the title of the volume that "modern" is only a euphemism for "recent" and "tendencies" for "fashions."

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

Problems of Mind and Matter. By JOHN WISDOM, Lecturer in Moral Science at the University of Cambridge. Lately Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of St. Andrews. (Cambridge: At the University Press. 1934. Pp. xv + 215. Price 6s.)

This book is an attempt, as Mr. Wisdom says in the preface, "to give an elementary, but not too inaccurate introduction to the applications in philosophy of what is now sometimes called the analytic method." There is an introduction, in which a few examples of the method of analysis are followed by notes on some of the most important words used with technical meanings by analysts; and the rest of the book falls into two parts, the first dealing with problems involved in the relations of matter and mind, the second with such problems of cognition as the analysis of perception, the analysis of our knowledge of material things, and the analysis of what is being said of a statement when it is said to be true.

I shall not attempt to give an account of the contents of the book in detail, but confine myself to a few points.

Facts and events.—At the outset (21), Mr. Wisdom describes a fact as what a sentence expresses. Later on, this, I think, is modified so as to run, a fact is what a complete sentence expresses (28–29).

As illustrations of complete sentences we may take: This is white, Jack loves William, Othello is jealous of Desdemona on account of Cassio, and such sentences as Orange is between red and yellow.

To explain what is meant by a complete sentence, we have to note that there are two kinds of elements in a fact, constituents and components. Mr. Wisdom confesses (24) that he cannot define constituents or components, but only show "ways of picking out" what he means. It will be enough to say here that in the sentence This is white, *this* is constituent and *white* component, in the second sentence above, *Jack* and *William* are constituents and *loves* component, in the third *Othello*, *Desdemona*, and *Cassio* are constituents, and *jealous of . . . on account of* component, and in the fourth, *orange*, *red* and *yellow* are constituents, and *between . . . and* the component. We can say that components are either qualities or relations. But it will not do to say that constituents are the elements of facts expressed either by proper names or by demonstrative pronouns, if we admit with Mr. Wisdom that universals are sometimes constituents in facts (as in the fourth example). For the same reason it will not be possible to accept the preliminary account quoted from Mr. Mace, "The constituents . . . in a fact are the elements in virtue of which one characterized thing might be merely numerically distinct from another, i.e. distinct without difference of character." (22) For Mr. Wisdom insists (208) that "in the sense applicable to universals, exact likeness vanishes into identity."

A simple complete sentence will then be one which contains only one component, and only as many constituents as its component requires—i.e. one

constituent if its component is a quality (This is white), two if its component is a dyadic relation (Jack loves William), three if its component is a triadic relation, and so on. A complete fact "which is not made up of other facts" (24) will be expressed by a simple complete sentence.

A simple incomplete sentence will be one "obtained from a simple complete sentence by omitting one of the names which makes it up and filling the gap in the sentence with the word 'something' or 'x' or some other mark equally non-informative" (27). Mr. Wisdom gives the sentences "Wong is happy," "Something is happy" as complete and incomplete respectively.

It is better, he says, not to say that incomplete sentences express incomplete facts, but rather to say that they incompletely express facts which are complete. But "incompletely" here must not be taken to involve incompetence on the part of the user of an incomplete sentence. All generalizations of science are incomplete sentences (28–29). (His reason is that they do not name any particulars, though that will not quite do, if some complete sentences contain only universals.) Now it is just the merit of scientific generalizations not to name particulars: they are not intended to be complete expressions of (complete) facts.

A further distinction is necessary if we are to see the relation between facts and events: viz. a distinction between universals. Sometimes one universal specifies another, in which case the latter is more generic than the former. E.g. *red* specifies *coloured*; *running swiftly* specifies *running*. A completely determinate shade of red is an absolutely specific universal.

We can then express the relation between facts and events. A fact "which is not made up of other facts" and which is complete, particular, and specific, is one whose component is an absolutely specific universal (quality or relation) and whose constituent or constituents are particulars. Every such fact is concerned with one moment (e.g. this is pulling that now with such and such a force, etc.).

Thus facts are not identical with events, since events occupy time. But "to every fact which is complete particular and specific there corresponds an event including the same particular and the same universal and occupying a period which contains the moment which the fact is *at*" (32).

This leads Mr. Wisdom to speak of a complete particular specific fact as "an infinitely thin temporal slice out of an event"; an event being "a pattern of complete particular specific facts."

I am not in the least sure about this. Let us look at it more closely. And let us confine ourselves meanwhile to spatio-temporal events.

In the first place it would involve (i) that since any "event" whose duration includes the instant t_1 can be sliced "temporally" in only one way at t_1, there would only be one fact at t_1 corresponding to this event, and (ii) that for every different fact at t_1 there would be a different event whose duration included t_1: e.g. if the fact that this rod has lengthened now in a specific degree is a different fact from the fact that this rod has now increased in temperature to a specific degree, then the lengthening of the rod will have to be a different event from its increase of temperature; and so if each fact ("not made up of other facts") contains only one component, then no "event" ("not made up of other events," we might say by way of qualification) will be able to manifest more than one component at any one instant; and this will be your criterion of "one event, not made up of other events."

If you want to hold that from one "event" many complete particular specific facts can be derived by "slicing" at an instant, your slicing will have to be other than purely temporal. It is worth while to ask, what other kinds of "slicing" could we have?

Let us start with a given volume (v) marked off in space, and consider everything that happens within it during the interval t_0–t_2, including the time t_1. Let us call everything that happens within v during t_0–t_2, the "flow of events (v, t_0–t_2)." A purely temporal slice in this flow at t_1 would be got by taking a narrower and narrower duration including t_1, still keeping the whole flow within v for this duration. Passing to the limit, we should get what might be called the "complex fact (v, t_1)." To get anything like Mr. Wisdom's complete particular specific fact we must clearly do something very different. For a complete particular specific fact corresponds to a sentence with only one component, and with only so many particulars as the component requires.

A further slicing could be made, spatially. We might discover within the flow (v, t_0–t_2) a set of smaller volumes v_1, v_2, v_3, . . . v_n such that the set of flows (v_1, t'), (v_2, t''), (v_3, t'''), etc., made up what we regarded as one event in a much more significant sense than the original flow; t', t'', etc., being successive small stretches of t_0–t_2. We might call this a "strand-flow (t_0–t_2, within v)." (Compare a tiny fish swimming in a pond, the complete "flow" including water and fish, the selected set of volumes being confined to those occupied by the fish). We could then take the particular flow whose stretch—say t'''—included t_1, and cut it temporally at t_1, through the appropriate volume (v_3): hoping thereby to get a complete particular specific fact.

If, however, this kind of slicing, which is both spatial and temporal, is to result in a single fact such, e.g., as *merely* This here is now white (without any other quality or relation being found here now), it will follow that every different quality and every different relation occupies a separate space. The ultimate single-consituent facts will then be expressed by sentences of the form "specific red is here now, and nothing else is here now," "specific sound is here now, and nothing else is here now," etc. (leaving aside the question what ultimate relational facts would involve).

This is a logically possible view, so far as spatio-temporal events are concerned. But it would give rise to some difficulty in regard to mental events, which Mr. Wisdom considers to be temporal only and not spatial. It is not easy to see how a single complete specific mental fact *and nothing else* could result from a purely temporal slicing of mental events at a time t_1, unless every different mental quality and every different mental relation occupies a separate time. The ultimate single-constituent mental facts would then be expressed by sentences of the form "specific awareness is now, and nothing else is now," "specific pleasure is now, and nothing else is now," etc.

If you are to succeed in obtaining a plurality of distinct facts about a number of separate selves at any moment t_1, you will clearly have to slice your temporal cross-section at t_1 further, in some new way. You cannot make a spatial slice, since mental events are not spatial. You will have to recognize between the different particular selves an ultimate distinction which is not manifested by differences of either spatial or temporal position. Let us see what this involves. At any time there is a plurality of selves S_1, S_2, S_3, etc. To get a single complete particular specific mental fact at t_1 we shall have to make what might be called a *selfo*-temporal cut of the flow of mental events at t_1, hoping that it will result in such a fact as "S_1 is feeling specific pleasure p_1 now, and nothing else is now the case of S_1"; "S_2 is having specific awareness a_2 now, and nothing else is now the case of S_2," etc. Each self at any instant, that is, will contain one specific character, and nothing else. Whether this could logically be the case in special circumstances or not, I do not think it is generally (or even ever) the case. I believe that a temporal cross-section of a self will generally (and I think always) result in an extremely complex "state" (I use the word without any necessary suggestion that a "state" is a state of

some "substance"). And I believe that the same is the case with spatio-temporal events. I do not think that such a complex "state" is a "fact" at all; and that "facts" have a quite different relation to events from that described by Mr. Wisdom. If facts are derived from events, it is by what could be called slicing only in a very metaphorical sense.

Mental facts and material facts: and events.—In the introduction Mr. Wisdom gives definitions of mental and material facts: "a mental fact is one which contains as component *conscious* or some universal which specifies *conscious*"; while a material fact "is one which contains as component some species of *has a spatial character*, or some species of *has some extensive character*, or some combination of these" (31); and since he holds that there is no generic universal specified in both *conscious* and *has a spatial character* or *has some extensive character*, and that material facts are not necessary *constituents* of mental facts (206), he concludes that mental facts are distinct from material facts.

In Part I he considers various questions about the relations between mental events and bodily events, concluding in Ch. III that mental events are not also bodily events. I cannot see that this conclusion is made out.

It appears to be based on the relation between facts and events we have been discussing: viz. that to every complete particular specific fact not made up of other facts there corresponds an event which contains the same component and the same constituent or constituents. And of course if a fact is a mere thin temporal slice of an event, it *would* follow that if a mental fact is different from a material fact, and does not contain a material fact as a constituent, then the event of which a mental fact is a slice must be different from the event of which a material fact is a slice. This would also be clear from the fact that, according to Mr. Wisdom, mental facts contain no spatial element but only a temporal one, whereas material facts contain both spatial and temporal elements. But if it is not the case that facts are merely temporal slices of events, if some other kind of "slicing" is involved in the passage from events to facts, then there is nothing to prevent two different facts from being "sliced" out of the same event; and consequently it *may* be possible that the "event" corresponding to any mental fact also always in fact corresponds to one or more material facts. The question whether this is the case would have to be settled by a careful discussion of the relevant facts. Like Mr. Wisdom I can see no principle to the effect that mental events *must* also be material; but I think that his line of argument requires him to say that mental events *cannot* also be material; and I do not see that this line of argument is conclusive.

Cause, production, explanation.—Mr. Wisdom distinguishes between a complete cause and an occasion, which is only a part of a complete cause (67). Cause he describes in terms of production, and in terms of explanation. If S is a complete cause, and S_1 its effect, then S produces S_1, and this can be expressed otherwise by saying that S forms the complete explanation of S_1 (83). The entities S and S_1 between which the cause and effect relation holds are sometimes described as "events" (e.g. 83–87), sometimes as "facts" (88), sometimes as "situations" (88, 93, 94), sometimes as "manifestations of sets of values of variables" (91). This variation in terminology is to be deplored, especially in regard to such a discussion as that of causality, where precision is more than usually important.

If we keep to ordinary language, what we mean by a cause is always something different from the complete flow of events within a particular volume or set of volumes during a particular stretch of time (plus certain non-spatial events during this stretch in the case of a cause involving mental events, if

mental events are non-spatial); for any such flow of events contains a great deal that could not be included in any relevant statement about a cause. This seems clear if Mr. Wisdom is right in saying that a complete cause is also a complete explanation of its effect. For explanation seems to involve some kind of selection from events other than mere temporal or spatial slicing. And if *S produces* S_1 can be stated otherwise by saying *S explains* S_1, it looks as if we cannot say that one complete flow of events *produces* another complete flow of events. Again, while there is propriety in speaking of one set of facts as the *explanation* of another set of facts, it is difficult to see how there can be propriety in speaking of one set of facts as *producing* another set of facts. If facts are selections (of a kind other than merely temporal) from events, then when we can say "these facts explain those facts" it may be legitimate to say also "any flow of events from which such facts as these could be selected *would be succeeded by* a flow of events from which such facts as those could be selected"; but the word "production" would not fit either facts or events.

That is exactly the view I should take; for the notion of production seems to me to be of an entirely different order. But whatever view be taken on this matter, it seems to me that by using the variety of terms he uses—"fact," "event," "situation," and so on—Mr. Wisdom is escaping the real issues, and making it difficult to distinguish things that ought to be distinguished.

Nevertheless, Ch. VI, to which this discussion refers, contains in its twenty pages a number of extremely important points. It deals with the question, Do bodily events produce mental events? and is concerned with the statement and examination of general principles in the light of which the question must be answered. The whole treatment is developed out of Stout's statement that "when anything changes, it does so always in *some respect*. The change affects some general aspect of its nature, and its successive phases consist in specific and particular variations of this generic character" (quoted on p. 87): and in his consideration of this, Mr. Wisdom states three principles, the principle of continuity, and two principles of resemblance, one referring to causes and one to effects, in a way that should help greatly to clarify future discussion on the subject. He concludes, in opposition to Stout, that bodily events cannot produce mental events and vice versa, though bodily events may occasion mental events and vice versa.

The chapter on Freewill should be compared with Broad's inaugural address on *Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism* and with Moore's discussion in his *Ethics*. Broad argues that any such statement as "you ought not to have acted as you did" has not the significance we generally attach to it unless you *could* have acted otherwise in a genuinely categorical sense; and concludes that there seems no genuinely categorical sense in which you could have acted otherwise, and therefore, that statements such as "you ought not to have acted as you did" cannot mean what we generally take them to mean. Wisdom (writing before Broad's discussion was published) takes a different line. He stresses rather "blame"—"you are to blame for this"—"What blame requires," he says, "is that, however far back we go in setting out the causes of your act, we shall never come to a time at which a set of purely external circumstances, i.e. not involving you and your will, formed a complete cause of your act" (118). And if we accept the law of causation in the strict sense according to which every event without exception is completely determined, blame requires that the causes of the causes of . . . the causes of your decisions, however far back you push them in time, shall include determinations of your will by your will (118). Thus, if the strict law of causation is true, blame requires that "the series of determinations of the will by the will is endless" (130). Even on the modified law of causation, that

every event except the first events in the world history is determined, blame would require that the series of determinations of the will by the will stretched back to the beginning of the world. Thus in either case blame requires that the self must have existed not only before birth, but as long as anything existed.

Mr. Wisdom accepts this conclusion, which, he says, is "not incredible" (and I should agree to that) "but merely surprising to the western world" (123).

I am, however, doubtful whether by it he would secure what we want. I should agree with Broad, that unless there is a categorical sense in which we could in the past have acted otherwise than we did, then what is ordinarily meant by saying "you ought not to have done that" rests on a mistake; and I should add that unless there is a categorical sense in which *in future* you can avoid doing so and so, and can do so and so instead, then what we ordinarily mean by saying "if you do so and so you will not do as you ought, you will be to blame" rests on a mistake. Broad does not see any way of giving us this, but he is clear about what he is refusing to us. Wisdom's suggestion does not give it us; and I cannot agree that his suggestion gives us all we need.

I should press the antithesis: if universal causation, as interpreted by Broad and Wisdom, be accepted, then the ordinary concepts of ought and of blame must be rejected. And I should seek a reinterpretation of the notion of causation, looking for it to a closer examination of the concept of *production*, which as I suggested earlier, does not seem to be applicable either to the succession of events or to the linkages of facts which give us one kind of explanation. All genuine productions seem to me to be acts, and acts do not seem to me to be reducible to successions of events. And while *change in a particular thing* can be described as the characterization of the thing by different specifications of the same generic variable at successive times, this seems only to be an external description. I can hope to understand change *in* a thing, if I can find some way of regarding it as the outcome of an act on the part of the thing; an act of production into actuality of what previously was mere potentiality. In the case of an apparent change in material things, I find I can get no clue to an understanding; but in the case of selves, I think I can see some faint light. And so I should stick to the case of selves, leaving the case of apparently material things until the case of selves has been disposed of. Thus I regard the whole problem as one requiring an exploration of the whole conception of change, and as consequently forcing us to go below the level on which ordinary formulations of the principle of causality rest. This, however, is merely a confession of personal dissatisfaction with present-day discussions, and not a claim to have any satisfactory solution to offer.

I have left myself no space to deal with Part II, on Cognition, but the reader will find it equally suggestive and worth careful study. The book as a whole forms an admirable introduction to the analytic method. Where its edges are ragged one is provoked to do some knitting on one's own; and Mr. Wisdom's general practice provides an excellent example of how to do it.

On pp. 203, 205, there is a small misprint. $n - 2$ should be $n + 2$.

L. J. Russell.

And the Life Everlasting. By John Baillie, D.Litt., Hon. D.D., Professor-Elect of Divinity in the University of Edinburgh. (London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1934. Pp. xii + 294. Price, 10s. 6d. net.)

Much water has passed under the bridge since Kant could assume that God, Freedom, and Immortality were the supreme objects of philosophical speculation; there are to-day not a few who would not hesitate to declare that

the very title of Dr. Baillie's book disqualified it for notice in a philosophical journal. The charge is indeed due in great measure to the effect of Kant's own contention that no *knowledge* properly so called of these objects is possible, although a reasonable *faith* in them is postulated by the facts of our moral consciousness. He has at least convinced many of us, who yet do not regard religion as no topic for a philosopher, that religious conclusions cannot be legitimately based upon premises which abstract from all moral and religious experience. If his own "moral" argument for immortality be stated, as it is, in an unnatural and unconvincing form, this is, at least in part, because he, although giving a *moral* foundation to the belief in it, ignores the specifically *religious* experience of communion with God, on which Dr. Baillie, following the tradition of Jewish and Christian thought, would prefer to rest it.

In thus making the belief in immortality a corollary of belief in God, Dr. Baillie of course by no means stands alone. But few philosophical apologists for that belief have so explicitly and deliberately taken as their starting point the Christian hope of eternal life, in its proper context of the Christian life of faith in and communion with Jesus Christ as the crucified and risen Lord in whom God's love has been made manifest to men. This gives to the book before us its special character and its special value. It is primarily a study, not of the objections which may be raised against a belief in a future life for human souls, and of the possible answers which may be made to these, nor even of the "intimations of immortality" which may be received in rare moments of exaltation, wherein men may seem to themselves to be transported beyond the world of everyday experience; but rather of what has been and is to a multitude of Christians, very various in temperament, in ability, in culture, even in the fashion of their piety, an integral part of that outlook upon the world by which their daily life is determined and controlled.

Dr. Baillie begins his discussion with an account of the "modern revolt against other-worldliness" which has so greatly changed the mental atmosphere from that in which the bringing to light of the hope of immortality was regarded as the chief benefit conferred by the Gospel, and that hope itself was rarely disowned altogether by anyone, however heterodox, who pretended to any sort of religious faith. He inquires into the historical origins of this revolt, and insists upon the importance of acknowledging "the proper claims of earth" if we are to commend to our contemporaries the doctrine of a life after death. Then, after referring us to the experience of the first disciples of Christ, who believed that their Lord, who had died, was alive for evermore, and found in His resurrection the earnest of their own, he sets this faith of theirs against the background of the universal anticipation of a "ghostly survival" in the underworld and, like others (notably Dr. Charles) before him, points out that the Christian hope is no lingering relic of this anticipation, but continues a development which in Greece, in India, in Persia, in Judaea, was "born of a new kind of religious experience," the culmination of which is to be seen in that which the Christian Church claims to have of an "eternal life" in God imparted by the power of the risen Christ. The Christian notion of this eternal life is compared and contrasted with the alternative conceptions of a "corporate immortality" and of "reabsorption," and its nature further elucidated. Dr. Baillie's discussion is unspoiled by indulgence in fanciful speculation. "The only knowledge," he says (p. 251), "we can have of eternal life is that which comes to us through our present foretasting of its joys."

I find little to criticize in this admirable book, which is distinguished by the candour shown alike in the appreciation of difficulties and in the frank exhibition of the ground and inspiration of the position which the author is

concerned to maintain. I am disposed, however, to think that Dr. Baillie, in dealing with the religious experience lying behind Plato's hope of immortality, lays too much stress on a supposed "Orphic experience of oneness with God," too little on his recognition that in his philosophy itself, as the apprehension of the Forms behind the shows of sense, he was actually in communion with the Eternal. It was surely this which in his case corresponds to the Jewish prophets' sense of communion with the God of Israel as involving the participation in His undying life, rather than an eschatology which supplied him indeed with some of the imagery of the "myths" whereby he filled the place of a detailed knowledge which he knew to be lacking, but not with the substance of that view of the world as ordered by the principle of Goodness which was for him the presupposition of all our thinking.

A passage which I have already quoted from Dr. Baillie shows that he is fully alive to the truth that the Christian hope of immortality, being rooted in the actual experience of God's presence, is never rightly understood if it is supposed to be concerned only with another life than this. In another place (p. 159) he emphatically declares: "The denial of immortality always seems to me to be more disquieting for what it is a sign of than for what it is in itself. That a man should be doomed to go through this present life without any sense of God's accompanying presence is a much greater tragedy than that he should be faced with the prospect of extinction when at last he dies." But he has not perhaps sufficiently considered the bearings of the fact that not only those who face death in the spirit of the well-known lines, "I warmed both hands before the fire of life; It sinks, and I am ready to depart," but even those whose mood is that of the *Nunc dimittis* may acquiesce for themselves in an end which seems reasonable and welcome, and feel no desire for the prolongation under new conditions of activities which, with their congenial setting of time and circumstance, seem to be drawing to a natural close. It may, however, be allowed that these last, unlike the former sort, may be driven by their faith in Him from whose service they are accepting their dismissal to look forward, not so much in their own interest as in that of the multitudes who, unlike themselves, have *not* seen God's salvation during their earthly life, to some further opportunity of enjoying that vision which has here been denied to so many of their brethren.

On p. 182 Dr. Baillie seems, by the way, to imply that the phrase *νοῦς ποιητικός* is actually used by Aristotle; this, of course, is not the case; his nearest expression is *νοῦς ὁ ποιῶν*.

CLEMENT C. J. WEBB.

Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development. By WERNER JAEGER. Translated by RICHARD ROBINSON. (Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. London: Humphrey Milford. 1934. Pp. 410. Price 18s.)

It is only the plain truth that "in the eleven years since its publication Professor Jaeger's great work *Aristoteles* has profoundly altered the general view of Aristotle among philosophers and classical scholars of German-speaking countries. It has almost destroyed the view that Aristotle was uncompromisingly opposed to Plato, and also the view that his extant writings present a homogeneous system in which nothing is contradicted and nothing superseded" (a note prefixed to the book). The same is, it seems, not true of English-speaking countries, where the prejudices exposed by Professor Jaeger are still strong. No doubt the book has won an immense reputation amongst us, and many who have never read it can expound its conclusions. But, as I can bear witness, the power of Professor Jaeger's

argument is known only to those who have themselves been caught by his glittering eye, and compelled to hear him to the end. Mr. Robinson is to be congratulated on having preserved so well the peculiar impersonal firmness of the original—in addition to giving us an intelligible translation. Even where the argument is most concise, he succeeds in leaving the emphasis in the right place. Mr. Robinson has also translated all quotations from the Greek—a very wise plan, by which some who have only a remote interest in the subject of the book will be able to appreciate its method and manner.

As to the controversies of recent years, their result has, so far as one can judge, been entirely favourable to the thesis of the book. The novelty of Professor Jaeger's idea has been disparaged, and his analysis of the treatises criticized. But what matters is that no other *gesamtbild* of Aristotle's mental evolution has been set up to challenge his. It is, I presume, unthinkable that anyone should wish to return to the idea of an Aristotle in hopeless antagonism to Plato from the first; not only for psychological reasons, but because the evidence of the exoteric works cannot be explained away. Nor, again, will anyone in future wish to view the main treatises of Aristotle otherwise than as the result of a gradual growth; even the uncompromising von Arnim paid his opponent the compliment of borrowing this principle from him. For my own part I can go further and express my complete faith in Jaeger's chronological analysis of the treatises, with the exception of the group of physical works. Given the *Protrepticus*, the *Politics*, and the two *Ethics* as works of one author, what else can be said but that, under his influence, the sciences of politics and ethics changed their nature, and gradually gave up the claim to govern the life of the State and the individual by reference to an ideal norm? Again in metaphysics: if Professor Jaeger means that the study of "physical substance," which was at first a mere preliminary to metaphysics, eventually achieved a position as the core of metaphysics itself, and that consequently books Z—Θ, together with book M 1—8 and the eighth chapter of book Λ, belong to the later version of the lectures on metaphysics: if this is a correct statement of the view, it seems to me an irreproachable explanation of the treatise as it stands.

The chapter entitled "The Organization of Research" is more difficult to judge fairly. Here Jaeger appears a little uncertain of his own position, and it is not surprising that he has caused some anxiety to other students of philosophy who are loth to see Aristotle dwindle into a mere empiricist. The chapter aims at showing that "while the central philosophical disciplines only received during this period certain alterations characteristic of the spirit of the new direction that his work was taking, it was the wide field of nature and history in which he was really productive." The evidence for this falls into two parts. First, it is known from external sources that Aristotle encouraged his students at the Lyceum to collect historical and scientific data, and collaborated with them. Secondly, in the *de Partibus Animalium* (by the way, how is it known that this work is late?), Aristotle urges that the philosopher, in his unceasing search for fresh forms, must approach the highest and the lowest realms of nature impartially. In treating of the celestial substance of the stars we have frequently to resort to conjecture, whereas "respecting perishable plants and animals we have abundant information, living as we do in their midst." "Research," then, is the keyword of the Lyceum; treatises like the *Nicomachean Ethics* and passages like the inserted chapter in *Metaphysics* Λ, are the result of a somewhat insincere attempt to find an opening for it without demolishing the old foundations.

Now as to the external evidence, it may, I presume, be treated very lightly,

and it deserves only an external explanation. Only when he was established as a scholarch had Aristotle any facilities for an "organization of research"; but his ambitions in that direction may have begun much earlier. Conversely, it is unsafe to argue that, because he then prescribed research for his pupils, he was in love with it himself. If he felt that they were better occupied in writing πολίτειαι than in irresponsible speculation about the good for man or the number of unmoved movers, he was probably quite right. Meanwhile he may, like Hegel, have taught them his own philosophical system "with naïve inflexibleness."

If so, the facts which are here used to show that Aristotle had become diffident about his own first principles, can easily be used to show the reverse.

But these are small points. What is more serious is that the passage from the *de Partibus* should be described as "reading like a programme for research and instruction in the Peripatetic school." Certainly it shows a friendly attitude to the visible world and a readiness to learn humbly from experience; but need we think that the reverse attitude was characteristic of Plato or a student of Plato's? In its cautious statement about celestial physics, the passage as a matter of fact merely echoes *de Caelo* 286*a* 4 and 287*b* 28—a work whose whole point of view, according to Jaeger, is that of the later Academy! Plato himself is not far from the spirit of the passage in his remarks about the forms of hair and mud. This, and the rest of the *de Partibus*, is indeed interesting as showing the relation between the two branches of physics, celestial and sublunary; but I do not see that it discusses the relation of metaphysics to either, or the relation between experience and *a priori* reasoning in general. The wish is father to the thought with Professor Jaeger when he sees, in this passage, a bold and novel defence of empirical research.

It is not, then, without reason that the chapter on "The organization of Research" has caused anxiety, and at least once a phrase has crept in which seems to conflict with the case that is being defended. ("The man who made empirical investigation an end in itself was Aristotle," p. 336.) There are other points which we should like to see dealt with, when a new edition is again called for. For instance, in the *Ethics*, where both versions exist, why is the later version so like the earlier? Everywhere but in the sixth book the versions correspond so closely that it is difficult to believe them separated by as much as twenty years.

D. J. Allan.

Kant. By A. D. Lindsay, Master of Balliol College, Oxford. (London: E. Benn, Ltd. "Leaders of Philosophy" Series, 1934. Pp. 328. Price 12s. 6d.)

One would think it an impossible task after this long lapse of time to write an outline book on Kant that was at once a first-rate introduction and yet both brilliantly original and thoroughly sound, but this seemingly impossible task has been achieved by the Master of Balliol. The book will not satisfy a student who looks upon a commentary as a substitute for reading the original and expects to learn philosophy without any hard thinking on his own part, but for any other students it may be heartily recommended. Any philosopher, however far advanced, will be the better for reading it, and no Kantian scholar can afford to neglect it.

Most attention will no doubt be roused by the author's novel treatment of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, though he also deals with Kant's other main

works. There are so many different strands in Kant's complex web of thought that it is sometimes hard to believe that different commentators are writing about the same man, and which are to be most emphasized will naturally depend partly on the individual taste of the commentator and not be a matter for argument. Further, no intelligent person will suppose that a study of the *Critique of Pure Reason* could have been achieved in 125 pages without very grave omissions, or that in deciding what is to be retained and what omitted the author can or ought to be uninfluenced by his own philosophical views. We think nowadays that nineteenth-century commentators generally emphasized far too much those elements in Kant which could be regarded as imperfect anticipations of, or stepping-stones towards, Hegel, and similarly, if in less degree, it might be objected by other commentators that the Master of Balliol lays rather too much emphasis on mental activity in his interpretation of the critique. They would say that the doctrine of the synthesis is a doctrine rather of the unity of experience than of an empirically observable process in time by which we make it a unity, and would be shocked by the bald statement that "the conception of synthesis is dominant with Kant because he holds that knowledge is always a process in time."[1] For surely, they would say, the act of knowing is, in Kant's view, non-temporal and emphatically not a process in time. However, no doubt the Master could have given a fuller justification of his position had the size of the book permitted it. Another point in connection with the synthesis where he joins issue with orthodox views is in his contention that even according to Kant's mature view perception is possible without the categories, and that it is only the thought of what we perceive as physically objective which presupposes them, and his consequent denial of the doctrine that the imagination is the understanding working unconsciously. He is thus able to give a much more attractive presentation of Kant than the one according to which what is given is simply a chaos of unrelated elements, of which we cannot be in the least conscious till it has been unrecognizably transformed by an act of synthesis outside time in which we with incomprehensible accuracy unconsciously apply the categories. What Mr. Lindsay says is certainly what we should wish Kant to have said, and I feel half-converted to his interpretation myself, but I am not too clear as to the relevance of most of the quotations adduced by him in this connection. Nor do I see how his account can be reconciled with Kant's insistence in the crucial opening passage of the second edition transcendental deduction, which therefore cannot possibly be dismissed as pre-critical, that all relation comes from the understanding, and his express identification there of all "spontaneity of the faculty of representation" with the understanding.[2] But it is a line of thought that certainly deserves very careful consideration. It admittedly "cannot be put forward as an account of what Kant did say"[3]; but then, "no mere interpretation of what he says will give a defensible doctrine. Whichever interpretation we adopt, we have to say of it, *This* is the line of argument in Kant which, if consistently worked out, as it was not consistently worked out by Kant, will give the most fruitful results."[4] The account of Kant's proof of the categories also differs radically from others in that it logically implies that freedom is presupposed not only in morality, but in the theoretical distinction between objective and subjective in phenomena, though the author admits that Kant would not draw this conclusion himself. The connection of reason and practice for Kant is strongly (perhaps too much) emphasized, and even "theoretical reason" is said to be practical because it directs the use of the understanding and formulates ideals, i.e. it is responsible for the practi-

[1] P. 64. [2] B. 130. [3] B. 117. [4] *Ibid.*

cal conduct of the operation of attaining scientific knowledge. The fundamental doctrine of Kant seems to be for Mr. Lindsay, that "the aim of life and, therefore, of philosophy, is action and not contemplation."[1]

The chapters in Kant's *Ethics* and the *Critique of Judgment* contain many valuable points in a condensed form, but I must confess that I felt somewhat less enthusiastic about them than about the chapter on *The Critique of Pure Reason*, largely because there is less of Mr. Lindsay in them. There is no doubt a great deal to be said in favour of letting the author commented on tell his own story, but it is surely carrying this principle to excess to occupy at least a third part of the two chapters in question solely with quotations. The chapter on the *Critique of Judgment* concludes with a brilliant summary of Kant's philosophy, though one which does not leave me without some uneasy doubts as to what exactly the warrant in Kant's writings is for everything Mr. Lindsay says. In particular I should hold that Kant made a much sharper distinction between phenomena and noumena than appears from this account, that he did not in any way think of phenomena as noumena partly known, but as a second, quite different set of objects. I know the opposite is very often maintained nowadays, but those who maintain it unfortunately do not quote the passages which are supposed to support their interpretation, and I am unable to find any which to my mind give this support. But again, if this is only an interpretation of Kant in the sense that it is "the line of argument which, if consistently worked out, as it is not consistently worked out by Kant, will give the most fruitful results," Mr. Lindsay may well be right. The brief last chapter on *The Influence of Kant's Philosophy* is excellent.

A. C. Ewing.

Immanuel Kant's *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone.* Translated with an Introduction and Notes by T. M. Greene and H. H. Hudson. (Chicago and London: Open Court Publishing Co. 1934. Pp. lxxxv + 200. Price 15s.)

While the translation is the joint work of Professors Greene and Hudson, the former assumes responsibility for the Introduction, the content of which was written under the supervision of Professor Kemp Smith. After an interesting account of the *Aufklärung* comes a useful sketch of Kant's early career. Of peculiar interest at the moment is a section dealing with his clash with State-censorship. In an article, *Was heisst Aufklärung?* published eight years before the appearance of the first sections of the *Religion*, Kant had indicated his acceptance of the principle of the general control of university and church by the State. In 1788 Wöllner, head of the State department of church and schools, had issued an edict threatening civil punishment and dismissal to all under his jurisdiction who deviated from adherence to Biblical doctrines. Book I of the *Religion* passed the censor, but Book II was turned down on the ground that it controverted the teachings of the Bible. Kant's way out of the difficulty was to get the necessary imprimatur from the Philosophical Faculty at Jena, which held the right to authorize the publication of books dealing with religious subjects. His justification of this evasion was that though a priest is not free to teach what he pleases, a scholar is bound to make known his carefully proved and well-intentioned opinions. The King, who was not satisfied, censured Kant severely and drew from him a pledge to refrain from all public statements on religion as His Majesty's faithful servant.

[1] P. 304.

It is disappointing to find, in what purports to be an Introduction to the translation which follows, no treatment of the subject-matter of the work (Hasenfuss's *Die Grundlagen der Religion bei Kant*, 1927, might well have been referred to), nor any treatment of the obvious difficulties arising from a consideration of the relation of the *Religion* to the three great *Critiques*. The translators tell us that since Kant fully explains his conceptions, there is no need to restate them! This is surely an odd position to take up, especially as the writers attempt, in this very introduction, some sort of characterization of most of Kant's other works. A useful purpose might have been served if the writers had indicated the difficulties with which Kant had surrounded his philosophy of religion by reason of the critical position, and by reason also of the uncertain correlation of his various antitheses; nomenal and phenomenal; intelligible and sensible; theoretical and practical reason; the Ideas of reason and the postulates of practical reason.

Occasionally the writers appear to betray a lack of grasp of Kant's fundamental positions, or at least to express those positions in misleading language. Perhaps the worst example is on p. lxxvi, where it is stated that "the main tenor of Kant's writings indicates a prior philosophical allegiance to the insight based on reason and sensation alone."

In the *Translators' Preface* it is stated that "an inaccurate English translation of some parts of this treatise was made by John Richardson, a Scot, and printed in 1798 under the title, *Religion Within the Sphere of Naked Reason*." A footnote adds that the translation appears "in the second volume of Richardson's collected translations of Kant, entitled *Essays and Treatises*." There is surely a serious confusion here. John Richardson published in 1836 a book entitled *Metaphysical Works by Emanuel Kant*, containing translations of the *Logic*, *Prolegomena*, and *Inquiry into the Proofs of the Existence of God*. But there is no evidence that John Richardson had anything to do with the *Essays and Treatises*. The printer's name was William Richardson, but the works were claimed to have been done into English "by the translator of the *Principles of Critical Philosophy*." This latter work which appeared in 1797 consisted of a selection from the writings of Kant, expounded by J. S. Beck and translated from the German "by an auditor of the latter." It is generally understood that the "auditor" was Mr. A. F. M. Willich, author also of *Elements of the Critical Philosophy*, 1798. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the references to Richardson on pages xliii, lxxi, lxxix, lxxx, lxxxiii, and lxxxiv would appear to be erroneous.

Another inaccuracy appears on p. lxxxiii, where Meiklejohn's translation of the *Kritik. d.r. V.* is shown as a translation of the first edition of that work. His translation follows the second edition (which, by the way, should surely be mentioned on p. lxxxiv).

A slighter inaccuracy is F. A. for F. E. on pp. xxxvii and 192.

The imperfections of the Introduction are in large measure redeemed by the excellence of the translation, which successfully copes with the well-known difficulties of Kant's composition.

In itself, the *Religion* is of considerable historical importance, for apart from its interest as a product of the *Aufklärung* it throws some light upon Kant's own religious thought. His view of the moral life as a life of individual self-determination in which neither God nor man can assist, but in which each individual must carry on his separate struggle by his own unaided strength, left little possibility of anything like a sense of personal relation to God. Kant's own private conception of God appears to have been extremely crude. All his religious views followed from his ethics, and, so far as the demands of his moral theory are concerned, God might be little more than

an eternal principle or *Deus ex machina*, though, it is true, he more than once professed his devout belief in God as a being worthy of adoration. As for religious observances, he tends to regard them as more or less useful concessions to the immaturity of the popular mind. For the fully developed mind the "ought" is the controlling element. "Everything that man imagines he can do, over and above good moral conduct, to make himself well-pleasing to God is mere mock religion and pseudo-service of God." "The right course," so the Essay concludes, "is not to proceed from grace to virtue, but rather to progress from virtue to pardoning grace."

F. E. England.

Idealismus, Jahrbuch für die idealistische Philosophie. Edited by Ernst Harms. Vol. I. (Zürich: Rascher & Co. 1934. Pp. 280. Price 10 mks.)

At a time when Europe seems to be in the throes of a violent reaction against all that idealistic philosophy is usually understood to stand for, and when even in its spiritual home in Germany, as we write, an open attack is being levelled at its central citadel in the Kant Society with its thirty-two branches, the appearance of an ambitious year-book devoted to its exposition might seem to be a somewhat hazardous enterprise and to require some justification. The explanation is partly to be found in the fact, mentioned by the editor in the Introduction, that the design was first formed so long ago as 1926, at a time when there were marked signs of a revival, not only in Germany under the lead of such writers as Husserl and Cassirer, and in Italy under that of Croce and Gentile, but in England and America through the new bent that had been given to realistic philosophy by Alexander and Whitehead and by the recent utterances of distinguished physicists. Across the prospect that had then opened brightly for a journal of the kind, supported as it was by the promise of help from leading writers and a leading Leipzic publisher, came the cloud of the revolution of 1932, making the production of it in Germany itself practically impossible and involving the withdrawal of many of the promises of contributions. Another part of the explanation consists in the fact that, as the editor also explains, it is only the external frame of the Year-book that happens to be German. In the articles and reviews it aims at being in every sense international, and invites contributions from competent writers in their own language from all parts of the world. But the most important part of the explanation, as also its all-important justification, is the wide sense that is here meant to be given to the word "Idealism." Various definitions are offered of this in the first number when used in the narrower sense (e.g. by Laird on page 36, and by Jessop on page 59); but in the Introduction it is defined by the editor in so wide a sense as to exclude nothing but materialism and relativism, and thus to include all forms of philosophy (whether positivist or realist or idealist in the narrow meaning of the word) which acknowledge the decisive importance of *ideas* in the life of man as a means of obtaining knowledge of himself and the world.

An enterprise, entered on under these circumstances and with the object of offering an open channel for all forms of constructive thought, has a right to claim the sympathy and encouragement of all who share the faith of the editor in the living force of ideas and his conviction that the time has come for the encouragement of a far more catholic interest on the part of nationals of different countries in the best that is being thought and written elsewhere on the right interpretation of human experience. If there is any field in which the "intellectual co-operation," which one of the chief committees at Geneva has at heart, is more important than another, it is in the effort to trace out

men's spiritual affinities with one another and with what is greatest in the world.

In the hope that the Editor of PHILOSOPHY may find room for a second notice dealing with some of the more important articles, it seems best to confine the present one to a short indication of the plan which it is proposed to follow in the Year-book, and of which we have an impressive specimen in this first volume. Seeing that, as the editor and several of the chief contributors remind us, philosophy draws its life-breath from the continual effort to face new problems or new forms of old ones, more particularly as these arise in connection with the great questions of the being of the self and of the world, the first (and in the present volume by far the largest) of the four Parts into which the book is divided is occupied with symposia on the Self, Being, Spirit, and the Absolute contributed to by German, Swiss, English, American, and French writers. We should have welcomed contributions from the Italian school of neo-idealists, but for some unexplained reason we are disappointed, and can only hope that they will be stimulated by what they here find to assert themselves in future volumes. The second part is devoted to biographical accounts of leading idealistic thinkers who have died since the beginning of the century, and are here represented by Wilhelm Dilthey, F. H. Bradley, and Felix Ravaisson. The third part, which some will be inclined to regard as the most valuable of all, is designed to contain bibliographies and histories of the influence of great philosophical writers from Plato downwards, and the editor offers an attractive programme of ancient, early Christian and Platonic, mediaeval and modern names which will take several years to work off. What we have here to expect may be seen from the two exhaustive historical reviews of the "Schelling Literature" and of the "Transformation of the Picture of Hegel since the turn of the Century," accompanied with a German bibliography from the same date to the present time. The last part is devoted to notices of new books, and is that which seems to have suffered most from the circumstances under which the Year-book has been produced. It would indeed have suffered more but for the indefatigable labours of the editor himself, who has contributed no less than fourteen of the notices it contains. But it should be remembered that this is a matter in which the publishers of a new journal depend largely on the generosity of writers in the department to which it devotes itself. If readers of PHILOSOPHY who are accustomed to contribute reviews to it or to other British or American journals would send their names to the editor at the publisher's address as a sign of their willingness to receive books for this purpose, or to write notices of any particular book they have themselves been reading, they would be rendering valuable assistance to an enterprise which seems to me to be as unique as it is timely and important.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

The Platonic Legend. By WARNER FITE. (New York and London: Scribner's Sons. 1934. Pp. viii + 331. Price 10s. 6d.)

In the publisher's "blurb" attached to the volume it is rightly described as "this amazing book." It appears to be an attempt to play the fashionable game of "debunking" at the expense of Plato. Anyone who finds anything of value in Plato is dismissed as a "disciple" for whom "Plato is divine." What there must be in Plato to attract so many different people in all ages to him as disciples, Professor Fite does not think it worth while to inquire. For him there can be nothing of value in the work of the neurotic effeminate snob

and second-rate artist which is all he finds in Plato. Its main interest for him seems to be to bring out by contrast the superiority of the "modern" point of view of the ordinary citizen of the United States.

How are these results arrived at? Partly by the assertion of personal impressions. "My own judgment would be that the *Gorgias* is an attempt to be impressive which succeeds only in being ill-tempered and absurd." "The total impression that I get from the dialogues is that Plato's art is . . . for the most part the art of a clever but prosaic mind." "Of no other literature is it more difficult after reading to retain a clear impression." "My own feeling is that Plato's understanding of human nature was superficial and childish." Why Professor Fite's impressions are to be preferred to the impressions of almost everyone else who has studied Plato with any care we are not told. But it is amusing to find Professor Fite so often accusing Plato of arrogance.

For the rest, a great part of the argument depends on a series of dogmatic assertions, question-begging epithets, insinuation of motives, and misrepresentation of arguments and sometimes of facts. A few brief instances, taken from a much larger number, will illustrate Professor Fite's methods. He is determined not to admit that Plato in the *Republic* really contemplated the possibility of anyone born in the industrial class being promoted to the ranks of the guardians, or vice versa. Though it is clearly asserted in the myth of the gold, silver, iron and brass races, he argues that that, being a myth, is obviously not meant to be true. "Behind the words of the dialogue we can hear both Socrates and Glaucon laughing heartily at the thought of fooling the people by a device so transparently audacious." It is admitted that Plato says the same thing later. But "what Plato is thinking of here I will not venture to say." And that, apparently, proves the point. Again, he says, what is roughly true, that Plato speaks of sex-desire as a natural craving of the same order as hunger and thirst. But he goes on to the absurd distortion of this, "Meat, wine, and women—they are the same sort of thing." He is quite ready to use contradictory arguments when they suit his purpose. When he wants to depreciate Plato's originality, he argues that "the striking features of the *Republic* were mostly copied from Sparta." When he is emphasizing Plato's remoteness from real life, he calls the *Republic* "the most Utopian and impracticable of all social schemes." Nor are his statements of fact to be relied on. It is quite false, for instance, to say that Plato "conceived the idea of making a philosopher of the younger Dionysius": in fact, he only went to Syracuse very reluctantly with small hopes of success.

Some of the more general discussions, for instance, on the significance of personality, ought to be of greater interest. But throughout, as it seems to me, the account of Plato's views is a one-sided exaggeration, even when it starts from an element of truth. And Professor Fite's views which he opposes to Plato's are far from clear: so far as I can follow them they seem to me as one-sided and exaggerated as his own interpretation of Plato. Throughout the book, indeed, the whole tone is one of advocacy and special pleading, which deprives it of any claim to be seriously considered. It is a pity, for there is undoubtedly room for a sane and balanced criticism of Plato. Of course, no one, in spite of Professor Fite, really believes that Plato's philosophy is absolutely true on every point. But perhaps those of us who have worked at the interpretation of Plato have been at times a little over-anxious to understand and explain, and not ready enough to criticize. Yet our mistake, if mistake it be, has surely been only an exaggeration of a sound impulse. For criticism that is not based on sympathetic understanding is worthless. Professor Fite, however, as the above quotations indicate, goes much further

than a mere defect in understanding. There is a note of personal animosity, which suggests that the book was written under the influence of some strong emotional complex. But that is a matter for a psycho-analyst rather than a reviewer.

G. C. Field.

Essays on the Logic of Being. By Francis S. Haserot. (New York, U.S.A., and London: The Macmillan Company. 1932. Pp. xiv + 641. Price 20s.)

This book is concerned with metaphysics, interpreted as ontology. Mr. Haserot states that he accepts the 'Aristotelian position (1) that metaphysics is the science of being, and (2) that it is a logically simple and an ultimately prior science.' However, his work is, if Aristotelian, then Aristotelian with a strong flavour of Hegel. But though the manner may owe something to Hegel, the thought is all his own. It is not easy to determine what exactly that thought is. Mr. Haserot's chief aim seems to be to establish the thesis that value is an ontological category. The book is divided into two parts, of which the second is mainly devoted to considerations with regard to value, the first to other categories. Each section is called an 'essay,' but the various essays are connected in the manner of successive chapters.

Mr. Haserot begins by pointing out that 'every philosophy presupposes a theory of communication, and conversely every theory of communication implies a philosophy' (p. 3). Accordingly, he deals with species of communication, language, and words. His discussion of language is limited to the consideration of 'the use of spoken or written words.' A word is defined as 'a sound or mark which has content.' This content is said to consist 'either in an external item referred to or in a function performed in an expression which contributes in giving the expression a certain qualified meaning' (p. 15). He adds: 'Instances of the latter type of functional word are: in English, *and*; in Greek, *αν*. These, however, are recognized as words not because they are names of the characters of things but because they are indicators of the type of reference which other words are used to represent.' It is characteristic of Mr. Haserot's method that he makes no attempt to explain how we are to understand the important words 'reference' and 'meaning.' The former word is not even mentioned in the index, and nowhere is it discussed. Yet it is by the help of *reference* that he attempts to explain *meaning*, whilst *meaning* is said to be 'the distinguishing mark of truth' (p. 82). 'The process of discovering truth,' he says, 'is the process of distinguishing those propositions which mean something from those which do not.' He had just said, 'Any proposition which has meaning, i.e. which refers to something, is true; any which does not is error.' This remark remains obscure, since Mr. Haserot fails to tell us what we are to understand by "refers to something." Certainly it would be unreasonable to expect a clear account of *reference*; the problem is too difficult. But there is ground for complaint in Mr. Haserot's failure even to see that there is a difficulty. The difficulty into which he thus falls may be seen by his essay on *Nothing*. 'A word,' he says, 'is a sign, vocal or otherwise, which stands for or represents something. If so, then every word must refer to something; that which refers to nothing is not a word. But obviously the word nothing refers to nothing. Shall we, hence, cease to call it a word?' But, he continues to argue, 'since nothing quite obviously performs some sort of function as a word, we shall have to find out what that function is in order to resolve the difficulty engendered in allowing it both to be a word and to stand for nothing. Nothing in some sense must be something'

(p. 105). He concludes that 'the negation of reference, i.e. the absence of content in linguistic expression, constitutes the nature of nothingness' (p. 108). But error also is said to be 'absence of meaning, i.e. the non-reference of an apparent expression.' Accordingly, 'error and nothing constitute the same concept.' To the present reviewer these statements seem to provide instances of what Mr. Haserot calls 'nothingness'; he has so used his words that they are what he well calls 'apparent words,' i.e. words which 'differ from genuine words in that they lack reference; they differ from mere empty sounds, e.g. nonsense syllables, in that they seem to have reference' (p. 16). The distinction which he thus draws between what he calls 'apparent words' and 'real words' is certainly important, and much that he says on this topic is useful. For example: 'Whether words are real or apparent does not depend upon the words themselves but on those who employ them. A word has content as content is attributed to it. To the individual who gives a word reference it is a genuine word; to him who does not it is an apparent word' (p. 16). But here again Mr. Haserot leaves us in doubt as to what he means by 'giving a word reference.' He wisely remarks, 'Talking nonsense is a satisfaction of which humans are not to be deprived. But there is an element of danger in it when individuals become serious and lose the sense that they are talking nonsense.' This danger Mr. Haserot does not seem wholly to have escaped.

His theory of communication is bound up with his theory of 'the universal.' Mr. Haserot thinks that the universal has been rejected because it has been misinterpreted. Accordingly, he attempts 'to present an account [of the universal] so direct and clear that its being need involve no element of doubt' (p. 85). His view is that the universal is 'the logical form in which particulars participate.' What, then, is a particular? About this Mr. Haserot is not very clear. Much of what he says suggests that he means by a particular what McTaggart meant by a substance. Thus he says that 'the parts of particulars are particulars' (p. 170). But he also says, 'Every quality of a particular is itself a particular,' so that he does not seem to make the disjunction between particulars and universals that McTaggart made between substances and characteristics. His clearest statement is: 'By a particular we refer to a singular item not predicable of any other item' (p. 90). A particular is also said to be 'a relational complex, i.e. a situation' (p. 166). But are the elements of the relational complex *particulars*, or are they *universals*, or are they something else? Mr. Haserot gives no hint how he would answer this question. He contents himself with such remarks as: 'Every particular, furthermore, is an instance of a universal. And the universal characterizes the particular, i.e. the universal determines the relations which constitute the essence of the particular' (p. 168).

Mr. Haserot's treatment of value, in Part II, is very lengthy and difficult to follow. All that can be done here is to indicate his general point of view. 'Whatever else value is,' he says, 'it is that principle according to which judgments of better and worse are made' (p. 310). He points out that this statement is not offered as a definition of value but 'as a condition to which a definition of value must comply' (p. 317). Value is indefinable. The point of the statement of the condition 'to which a definition of value must comply' (although value is said to be indefinable) seems to be that it is intended to make clear that 'the existence, that is, the being of value, cannot be denied unless this denial is accompanied by the denial of any distinction in things of better and worse.' It is in this way that Mr. Haserot attempts to establish value as an ontological category. He does not, however, leave the matter there. He attempts to show that the 'attainment of wholeness, i.e. the

attainment of rationality, *is* the attainment of value' (p. 616). A rational form is 'a system of logical relations' (p. 490), and mind is a rational form. Accordingly, 'The mind is objective' (p. 492), and 'There is one mind only.' From this point of view it may be admitted that value is an ontological category. But Mr. Haserot's discussion of value is beset with the vagueness, and hindered by the unclearness, of his discussion of the other categories.

L. Susan Stebbing.

The Domain of Selfhood. By R. V. Feldman, M.A. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1934. Pp. 212. Price 10s. 6d.)

We are told on the dust-cover of this book (the author of which is Research Student in the Philosophy of the Jewish Religion at Jews' College, London) that "the manner is now rhapsodic and now reasoned-out." As most readers of *Philosophy* have probably a rather decided preference for reason to rhapsody as the vehicle of philosophical ideas, it seems proper to give some prominence to this information. The term "rhapsodic" may not, indeed, be an altogether adequate term to describe the somewhat grave and stately rhythms of Mr. Feldman's prose, but in its negative import, as excluding close, cautious, clean-cut argumentation, it does unquestionably apply to a substantial portion of his work. The picturesque diction which Mr. Feldman favours is often aesthetically pleasing, but it grows increasingly irksome to the reader whose main interest lies in appraising the intellectual validity of the theses that are advanced. Many of Mr. Feldman's pages are as thick with metaphors as the *Song of Solomon*.

The author's flowers of speech do not, however, conceal, but only render less obvious, the fact that he really does have something important to say. The concept of "self-respect," which is the corner-stone of his philosophy, is a concept which has as yet been most inadequately explored, and Mr. Feldman has done a genuine service in insisting so emphatically upon its significance.

The attitude of self-respect, Mr. Feldman contends, is something central and inalienable in human experience. When we analyse its nature and study its implications, it is found to point the way to certain ontological propositions of the most fundamental kind. We are led to assert (1) the real existence, in some sense, of that "ideal self" whose jussive authority is recognized by the agent in every experience of self-respect; and (2) the real existence of God, a Perfect and Personal Creator, Whom it is reasonable to postulate if we are to give any plausible account of the existence of the kind of being which analysis shows our self to be. ("To eliminate God is to treat human nature as a greater mystery than it deserves," as Mr. Feldman rather strikingly phrases the thought in his *Introduction*.) Interpreting the being of the ideal or "archetypal" selves in terms of timeless Platonic "essences," Mr. Feldman now arrives—a little rapidly—at the framework of an ontology. But it cannot be said ever to become very much more than a framework. The mutual relationships of God, archetypal selves, and empirical selves are stated rather than explicated. On the other hand, there follows a good deal of highly interesting discussion of certain basic sentiments of human nature which, through the medium of the ideas evoked in inherent connection with them, are held to give what the author calls "revelational" knowledge that is in harmony with the ontology outlined. In this part of the work there are some penetrating psychological aperçus (as in the analysis of "pity"), and the reasoning, while seldom stringent, is frequently suggestive. There is much to ponder also in Mr. Feldman's account, in the chapter entitled "The Lamps

of Self-respect," of the relation of self-respect to the cardinal virtues, and in his defence of the view that self-respect is the "prius of Duty." The last part of the book is chiefly occupied with criticism of opposing philosophical standpoints.

For reasons already pointed out, the value of Mr. Feldman's arguments is often difficult to assess. The reader who (unlike the present reviewer) is not in initial sympathy with Mr. Feldman's general position is unlikely to derive conviction from his chosen method of persuasion. The argument for the real existence of the "ideal self" is particularly unsatisfying in view of its virtual neglect of the point of view—which we may admit requires to be supplemented —from which the ideal self undoubtedly appears as a construction on the basis of empirical content. As regards the second of his major propositions, however, it is only fair to say that Mr. Feldman does not claim to have effected a demonstration. The existence of God is powerfully suggested, but not compelled, by the argument from "self-respect." It is an hypothesis, but one which, the author claims, is confirmed "in a cumulative and summative fashion" by other aspects of experience. It is needful to remember here, as often elsewhere throughout the work, Mr. Feldman's acceptance of the rule "drawn from Maimonides" that "anything which satisfies a developed religious consciousness and is opposed to no coercive demand of reason may be accepted as valid."

Perhaps the greatest merit of the book is that it does succeed, by concentrating upon the nature and implications of self-respect, in drawing attention to aspects of the life of the self which are apt to be ignored or slurred over in empirical philosophies. The book's deficiencies in the way of straightforward argument and thorough analysis have been sufficiently indicated. One must not, however, ask from Mr. Feldman more than in this volume he has attempted to supply. There are hints given of works projected for the future, in which partially neglected topics of the same general theme will receive more detailed treatment; and it may be proper to regard the present work rather in the light of a preliminary survey. If the author will consent to put a heavier bridle upon his Pegasus, the sequel should be full of interest.

C. A. Campbell.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Moralist. By C. W. Hendel (Oxford University Press. 1934. Two volumes. 25s. net. Pp. Vol. I, xii + 316; Vol. II, viii + 348).

In his *Studies in the Philosophy of David Hume*, Mr. Hendel has already shown distinction as an interpreter of eighteenth-century philosophy; but he tells us in the preface to these two stately volumes that his work on Hume was only an interlude in a study of Rousseau that began twenty years ago. It is natural, therefore, to take up this book with the highest expectations, and I am confident that few, if any, will lay it down with disappointment. True, there has been much recent work on Rousseau, and there are indications that the present literary output regarding the eighteenth century (much of which attained a high level) is rapidly decelerating; but there is still plenty of room for work of the best kind.

The fascinations of great writing, of moving appeals, of vivid intuitions of genius and of the stimulating sort of contradiction, both logical and moral, have combined to make Rousseau eternally readable; and the extent of his influence upon many fields, although easy to exaggerate, has been, on any

showing, most considerable. The man of whom Kant could say that he had been the first to discover the soul of man, as Newton had been the discoverer of physical Nature, and of whom Hume could say, "I think Rousseau in many things very much resembles Socrates; the philosopher of Geneva seems only to have more genius than he of Athens, who never wrote anything," was certainly great, so great indeed that the current enthusiasm for him in his adopted country, France, and in many other lands is readily explicable without any reference to the disputable question of his influence on world-history.

In these volumes Mr. Hendel, like many of Rousseau's contemporaries, treats Rousseau as a moralist, and withal as a practical moralist intent upon promoting virtue, freedom, and sympathy within the human species. Rousseau appears in these pages as the great modern Platonist, the grand projector of political visions whose spirit overshadowed their letter, the grand deviser of far-reaching schemes of education, a diviner of genius in all matters pertaining to the soul and to the profundities of religion, and, to descend to smaller matters, a critic of the theatre. Among many of Rousseau's statements Mr. Hendel might have chosen this as his motto, "Everyone has his vocation on earth, mine is to say hard but useful truths. I have tried to fulfil that vocation without suffering from the evil the wicked wish me for it and which they will do to me when they can. I have preached humanity, kindness, tolerance, so far as it has depended on me, and it is not my fault if they have not listened to me" (Hendel's translation II, 241).

Mr. Hendel's method has been to study this philosopher, projector, student, writer, and enthusiast during his maturity, and, in the main, for the two decades between 1744 and 1765, relying principally upon letters and other manuscripts, and all in a biographical way. These were the years of the *Discourse on Inequality*, the work for the *Encyclopedia*, *The New Héloise*, *Émile*, and the *Contrat Social*; and Mr. Hendel has successfully avoided the temptation of making confusing excursions into the later or into the earlier phases of Rousseau's career. On the other hand, he depicts on a wide canvas, not Rousseau only, but also a great part of the ideology of Paris and of Europe in the middle years of a remarkable century; and so he deserves our most grateful thanks.

Mr. Hendel's sympathy with Rousseau and his deep admiration for him are everywhere apparent. The hero shines so brightly that the commentator disdains to use a spot-light; and this matter-of-course enthusiasm has certain disadvantages. I submit, for example, that thirty-eight pages are far too many for the *Letter to D'Alembert*, and I should make the same submission even if I were wrong in supposing (as I do) that the letter is pretty poor stuff, although it borrows some interest from a certain resemblance to Plato and from the light it sheds upon Rousseau's relations with Geneva. (To describe the letter as "epochal" as Mr. Hendel does in II, 129, seems to me unintelligible.) Again, it seems to occur far too seldom to Mr. Hendel that certain signal weaknesses in much of Rousseau's argument (for example, in the *Contrat Social*) are scarcely less apparent (to many readers) than its incontestable genius. In his account of that work, in a sense the culmination of his commentary, Mr. Hendel, it is true, occasionally refers to contradictions, but always in an incidental way, without any serious attempt at critical appraisal; and this instance, I think, is typical. It may be a pity (if it is true) that no one can be a hero to his valet; but literary valets are usually more entertaining as well as more useful, when they are prepared to drop the official mask and have the temerity to become confidential. Mr. Hendel, however, is so very correct in his attitude that he

never tells us explicitly what Rousseau's bodily afflictions were, his nearest approach to plain speaking on this matter being the very wary statement that "an Armenian, loose-flowing costume" was "a style of apparel better suited to Rousseau's particular ailments than the breeches of the period" (II, 265).

Mr. Hendel has put so much accurate and varied learning into his book that any complaint at all on that score may well seem ungrateful. A critic, however, has always a licence to carp, and therefore I may be permitted to suggest that there is prejudice in certain of Mr. Hendel's comments, and (what is much more perplexing for the reader) a frequent failure to give any clear indication whether Rousseau or Mr. Hendel is the prejudiced party. Here I shall select the references to Hobbes for comment; and although I do not suggest that these are altogether typical, I have (I believe) reason for doubting their complete singularity.

In the first 200 pages of his first volume, Mr. Hendel mentions Hobbes's name at least seventy times. That would be a liberal allowance, even granting (*a*) that the discussion in this part of his book is mainly concerned with political problems, (*b*) that it deals with a period during which Rousseau was very intimate with Diderot, who then was a profound admirer of Hobbes, (*c*) that Montesquieu (quoted I, 182) referred pointedly to Rousseau's attack upon Hobbes's "système terrible," (*d*) that in the rare passages cited in which Rousseau explicitly mentioned Hobbes, Rousseau (at this period) called Hobbes a "blasphemer" (I, 42), a "sophist" (I, 73), and such-like names, (*e*) that Pufendorff and others whom Rousseau studied very carefully had been greatly influenced by Hobbes, and (*f*) that Rousseau seems to have been profoundly shocked at Hobbes's picture of ungoverned man and the *bellum omnium contra omnes*. Despite these circumstances, it seems pretty clear that the majority of these seventy references indicates rather what Mr. Hendel was thinking about Hobbes than what Rousseau was thinking about him; and although, so far as I know, there is no evidence that Rousseau had studied Hobbes with any high degree of assiduity and fairness, I should hope (and I believe) that Rousseau's ideas about Hobbes were less remote from their historical original than Mr. Hendel's appear to be.

Thus Mr. Hendel informs us (I, 155) that Hobbes, like Bodin and some others, "shyly" incorporated the people's consent into his theory of instituted sovereignty; and he later says that Hobbes was not only "shy" but "sly" about this important matter (II, 162). But when we turn to the shy and sly old fellow himself, this is what we read (*Leviathan*, ch. 17). "The only way to erect such a common power . . . is to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will; which is as much as to say, to appoint one man, or assembly of men, to bear their person; and every one to own, and acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person, shall act, or cause to be acted, in those things which concern the common peace and safety; and therein to submit their wills, every one to his will, and their judgments to his judgment. This is more than consent or concord; it is a real unity of them all, in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man. . . . This done, the multitude so united in one person, is called a *commonwealth*, in Latin *civitas*."

Again, Mr. Hendel habitually contrasts the "sly" Hobbes with the "noble" Pufendorff. So far as I have observed, he invariably treats Pufendorff as a hostile critic of Hobbes, whereas, in fact, Pufendorff was a mediator between Hobbes and Grotius (or the Grotians). Thus (I, 144–145) he praises Pufendorff for expressing what was really a Hobbian theory stated in very Hobbian

language, and remarks, quite falsely, that Pufendorff's meaning was very different from Hobbes's.

More generally, so far as I can see, Mr. Hendel frequently conveys a false impression by failing to recognize adequately that most of the fundamental notions connected with the social contract were of very old standing, and in no way peculiar to modern times. Anyone, during many centuries, who believed with the Roman jurists, the canonists, or the conciliar party in the Church that either secular power, or the organization of the Church, came from the people and was instituted by them, had employed very similar conceptions to those of the "contract." Mr. Hendel, however, tells us (I, 100) that "the genealogy of the general will begins with Jean Bodin." Then he says it didn't (same page) because it had once been Greek and mediaeval. Then he says that Grotius "started it up" again (as if Grotius's attention to it had been in some way singular). Then (next page) referring to the passage from Hobbes I have already quoted, he says that Hobbes showed a deplorable lack of logic in holding that a union of wills must be a union of persons (in which case Rousseau's *volonté générale* was just as bad) and in the end highly commends Pufendorff for calling the State a moral person (as if the Hobbian sovereign had been supposed by its author to have no moral duties). And surely it is odd to find references to the revenue from the Crown Lands discussed (I, 117, cf. I, 160) as if the very idea of such a thing had been a vagrant idea of Bodin or Aristotle, that is to say, without any reference to feudalism, or to the actual Crown Lands that persisted in European monarchies in Rousseau's own time.

I think Mr. Hendel's book may reasonably be commended for the care and perspicacity with which it is written. I wish he had not said, however, that some of the ideas of the Abbé de St. Pierre "jibed very well" with one of Plato's fancies (I, 123), although I suppose the "jibing" was intended to indicate agreement. Again, the word "repugns" is repugnant to me; and although the Americanism "it was up to him" may be pardonable (even when frequently employed), I am inclined to think that Mr. Hendel should have renounced expressions like "won out" and "put us wise" when translating Rousseau's noble prose. And, talking about translation, the phase "I am not at all of your advice" (II, 162), is surely neither English nor intelligible, unless one remembers the French expression it was doubtless intended to render.

JOHN LAIRD.

L'Esthètique de la Grâce; Introduction à l'Étude des equilibres de structure. By RAYMOND BAYER, D.-ès-L. (Paris: Felix Alcan. 1933. Tome I. Pp. viii + 635. Tome II. Pp. 581. 2 Tomes ensembles. Frs. 100.)

Lèonard de Vinci; La Grâce. By RAYMOND BAYER, D.-ès-L. (Paris: Felix Alcan. 1933. Pp. 303. Frs. 30.)

It is legitimate to take either the subject or the object of aesthetic experience as the starting-point for one's inquiries; owing to the pre-war partiality for exclusively psychological investigations, modern writers generally adopt the latter course, and Monsieur Bayer is no exception to this rule. For him the fundamental problem, on which the solution of every other hangs, is to discover those peculiar structural qualities on which the aesthetic object depends for its appeal, and in virtue of which we invest it with the sacred aureole of beauty.

A work of art is in fact a certain organization of colours, musical tones, words, or other materials selected by the artist for the accomplishment of his

secret purposes. Hence, like other sciences, aesthetics uses a number of auxiliary sciences as its tools—the history and technique of the various arts, anatomy, the physics of motion and of the properties of raw materials; they all shed light on the nature of the finished work and on the causes that have produced it. Now a comparison between the different arts, major and minor, leads to the detection, amidst the diversity of their several embodiments, of certain underlying resemblances based on a similarity of *structural equilibrium*; these resemblances have given birth to the categories of beauty, grace, sublimity, etc., which are really no more than names for types or aspects of dynamic equilibrium between the object's component parts.

Let us pause a moment at this theory of equilibrium, an hypothesis as central to this writer's conception of art as to the doctrines of a modern school of political economists. He does not maintain that we ever perceive directly this subtle play of forces; but the audible or visible object is related to its dynamic substratum *as effect to cause*. So far so good; granted the existence of a material world external to ourselves, the objective factor in aesthetic experience can only be fully explored in terms of a specific combination of molecules in space, which, according to modern physics, would signify a particular distribution of energy. But for a purely objective theory, which aims at independence of the artist's creative deed, it is surely an error not to distinguish between the physical ingredients of art and the other mechanical equilibria manufactured by men or studied in the field of nature by physicists and astro-physicists alike.

The discovery of recurring types of structural equilibrium provides a clue to the Kantian riddle of the aesthetic judgment. Now what strikes one most forcibly about the opinions of different individuals, in different historical epochs, about art, is their extraordinary diversity, their evident relativity to the private interests, to the degree of culture, to the religious convictions or the aesthetic sensibility, of each person who registers a reaction; hence impressionistic criticism, revolutions in taste, and discrimination between styles. There is thus in the normal aesthetic judgment a *de facto* relativity to the state of mind of the individual when he is confronted by a work of art, and "chaos is come again."

But, if the object possesses an intrinsic pattern or structure on which its whole claim to beauty lies, then, besides the fluctuating preferences of ordinary life, there must be an invariable, ideal judgment, solely determined by the actual exigencies of a material thing. This truly judicial decision, alone capable of furnishing a code of unalterable norms, is, however, no longer an aesthetic judgment, a judgment of value or of taste, because it is founded on real facts and aims simply at separating the chaff of error from the good grain of truth; the metamorphosis is complete, beauty has been absorbed without residue by logic.

Let none draw the paradoxical conclusion that perfect taste is the absence of all taste whatever; for the ideal aesthetic judgment, which reconstructs the object as it is in itself, unaffected by subjective fancies, is determined immediately by taste and only mediately by the thing perceived. There are three links in this causal chain, instead of two; the pattern or structure of the work of art, the "rhythmic-resonance" it provokes in the person who abandons himself to contemplation, and the inward or outward formulation of a preference basing itself on a psychic disturbance. This subtle analysis, establishing so firmly the reality of ideal laws to which judgments of beauty should approximate, only lacks the clarity and completeness that an investigation of the psychological or subjective aspect of the problem would have given it.

A specific "rhythmic resonance," a spontaneous organization of mental

energy, is the subjective counterpart and effect of a particular structural equilibrium, itself the material embodiment of a rhythmic design in the artist's mind; it is also the unique source of "the pure aesthetic sentiment," a pleasure so distinguished from technical satisfaction or sensuous enjoyment. The moods described by Volkelt and the philosophers of Einfühling are no more than an "extra-aesthetic" accompaniment of this fundamental phenomenon. This exclusive "formalism," shared by another young philosopher, E. Souriau, appears to be a strong current in modern speculation in aesthetics; we have always regarded it as one of those doctrines condemned by their onesidedness, and in this instance many of the author's own examples of grace in art contradict it flatly.

We have reached a point where the concepts that designate different categories are simply names for various ways of organizing the play of energy; we receive our orientation entirely from the object. Now the principal types of structural equilibrium are these; when there is an excess of energy over what is required to maintain stability, we have *the graceful*; when it is exactly equal to its task, we have *the beautiful*; when stability is threatened by a deficiency of energy, we have *the sublime*; and when there is a sudden rupture of equilibrium, we have *the comic*. This is not the occasion to criticize in detail a theory of the categories, or to wonder what has become of the tragic; we will confine ourselves to the main object of the author's researches, to *the graceful*.

The characteristic features of grace, in art or nature, are a certain ease or facility, an easy superiority of the self over mental impediments or of energy over brute matter, rightly observed but wrongly interpreted by Herbert Spencer. His mechanical hypothesis of a minimum expenditure of force is open to two grave objections; it accounts only for physical, not for spiritual, grace, and even then it formulates a necessary rather than a sufficient condition for the appearance of grace in the material world. None can doubt that the greater the quantity of energy employed, and the more of it is wasted in the performance of a given movement, the clumsier that action or movement will appear; but, on the other hand, all our bodily habits, such as walking, are accomplished with a minimum of unnecessary expenditure, and yet they are barren of charm for the beholder. The movements of an athlete, of a bird, or of a quadruped, are more or less graceful according to the degree of effort we estimate has been required to release them, but every effortless movement does not bear the stamp of grace.

Moreover, this aspect of the beautiful reappears on a plane altogether ignored by Spencer, and shines in the motions of the soul as well as in those of the body; when spontaneous impulse gently displaces the inhibitions of convention and morality, we have the natural grace of children, or the rarer variety that sometimes emerges from full maturity. So much for the graceful in nature; it is time to pass on to its embodiment by artists in the materials of fine and applied art. A detailed inquiry into the objective features of this aesthetic category as they appear to the eye in works of art or nature cannot be overlooked, because it constitutes the most original and precious contribution of R. Bayer to the topic under discussion.

The most detailed application of his principle is furnished by his penetrating essay on Leonardo da Vinci. He contends there that the dominating influence on the greatest of all the Florentines was not the painting of his *quattrocento predecessors* in Florence or Milan, not the sun-illumined face of his native Tuscany, but a unique combination of philosophical and technical forces. His dual starting-point is the doctrine of "splendour," as formulated in the mystical Neo-Platonism prevalent at this time, and, above all, in the writings of Marsilius Ficinus, and the technique of two different mediums; bronze

statuary suggesting the power of reflected light, oils—as contrasted with tempora—the possibility of establishing an almost imperceptible transition from one tone or colour to its neighbour. But it was his genius—and genius is a "sudden mutation" without ancestry or heirs—that transformed problems of metaphysics into experiments with light, and that produced the wonder of chiaroscuro from the technical peculiarities of different mediums. It was his genius that lent him the grace of a Botticelli or a Correggio, without depriving him, like them, of tri-dimensional solidity, and that gave birth to one of the rarest and most perfect examples of the alliance between grace and beauty.

Let us now turn to the adventures of the graceful among the different arts. In architecture its salient characteristic is antagonism to the monumental, to vast and ponderous masses of stone; in the minor arts we find that grace of static forms is not inherent but rather derived from the living organisms they faintly resemble; in painting and sculpture, besides the portrayal of movement or of incipient movement, there is the fusion and continuity of tone and colour, the delicate suggestion of this or that emotional timbre; in poetry, the lyrical fragment, the nostalgic elegy, the pastoral idyll; in music unaccented rhythms are favoured for the waltz, the mazurka, or the dance suite; in melody a Mozart weaves subtle liaisons or continuous embroidery, while the lovely tone of the flute, the lute, or the harp can easily migrate from key to key. But the apotheosis of the graceful is in the art of dancing, the only art of which the raw material is the movement of the human body; here at last we visit the home of our category. What is the good of all the muscular exercises of the ballet dancer, the *raison d'être* of her stern bodily discipline? To become able to defy the law of gravity, to approach the freedom of the bird, without, at the same time, allowing the fatigue and strain of her muscular prowess to appear in her face or in her gestures; the most arduous feats are accomplished with the most supreme facility.

This summary, however brief, gives some idea of the wealth of observation, research, and original thought, brought by the author to his task. To our mind the essential weakness of his study lies in a faulty methodological assumption; for it assumes that the key to the major problems of aesthetics resides solely in the object, in the realm of substance, whereas to us subject and object are complementary factors, of which the former is the more fundamental. Hence, we believe, an exhaustive description of the aesthetic categories would necessarily include both aspects, mental and material, and our final definition would be an amalgam of the two. Envisaged from this angle, the category of the graceful is no longer independent or irreducible, for it becomes an irradiation from the wider category of beauty; fallen from the paradise of mind, it confines itself to those sublunary regions where things are thrall to the unrest of motion.

Whatever the defects of an excessive preoccupation with the aesthetic object and of an exaggerated emphasis on form, this study should be regarded as a standard work on the category of the graceful, and as a major contribution to the progress of what is variously known as "Künstwissenschaft," "science de l'art en générale," or simply, "science of art." LISTOWEL.

Vale. By the Very Rev. WILLIAM RALPH INGE, K.C.V.O., D.D., Dean of St. Paul's, 1911–1934. (London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1934. Pp. 127. Price 3s. 6d. net.)

This small volume has more than a personal interest, as on the thread of an outline of his life the distinguished author discusses the subjects which he has studied and written upon, and the causes in which he has been interested

and to which he has lent his influence. It is entirely free of egotism, and the autobiographical element might have been more prominent without risk of any such charge. It confirms the growing recognition of the Dean as possessing one of the acutest and finest minds in the Church of England; it corrects prevalent popular misconceptions of his personality and increases appreciation of his character. His reserved references to his domestic relations will bring him nearer to the hearts of those whom some of his outspoken opinions may have estranged, while it still betrays some of his prejudices on social questions, although the expression is now more temperate. His home and early environment leads him to give an account of the ecclesiastical development in his Church during his lifetime. For Anglo-Catholicism he has no affection, and regarding Modernism he also makes reservations.

The part most interesting to the readers of PHILOSOPHY is that in which he gives an account of the development of his interest in mysticism, leading on to his thorough study and authoritative writings on Plotinus. For what may be called the abnormal accompaniments of mysticism, trances, visions, voices, he has no liking and discounts their value; but he does share with the mystics the certainty of the immediacy of man's relation to God. Whether his much more favourable estimate of Plotinus will find general acceptance is a question on which I do not feel competent to pronounce any confident opinion. Even Baron von Hügel is charged with misunderstanding this thinker, whose cause the Dean has so warmly espoused. These studies have led him in his theology to emphasize the transcendence of God. What he finds lacking in the Platonism, which he advocates as a basis for a distinct type of Christian thought, is what led Augustine beyond it, the absence of the doctrine of Incarnation. For pragmatism he has no use.

His latest interests have been the relation of science and religion and Christian ethics. He finds in the view of the Universe in modern science a support to his own emphasis on divine transcendence. He is an uncompromising protagonist of Christian ethics, for the guiding principles of which he finds an adequate source in the teaching of Jesus. He writes at length and with strong conviction on Eugenics; he is a defender of birth-control by the use of contraceptives; he advocates a smaller population, since there are difficulties about adequate emigration as the remedy of our social ills. He seems to me to oppose without reason quantity and quality of population, nature and nurture as the conditions for securing quality. His attitude to the toiling masses is unsympathetic and even contemptuous; he misrepresents the motives of many socialists. He does not seem to realize how serious is the disease in "the body politic," and an inadequate diagnosis leads him to offer quite insufficient and inefficient remedies. The conditions under which he has lived his life and done his work have imposed limitations on his understanding and sympathy, which appear in his attitude to, and treatment of, the social problems of our day. This to me is "the fly in the ointment" of a life which as a whole must command admiration, and of a work as scholar, thinker, and teacher which demands our gratitude, and I gladly offer my personal tribute of both in commending this admirably conceived and expressed "farewell."

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

La Notion de Renaissance dans l'Histoire de la Philosophie. By ÉMILE BRÉHIER. (Oxford: Clarendon Press. London: Humphrey Milford. 1934. Pp. 32. Price 2s.)

In his Zaharoff Lecture at Oxford last year Prof. Bréhier, of the Sorbonne, sets himself to examine "the indubitable philosophical renaissance"

which marks the first third of our century. Abstaining from all criticism or evaluation of the contemporary contribution, he devotes his hour to disengaging its essential traits and to elucidating their significance. For his material he draws almost wholly, as he admits, on the recent work of his own countrymen, and though, as he says, his findings have a sufficiently general import, one may perhaps question whether much that is most characteristic in present-day philosophy can enter unqualified into those formulae which adequately resume the essential tendencies of recent French thought. A proper presentation of the contemporary contribution necessitates first an interrogation of the work of the last century, with a view to defining in what the novelty of the new work consists, and in what the continuity of the old. And, though this retrospect is only preparative, it is, perhaps, in the penetrating observations of these five pages that the most instructive and suggestive part of the lecture is found.

M. Bréhier maintains that an improper usage of the history of philosophy during last century had the paradoxical consequence of checking what spiritual influences the past might well have exercised upon it. It was to refute or escape from a scepticism drawn from the notorious and persistent disagreement among philosophers on central and traditional issues that the outstanding thinkers of last century lent their powers. This escape was to be effected either by suppressing those contradictions through an appeal to evolution or to progress, as with Hegel and Comte; or else, as with Renouvier, by accepting the contradictions and submitting the doctrines from which they arose to the arbitration of a free, reflective volition. That each epoch has its own culture, of which its philosophy, its science, and its art are just as much aspects as its political regimen or its industry, is a dogma that passed current last century for an indubitable truth if not an axiom. For the genuine philosopher, however, it had the most serious consequence that he is perforce a product and never a producer. For if a philosophy is the resultant of a development at once necessary and superior to the individual, then the individual can do no other than await, and find his 'convictions' in, the verdicts which contemporary history allows him. But this, and the passive attitude it induces, would, as Renouvier maintained, be the abolition of any genuine philosophy at all. It was the sense of security in affirmation, its removal from the reach of scepticism, which this doctrine conferred, that recommended the attitude of 'inertia.' But, M. Bréhier emphasizes, it is in this very inertia, and the conception of the legislative power of the present in which it is set, that we must seek an explanation of the rupture in the continuity of philosophy which became so evident in the latter half of last century.

The philosophical renaissance of our time wholly rejects this interpretation of the philosophical effort, and, more in the spirit of Renouvier, regards philosophical conclusions not as being imposed on us by our place in time and history, but as issuing from an exercise of free reflection which aspires to attain to reality itself. Its dominant characteristic is the effort to define mind in its concrete activity as immediately known, and not in its products: it is, in this sense, an attempt to return to a direct vision of the real. The work of Bergson dominates our whole period. Despite differences of temperament and of intention among other thinkers, M. Bréhier finds in their researches a striking convergence towards a more concrete conception of mind. (Further, the present scene of European civilization has re-enforced the conviction that the spiritual life cannot be regarded as something acquired and definitive: spiritual effort cannot evince that stability which properly belongs to matter. Hence the distinctive character of the later phase of Bergson's idealism—its uncertainty concerning the place and future of spirit

in human societies). A right conception of mind is not to be had from contemplating any of its particular manifestations at this or that particular period: it is to be identified with no single form of science or religion or art or social reform. As a philosophy of the sciences its business is not so to synthesize their results as to draw from them an image of the natural world, but to elicit from the actual course of scientific thinking what is significant in its procedure and in its direction—"ce sont, dans chaque sorte d'activité, les moments de tension, de travail effectif, d'innovation, qui intéressent la philosophie; c'est eux qu'elle essaye de capter pour arriver à une définition concrète de l'esprit." If we apply Bergson's method, which "exclut toute construction et arrête la recherche au point précis où s'interrompt l'expérience," and retain only the orientation and direction of mental process—we shall find, as Lalande and Meyerson have shown in detail, that whether it be the domain of morality or that of science in which mind is active, its process is always orientated in the direction of greater assimilation and increasing elimination of differences. Besides this orientation of reason towards identity, there remains another possible orientation of the real—that of vital activity. Whether or no it can be shown why the one rather than the other should be the norm of our action, it is abundantly clear, M. Bréhier thinks, that we are immersed in a reality which is hostile to reason, which is sometimes victorious over it, and which ultimately eludes its grasp. Perhaps instead of seeking to determine the relation between reason and reality our proper course would be to show that there is no genuine problem here. These thirty years have also witnessed the rise of a philosophical tendency which, quite opposed to the essentials of Bergsonism, is in fact a recrudescence of romanticism. The dominant attitude of this movement is that "we expect all from the object and nothing from ourselves; it is from the action of objects on minds that we are to look for all happiness, all value, all truth."

So, in summing up, M. Bréhier is led to distinguish three tendencies in contemporary thought, and to indicate "a vast oscillation" between them. Over against the Bergsonian development, he descries "deux philosophies qui n'ont matériellement rien de commun; l'une est tournée vers l'histoire, et l'autre plutôt vers des réalités transcendantes, qui s'impose à la manière d'une sensation ou d'un sentiment; mais dans l'une et l'autre, il y a pourtant une même orièntation; l'une et l'autre, elles se détachent des activités où l'esprit se manifeste d'une manière vivante, pour demander une direction à des réalités fixes et toutes faites; l'une et l'autre, bièn qu'elles aient à l'égard de l'objet une attitude toute receptive et passive, sont pourtant amies des constructions métaphysiques et dialectiques."

S. V. KEELING.

The Philosophy of John Dewey. By W. T. FELDMAN. (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press. London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. 1934. Pp. vii + 127. Price $1.75; 8s. net.)

John Dewey is admitted by the author of this critical survey of his philosophy to be "one of the truly seminal minds in contemporary philosophy"; and one of the rewards or penalties of being "the dominant figure in American philosophy" is to become the subject of theses for doctorates in philosophy. This book originated as such a thesis, and like many of the kind show an orderly arrangement, careful elaboration of argument, and a freshness which are not always found in works written under other conditions.

The author attempts, by comparison of many passages in Dewey's writings, to show where the latter stands in regard to certain general principles or

ideas—such as organism, empiricism, temporalism, Darwinism, practicalism, futurism, creative intelligence, continuity, moralism. Many of these terms may appear somewhat barbarous captions, but they belong to the philosophy under review. The criticism which is enforced is that Dewey's statements on any one point are not always congruous, that his views on different points are not always consistent, that he wavers between different meanings of some of his most important terms, but that this instability of thought is frequently due to "his unusual sensitiveness to diverse considerations." The general result of the analysis is to reveal Dewey's theory as a contradictory mass of ideas and motives, and as a failure so far as a coherent synthesis is concerned.

The book is expressly limited in its scope, and the author safeguards himself against a possible line of criticism by definitely stating his method and aim. He confines himself to analysing and formulating Dewey's motivating ideas and their interrelations in so far as they influence his argument; and he considers that this is a task preliminary to the analysis of his arguments and the assessing of his philosophy as a whole. Yet the treatment gives the impression of being by one who stands outside Dewey's type of philosophy and who, though appreciative of his many good points, has quite definitely little sympathy with it. The reader is not led into the heart of that philosophy; there is no consecutive presentation of it; and the discussion can be followed intelligently and appreciatively only by those who have a prior acquaintance with Dewey's views. Dr. Feldman, of course, takes his stand upon a more traditional view of the intellect, logic, and truth than does Dewey; and he criticizes the latter on that basis. But then Dewey may not assign the logical and metaphysical value to the traditional logical canons which Dr. Feldman does; and in the absence of agreement on these points the charge of inconsistency against Dewey may be simply irrelevant.

B. M. Laing.

General Sociology. By H. P. Fairchild. (New York: J. Wiley & Sons. London: Chapman & Hall, Ltd. 1934. Pp. x + 633. Price 23s.)

Sociology is defined by Professor Fairchild as "The study of man and his human environment in their relations with each other." This definition brings out at once the difficulty of the claim which is made for the recognition of Sociology as a distinct and comprehensive science of society. In the first place, this "human environment" is made up of the individuals who are to be related to it, and it differs, therefore, for different individuals and groups of individuals. Further, even assuming the possibility of generalization, a science of society so defined would not be complete; for it is difficult to see how the relations between man in society and the physical environment can be ignored, since one is constantly modifying the other in a never-ending process of change. There is, indeed, a case for Sociology as the study of the dynamics of social development, which would take account of all the influences that have modified the character of social relationships and, unlike the separate social sciences, would give due weight to each. But this is not the kind of synthesis which is contemplated or attempted in this book.

It is unfortunate that there is so little agreement among Sociologists themselves as to the scope of their subject. Some are satisfied to pursue special inquiries, in the hope perhaps of contributing material for more comprehensive studies in the future. They are usually content to confine themselves to those aspects of society which lie outside the scope of the separate social sciences. Others, however, like Professor Fairchild, claim the whole field of all the social sciences as their territory. The discussion of the claims of Sociology to

recognition as a complete science is, for some reason which is not very obvious, postponed to Chapters V and VI of the book, and there is little attempt to define the scope of the subject. In any case, this discussion seems to bear little relation to the rest of the volume, which consists largely of an attempt to bring together the material and the main conclusions of the separate social sciences into some kind of synthesis. This appears to be a different conception of the nature of Sociology from that which is advanced in the chapters mentioned; it does not "apply the scientific method to the materials of Sociology," the phenomena of which, according to Professor Fairchild, "may be objectively observed, accurately recorded, and systematically classified"; and it possesses difficulties of its own, which are amply illustrated in this book. These difficulties must be obvious to every student of the social sciences.

In the first place, the material is so vast that it is impossible to reduce it to a single survey, except by making the treatment so superficial as to destroy much of its value. It is not possible in this review to do justice to the scope of Professor Fairchild's book, which ranges from the origins and development of human society to the American immigration problem, and from the institutions of the State and religion to standards of living and birth control.

A further difficulty arises from the unmanageable character of the material and the fact that so much of it has to be used at second hand. There is as yet no unanimity in the conclusions reached in the different social sciences; and since it is impossible in a general survey of this kind to state all the conflicting theories which emerge, the author is inevitably driven to the more or less arbitrary selection of particular theories, which is in itself unscientific. This is strikingly exemplified in the chapter on "The Control of Production." This chapter advances a complete and isolated theory of Profits which seeks to demonstrate, by what many people would regard as unsound reasoning, that there can be no such thing as Profits. It is hardly fair to the inexperienced student to leave him in ignorance of the very existence of other possible views on this and other controversial matters, even though, as Professor Fairchild somewhat naïvely suggests in the Preface, to introduce him to them may "confuse him unnecessarily" and "create an unwarranted impression of disunity and inconclusiveness." Surely the student who is going to be confused by the knowledge that there are conflicting views on social relationships had best leave the social sciences alone.

On the topics which are more usually found in works on general Sociology, Professor Fairchild writes freshly, and with a full realization of the new contribution which modern studies in social psychology have made to the interpretation of social phenomena. Particularly valuable is his analysis of the functions of the State, the requirements of "normality," the nature of law, and the means of control. And in the suggested distinction between what is described as "social engineering" and mere social reform, Professor Fairchild gets to the heart of the problems of modern society.

ROBERT PEERS.

The Ideals of East and West. By KENNETH SAUNDERS, Litt.D. (Cambridge: at the University Press. 1934. Pp. xxiii + 248. Price 10s. 6d. net.)

In these days, when there is so much discussion in regard to the relation of nations and races to one another, and of their conflicting interests, it is of interest and importance to discover from what motives, for what ends, under what standards, their mutual contacts are taking place. This volume, therefore, has not only a theoretical, but also a practical interest. The title is not, however, strictly correct, as the ideals are all of the East; even Christian

Ethics had its origin, and drew its character from the East; but it might be justified on the ground that it is a Western mind that is dealing with Eastern thought and it is to Western minds that the book is addressed. One great impression the book makes, and it is this, that "one touch of nature makes the whole world kin"; striking resemblances even more than differences arrest the reader's attention and hold out the promise of fuller understanding and closer co-operation, and even a growing approximation. The author is very hospitable in his own thinking and appreciative of other ideals than that which has shaped his life; but he indicates his acceptance of Christian ethics, while recognizing that these other ideals have a valuable contribution to make to the full exposition of the Christian ideal as presented by Jesus. It is a problem of the future, whether the distinctively Christian ethics, with such influence from other ideals, will dominate the morality current in the world as all parts become more and more a whole, or syncretism or eclecticism will prevail.

The writer seems most at home in dealing with the ideals of India, China, and Japan, as his previous studies have been mainly in this field, and there I do not feel competent to offer any critical comments. He deals with the ideals of the Greeks and Hebrews very capably and sympathetically. With his presentation of Christian ethics I am in general agreement; but, in dealing both with the Hebrew and Christian religions he seems to me to commit himself to far too negative statements. "The Bible as a whole is not history in any modern sense" (p. 167). This bald statement would lead many to a conclusion beyond any that literary and historical criticism justifies. So to speak of "the theological tracts known as the Four Gospels" (p. 205) is not to discriminate, as modern scholarship does, the historical values of the Synoptics and the Fourth Gospel, or even among the Synoptics. To assert that "Christianity won the ancient world largely as a mystery religion, and in Pauline and Johannine thought we see abundant proof of the influence of these cults as well as of Hebrew Prophetism, Platonism, and Stoicism" (p. 204), is a far too confident solution of a problem on which many of the best scholars are not yet agreed, if they ever will be. In view of the present situation in Germany, one cannot but wish that the words, "I cannot shirk the conviction that the Jews have deserved much of the persecution that has come their way" (p. 170) had never been written. While it is good for us to see ourselves as others see us, and to recognize how far short Christendom falls from the standards of Christ, the author seems to me to identify himself too unreservedly with the adverse judgment of Asiatics; but that may be a fault that leans to virtue's side.

The exposition of the ideals which is given with its historical background is in each case followed by illustrations from the relevant literature. These are well chosen and well arranged, but my mind is in doubt whether such illustrations should be thus apart from, and not woven into, the exposition. In view of the wide spread of Islam and the recovery of Turkey and other Islamic peoples, it is strange that there is no reference to that religion, except in the Epilogue (pp. 239–246). Neither this nor the Prologue seems to me to add anything of substantial value, although they are interesting as a literary excursion into realism. The Table of Contents is quite inadequate, as an outline of each chapter, indicating the divisions, would be useful. As inadequate are the two indexes; and in a book of this kind the use should be made as easy as possible by such aids. I can commend the volume as a useful textbook, the value of which is enhanced by the illustrations given from the literature.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

Treatise on Right and Wrong. By H. L. Mencken. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1934. Pp. ix + 277. Price 10s. 6d.)

We are all apt to settle into the grooves of routine in accomplishing our daily work, the moral philosopher no less than anyone else. In most work, routine is an advantage, but to the philosopher it spells danger, the danger of taking for granted the validity of the traditional doctrines of the schools. There is always, therefore, room for books which survey the moral code of our society from an unconventional point of view, and which vigorously challenge accepted beliefs. The latest free-lance criticism of morals comes from the distinguished American journalist, H. L. Mencken.

The title of the book is misleading, but the Preface corrects any false impression which it creates. No systematic study of Ethics is attempted. Most of such studies seem to the author to be quite useless. Right and wrong are simple matters. Unfortunately their nature has been obscured by the subordination of Ethics to Theology, and to some extent by the errors of philosophers. The one need is the correction of these errors so that a scientific study of Ethics can be undertaken. Mencken admits to a dislike for metaphysics that must almost equal his dislike for theology.

In the first chapter, three ways of accounting for ethical ideas are distinguished—Revelation, Reason, and Instinct, and we are shown how in men's attitude to work, to slavery, and to the place of women in society, the appeal to revelation has been compelled to give place to the appeal to reason. The author then turns to Metaphysics, and in some twenty pages discusses the views of philosophers on the problem of Free Will, concluding that we have a pragmatic sanction, and only a pragmatic sanction for the belief. This discussion is followed by an historical survey, or series of surveys, of changes in men's moral ideas. The history is written from the point of view of a good hater of religion, and apparently with the object of exposing the iniquity and stupidity of the Hebrew and Christian conceptions of Morality. A final chapter, on the state of Morality to-day, discusses in a somewhat casual and general way the problem of sexual relations in the modern world.

There are, undoubtedly, many passages in this book which direct attention to genuine moral problems, and which should provoke the reader to that "thinking in morals" for which Mencken pleads, but there are certain features of the book which counteract these effects and leave the reader disappointed.

For one thing, the attack is directed against a belief that one imagines few people accept to-day, the belief, namely, that "what God wills" is the final criterion of right. Many would call themselves Christians who would not subscribe to Mencken's belief that "the Christian theory is that the Bible is a complete guide to conduct." Nor are the author's weapons always well chosen. We are not encouraged to use our intelligence in moral matters when we find that Mecken can attach any importance to the fact that "the last word in the Old Testament . . . is 'curse.' "

Again, there are so many inaccuracies in the descriptions of the theories of philosophers—e.g. T. H. Green is included in the list of determinists and Jonathan Edwards among the champions of Free Will—that one must conclude that the author's dislike of philosophers is "hatred at first sight."

But the most serious defect is the absence of any sure and stable basis for criticism. Mencken remains uncertain whether Reason or Instinct is the real ground of moral distinctions. Both to him are "sanctions." There is no recognition of the distinction between problems of origin and of value. The importance of Intelligence is emphasized, yet sound morals are described

as "a simple response to a kind of instinct, shared with the ants and bees"—as though the man who ruthlessly seeks to acquire wealth or power at the expense of his fellows cannot appeal as convincingly to instinct as the man who respects property.

At root Mencken rests his case on the almost universal acceptance by man of five fundamental prohibitions—those directed at Murder, Theft, Trespass, Adultery, and False Witness. When one considers how often a defence of Religion has been based on the remarkably widespread belief in the existence of divine beings, and how little importance this writer attaches to such a defence, one finds it difficult to attach much value to H. L. Mencken's positive views on Ethics.

IDRIS W. PHILLIPS.

Ethics and Moral Tolerance. By ARTHUR KENYON ROGERS. (New York and London: The Macmillan Company. 1934. Pp. 323. Price 10s.)

After, or through, a criticism of Professor Warner Fite, of pragmatic ethics (represented by Professor Dewey) and of "rationalist" or "absolutistic" ethics (represented chiefly by Nicolai Hartmann), the author gives his own standpoint. This one feels inclined to describe as materially, if not formally nor after the classic type, hedonist, but with qualitative as well as quantitative standards, quality, however, being apparently reducible in the last analysis to quantity. Mr. Rogers himself classifies it as an "ethics of sentiment" *à la* Westermarck, differing from the latter chiefly in not relinquishing the claim to validity or objectivity, for the nature of which one must refer to Mr. Rogers's own carefully qualificatory and not easily translatable language (chiefly in Chapter V). From this standpoint a plea is put in for tolerance in morality—that is, for "limiting progressively the field of the distinctive moral judgment of censoriousness" or of blame or disapproval or condemnation. The grounds on which this plea is based are many, but the chief, it would seem, is that though this moral judgment must rest upon a feeling ("private" apparently), we cannot be sure that there is a moral constitution common to all men, and above all, we cannot know for certain that in the case of a particular condemnation the person condemned shares or can share our feeling with regard to the cause of condemnation (see especially Chapter VIII). Condemnation, blame, or disapproval is for Mr. Rogers, as for most people, something more than the mere recognition of the wrong or bad for what it is. If it were merely that he could not reasonably urge the limitation of its field so long as the field of the wrong or the bad is not limited. Quite rightly he says it involves hostility and self-righteousness. One cannot, therefore, help sympathizing with his proposal for a limitation of it. The difficulty, however, is that, as in the phrase quoted above, he makes the judgment or sentiment of disapproval as thus defined the very differentia and essence of morality and of the "ought." He is therefore in effect saying that the less morality the better, and that the moral life is not the best life or that which we ought to preach and practise, but, on the contrary, may be a vice to be condemned. Such language may be allowed as a brachylogy in ordinary life of those who wish to protest against a blind, cramped, or distorted life which, commonly enough, would substitute itself for the moral life, but when it is introduced into philosophy it reduces the latter to barren logomachy. One sympathizes with Mr. Rogers's aim as well as with his analysis of condemnation. But if he thinks them both through he may find himself urged to preach an ethics which, neither hedonistic nor "of sentiment," excludes *completely* all condemnation but also—and this is important—its correlatives, approval,

admiration, respect, self-respect—in short, all valuing, on which he relies so firmly. In other words, he may have to preach the morality of love, with both profounder scrutiny of the facts and more transcendent soaring of the imagination than his present pedestrian and opaque empiricism will allow him.

Reading smoothly and pleasantly, the book is, nevertheless, throughout marked by a difficulty of which it is hard to say whether it issues from complexity and subtlety of thought matching the complexity and subtlety which, he rightly points out, characterize the ethical experience itself, or merely from the obscurity and confusion inherent in the position taken up.

P. LEON.

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CONTENTS

PAGE

I. THE PRESENT NEED OF A PHILOSOPHY (LETTERS TO THE EDITOR) 131

II. PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS (SUMMARY) 140

III. GREAT THINKERS: (IV) PLOTINUS: The Very Rev. W. R. INGE, K.C.V.O., F.B.A. 144

IV. REASON AND THE PROBLEM OF SUFFERING: Professor C. A. CAMPBELL 154

V. MR. DUNNE'S THEORY OF TIME IN "AN EXPERIMENT WITH TIME": Professor C. D. BROAD 168

VI. SUBSTANCE: J. D. MABBOTT, M.A. 186

VII. AN ADDITION TO THE CORRESPONDENCE OF SPINOZA: Professor A. WOLF 200

VIII. THE OBJECTIVE VALIDITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF CONTRADICTION: EDWARD CONZE, Ph.D. 205

IX. PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY:

PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY 219

PHILOSOPHY IN RUSSIA 222

X. NEW BOOKS 225

XI. CORRESPONDENCE 252

XII. INSTITUTE NOTES 255

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